This chapter explores the strong cross-border trade connections between northern Benin and Nigeria. Today, cross-border trade in this zone emanates from price differentials between the countries and Nigeria’s significant oil wealth which, coupled with its interventionist economic policies, results in widespread market distortions and inefficiencies.[192] It explores the presence of vulnerabilities that could be exploited by violent extremists.

The transit trade into Nigeria is one of the largest economic driving forces for Benin. It results in government revenue and formal and informal beneficiaries.[193] It has been suggested that up to 75% of the Beninese GDP comes from informal cross-border trade.[194] Cross-border activities between Nigeria and Benin are more prevalent in the southern parts of the border area.[195]

This chapter makes two observations on the link between cross-border trade and violent extremism First, it highlights the key trade routes and hubs along Benin’s northern border with Nigeria and notes the overlap between the locations of unidentified armed group and violent extremists and these trade hubs. Second, it points out how cross-border trade is key to people's livelihoods and how livelihood vulnerabilities have emerged that risk being exploited by violent extremists. One example is a ban on cereal and soja exports, which has increased community vulnerabilities. Another problem is the plummeting fuel trade after the new Nigerian president cut subsidies in April 2023.

4.1 Goods, trade routes and hubs

A large variety of goods are moved across the border, both prohibited and non-prohibited. Non-prohibited commercial goods are agricultural products, fuel and vehicles.

The border between Alibori Department and Kebbi State mainly sees goods moving out towards Nigeria. These are mostly food items, automobiles, second-hand goods, cosmetics, beverages, drugs, textiles and fuel products.[196] The border area between Niger State and Borgou Department mainly involves the export of timber, oil, medicines, sugar and soy beans.[197] Goods imported into Benin include fuel products, medicines, oil, building materials, onions and garlic. Prohibited items include textiles, rice, second-hand goods, spirits and, more recently, cereals.[198] Other prohibited goods involve narcotics, small firearms and light ammunition. Human trafficking is also widespread.[199]

There are two main methods for moving goods: large convoys and small-scale, informal cross-border trade. Truck convoys are authorised through agreements between Beninese importers and senior Nigerian customs authorities. A predetermined flat fee is paid for each truck. Small-scale taxi and motorcycle transportation takes place on roads that are familiar to smugglers linking both sides of the border, as well as on waterways and through official routes. Other forms of transportation include boats using the intricate canal system in the Borgou area.[200]

The movement of goods – whether licit or illicit – is controlled by well-organised networks. Those who move goods can be heavily equipped (sometimes armed). Moreover, the networks operate based on trust and having important connections, often rooted in religious or ethnic ties. Kinship networks serve as important facilitators of illicit trade between Benin and Nigeria – particularly involving the Yoruba (whose general geographical area is not part of this study) and the Hausa.[201]

Routes and hubs in Borgou/South East Alibori and Niger State

Figure 9 shows the key areas for the licit and illicit movement of goods are around the forest areas between Kainji Lake and the Forêt de Trois Rivières. The main route runs from the Beninese town of Basso to Babanna, Nigeria. An alternative route is from Basso to Negansi from where traders and goods cross into Kapu, Nigeria. As a Bariba trader from Baninzi noted: ‘The market is very important, it’s the lifeblood of the local economy, we go to the market either in Babanna or Kapu.’[202]

Further up in Segbana are two additional routes. One route leaves from Segbana to the Nigerian border town of Gbesai from where people can reach the large markets in Zagiri, Kigbera and Lou. A second route linking Guene Laaga, Benin and the Nigerian town of Sainji is a final connection, providing access to the important markets of Sainji and Tsamiya in Nigeria.

Routes and hubs in North East Alibori and Kebbi State

Figure 10 shows the routes further up north, between the city of Malanville (Benin), Gaya (Niger Republic) and Kamba (Nigeria). In Malanville the local communities rely on the market in Gaya, although as of January 2024 the border is officially closed due to ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) sanctions on Niger. In Madecali, the markets of Lollo and Tungan-Gado in Nigeria are the most important. Monkassa, Tounga Zaouri and Kamba in Nigeria are also frequently visited.

