The North West of Nigeria is the heartland of criminal gangs, known as ‘bandits’. But North West Nigeria also has a violent extremism problem.[5]

Some years ago, the state governors in Nigeria expressed concern over VEO intrusions into the North West. In June 2019, the commander of the Joint Task Force Operation Hadarin Daji, Jide Ogunlade, stated: ‘Jihadists and terrorists have now infiltrated the ranks of bandits that are operating in the bushes of Zamfara’, adding that ‘banditry is now heading towards terrorism’.[6] According to the International Crisis Group, two Boko Haram splinter factions have encroached into the North Western region where they tap into community grievances and form alliances with herder-affiliated militias and criminal groups.[7] A recent article has argued that violent extremists from each of the three principal factions in Nigeria – JAS (Boko Haram), ISWAP (Islamic State’s West Africa Province) and Ansaru (Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina FiBiladis Sudan) – have established a certain foothold in North West Nigeria.[8]

1.1 The basis: banditry in North West Nigeria

The starting point for any meaningful analysis of conflict dynamics in North West Nigeria is banditry (see Figure 3). The total number of bandits is estimated to be in the low tens of thousands.[9] Their activities range from kidnapping for ransom, cattle rustling, rape and armed motorcycle raids on villages to, increasingly, forced labour, extortion/taxation and mining.[10] Banditry has resulted in several thousand deaths, the displacement of millions of people, and large-scale economic destruction. The states of Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara have been particularly affected.[11]

Banditry dates as far back as pre-colonial times when highway robbery and cattle rustling were common.[12] Over the last few decades, banditry has greatly increased due to factors such as political and economic neglect, resource competition, ethnic and religious tensions, corrupt distribution policies, and population growth.[13] But the banditry problem took on a new dimension in 2011. A key factor was the radicalisation of long-standing competition over ancestral land and water resources. This rivalry – between the predominantly nomadic Fulbe herders and the mainly sedentary Hausa farmers – was further fuelled by environmental degradation, allocation policies favouring farmers, and an influx of arms in the region. All of these factors undermined traditional mediation systems and led to a sharp intensification of the conflict.[14]

The first bandit group, known as Kungiyar Gayu (group of youths), emerged in 2011 in Zamfara state and was led by the Fulbe’s Kundu and Buharin Daji, with the aim of addressing long-standing injustices that the pastoral communities felt subjected to.[15] This opened the gateway for a mutually reinforcing dynamic. Armed vigilante groups, known as yan sa kai, first emerged within the Hausa communities and they mainly targeted the ethnic Fulbe.[16] To protect their cattle from theft and to avenge vigilante violence, Fulbe militias, referred to as yan-bindiga, also began to form.[17] Between 2011 and 2014, the Fulbe militia groups and bandits rapidly grew in their numbers and size, some motivated by self-protection or ethnic affiliation, and others by economic opportunism.[18]

It is very difficult to make a distinction between these Fulbe militias and criminal gangs, which has given rise to ‘banditry’ being used as a general term.[19] Today, bandits in the highly affected states of the North West (Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto and Zamfara) are estimated to number around 30,000 operating in about 100 gangs (most of them being based in Zamfara).[20] Bandit gangs draw on the grievances of Fulbe herders and they use anti-government discourse to rally support.[21] However, bandits mainly engage in economic activities such as cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom and looting. In recent years, the gold mining sector has also been targeted by bandit gangs. Particularly Zamfara State and its increase in artisanal gold production has attracted gangs who have begun to tax mining.[22]

The result is that some leaders are referred to as ‘bandit warlords,’ as some of them govern and rule over vast territory – in what could be seen as proto-states (others remain mainly extractive).[23] Among the most notorious, for instance, are the bandit warlords Dogo Gide and Kachalla Turji.[24] Dogo Gide controls agriculture and rules through neo-feudal sharecropping agreements. Another, Turji, builds mosques in local villages while dispensing harsh justice against petty criminals.[25]

Because bandits dominate the (crowded) violence landscape, it has been difficult for violent extremists to enter this market of violence; instead violent extremists have had to define their position vis-à-vis the bandits.[26] Despite the obvious links that are present, the relationship between these two groups remains as an unattended marriage. By and large, violent extremists abide by some form of political ideology which contradicts the often more economically driven bandits.[27] Another factor is that some bandits have amassed significant power and are not inclined to cede control to extremists. A final problem is that bandit groups are fragmented, which results in complex alliance puzzles for extremists – aligning with one set of bandits often pits them against other bandit gangs.[28]

1.2 Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP)

The first extremist group is the Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP). ISWAP was formed as a result of a split within Boko Haram – a group operating in North East Nigeria – in early 2016.

ISWAP has sought to expand from North East Nigeria. In the North Central region, it has done so with some success. Some reports of ISWAP activity come from the Central region where, in Kogi State, ISWAP allegedly absorbed an ‘indigenous’ jihadist movement, albeit the resulting network appears to operate rather autonomously.[29] Yet, in the North West this has proved to be difficult. ISWAP has sought to recruit bandits to support its agenda, but the group’s rather strict code prohibiting the killing of Muslims, cattle rustling and all other banditry-related activities was not readily accepted.[30]

An ISWAP presence in the North West was attempted by the future ISWAP leader Abu