A key hub is the Niger River. In Gaya and Malanville a number of new piers and jetties are under construction in villages on both sides of the Niger River.[203] Along the river towards Nigeria, border communities are involved in various smuggling routes (e.g. in numerous small border towns around Dole-Kaina, situated on the border between Niger’s Dosso Region and Nigeria’s Kebbi State). Smuggled goods are kept in warehouses and, in some instances, private houses.[204]

Overlap between trade hubs and violent extremist presence

The observed locations of unidentified armed groups, bandits and violent extremists is concerning. Darul Salam’s alleged influence as well as the observed movement of armed groups in 2023 took place on the Basso-Babanna axis as well as on the Basso-Kapu axis. Moreover, the alleged Darul Salam presence in Kebbi State is in Tsamiya (with a commercial connection to Segbana) and Lollo and Dole-Kaina (the heart of riverine smuggling in Benin). In this context, sources allege that different extremist groups are using the informal cross-border trade routes connecting Kebbi and Benin.[205]

In Niger state, Borgu LGA sources state that they have witnessed the arrival of new commercial agents operating many new and otherwise unknown bureau de change and operators starting businesses in the border communities.[206] Other sources allege that some of the traders operating along the border are sponsored by extremist groups that have an interest in profiting from cross-border business activities.[207]

4.2 People’s livelihoods and cross-border trade

Trade and the resulting cross-border movement of goods is key to the livelihoods of most people in northern Benin. But it is around these livelihoods that the risks of extremist violence emerged in 2023.

The crossing from Basso-Babanna provides an insight into the deep connections between people's livelihoods and cross-border trade. From Basso, goods from Cotonou enter Nigeria. Many businessmen/women from different parts of Nigeria come to Basso to buy these materials. For instance, every week, 1,000 bags of rice are exported from Benin via Basso to Babanna for redistribution to New Bussa and other neighbouring towns. Basso is also a supplier of timber, not only to Babanna and Bussa but also to other states in Nigeria such as Kebbi, Sokoto and Katsina. Moreover, most of the bottled water in Babanna is supplied from Basso.[208] The town’s weekly markets play a crucial role in the economic relationship between the two communities and the livelihoods of local people. The Nigerian Babanna market serves as an economic centre for many Beninese towns, including Kalale, Neganzi, Baninzi, Bessassi and Zambara. As a trader in Kalale said, ‘If you are a trader in Kalale, if you want to survive, you have to know about the Babanna market.’[209] The Monday markets are when traders from different parts of Nigeria and Benin exchange millet, maize, beans, cotton, livestock and poultry.[210]

For the border communities this informal trade is their primary means of income. Many are involved in cross-border trade as traders of fuel, soy beans, corn, meat and timber or as transporters thereof. For example, a meat vendor in Segbana said, ‘There’s not a week that goes by when young people don’t empty the village to go to the market in Babanna. Even when the border was closed, people found a way to cross.’[211] Another stated that, ‘If you don't have any money at home, you can buy certain products on credit […]. For example, at the beginning of 2021, I had a big family problem […] I negotiated with my partner in Nigeria, he gave me some products on credit for my shop. That really solved my problem.’[212] This forges a symbiotic relationship between communities: ‘Benin exports cashew nuts, soybeans and maize to Nigeria. Nigeria exports petrol, medicines and sugar to Benin.’[213]

However, interviewees noted the mounting difficulties in continuing this cross-border trade. Communities report increasing challenges in collaboration with border authorities, mainly due to new trade restrictions. The transhumance ban, in place for many years, is still a challenge for pastoralists. But a clear complaint is the export ban on cereals by the Beninoise government in 2022 which was meant to ensure that food produced in Benin remains there for local consumption in the face of high world prices as a result of the war in Ukraine.

Interviewees in the Borgou Department point out how soybeans (a cereal) have been an important export commodity for the community, allowing them to have market access and a livelihood. But with the ban, trade is restricted; as a resident from Basso noted ‘border markets are important, but since the ban on soybean exports, their importance is no longer felt’.[214] This ban affects not only the commercial market but also livelihoods. For instance, a cereal vendor from Madecali said: ‘It is the ban on exports of food products and soybeans that has caused me so much suffering.’[215] The closure of the borders and the ban on exports of cereal products has created a lot of problems for us,’ said a trader In Neganzi.[216] A soybeans trader from Garou noted that, ‘Since last year, the government has made us suffer a lot. I used to trade in soybeans.’[217]

In the context of a mounting violent extremist presence in the area and the role that VEOs could play in (some) cross-border trade, these are clearly vulnerabilities that should be urgently managed.

4.3 Livelihoods at risk after the ending of Nigerian fuel subsidies

Along the Nigerian-Benin border one key trade that affects people’s livelihoods is fuel. This is not only directly the case as many people are involved in moving fuel across the border but also indirectly as fuel prices have a direct impact on the costs of commodities moved by motorised transport.

After the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), fuel became the item that was most intensively smuggled across the Nigerian-Benin border from Nigeria, replacing agricultural produce.[218] Until recently, Benin relied on a network of smuggled fuel from Nigeria. The illicit fuel trade covers 80% of the national demand and employs an estimated 40,000 people (the same as the whole public sector in Benin).[219] Particularly young people struggling to secure formal employment work as transporters or retailers.[220] The main triggers for the fuel trade in the border zone have been the large subsidies in Nigeria and price deregulation in Benin, which created large price differentials and incentives for trade.[221]

The illicit fuel trade is deeply embedded in the local economy with officials either ignoring it or being involved themselves.[222] This cross-border fuel smuggling is based on ‘tarqaqe’ – a strategy that bypasses informal negotiations by using illegal routes and relying heavily on the assistance of informants or border communities to succeed.[223] In the former Borgu Empire, the key crossing is at Basso-Babanna, with Babanna having about four fuel stations that provide fuel, gas and kerosene to the immediate communities. From Basso in Benin’s Borgou Department, trucks export fuel to neighbouring towns as well as by roadside black marketeers (an estimated 100 drums of fuel on a weekly basis). This excludes unofficial transportation by motorcycles, which is a massive business in Babanna where jerricans are filled with fuel pre-emptively waiting to be exported to Basso.[224] In the northernmost hub there are dozens of fuel stations in North West Nigeria (e.g. Kamba). The towns that are involved in the smuggling of fuel (e.g. Lollo and Dole-Kaina) have a support infrastructure comprising banks, filling stations and large markets.[225]

A blow to livelihoods and risks to peoples livelihoods

In the border region between Benin and Nigeria’s Niger and Kebbi states, the fuel business is a common factor. Around 22 of the 50 interviewees had a link to this trade, either as full-time transporters, or having been transporters in the past or engaging therein as a sideline. Mainly young people dominate cross-border transport activities. By the end of May 2023, the new Nigerian president, Tinubu, put an end to the fuel subsidies (there are sound economic justifications for ending the subsidies).[226]

Cutting subsidies had a major effect on the black market fuel vendors, commercial drivers and the whole support structure. Fuel doubled in price, with various effects on people’s livelihoods. A resident of Garou explained, ‘Here in Garou, almost all the young people made a living from selling fuel. So now you understand why we’re suffering so much since this decision was taken. The nightclubs are closed, even the two bars behind customs, which used to be very lively, no one goes there anymore because there’s no money.’[227] A trader said ‘The main change in my life over the last year has been the money. Before, I used to make a lot of money with the fuel I brought in, but now it's become very complicated.’ A resident from Kalale explained that ‘Kalale is very much affected by this situation. Many young people in Kalale are traffickers.’[228] But the effect extends beyond all of those who are directly involved in the trade because all prices rise due to the increased cost of transport. A businessman from Baninzi said ‘This decision is a disaster for us, the retailers, because we can no longer get by. There were a few traders who managed to take a little from their profits or their reserves to trade. But after a few months, even they had to give up.’[229]

The problem is that violent extremists operate in the immediate surroundings, which poses two risks. First, there is a large reservoir of experienced young men who have lost their livelihoods, have no real alternatives, are angry, and are able to move between countries. This is a potential recruitment pool. Second, the cutting of fuel subsidies is a decision (even though taken by a president from another country) that has reinforced anger towards the state. For example, someone from Garou said ‘since last year, the government has made us suffer. I used to trade in soybeans. They created problems with soybeans, and now they've got together with Nigeria to create problems with fuel too.’[230] A resident from Guene Laaga said ‘I think this whole thing is a joke. The politicians want to make us suffer.’[231] Similarly, a resident from Basso noted ‘I don’t think the politicians give a damn about our population, they just want to serve their own interests. That’s why they decided to take this decision.’[232] While another person from far north in Madecali stated ‘the government has abandoned us here (..).’[233] This narrative is extremely concerning, particularly in an area where there is violent extremist presence.

4.4 Summary

This chapter finds that a well-developed cross-border trade system operates between the Nigerian and Beninese border. This system generates livelihoods for many people in the area. Livelihoods are at risk: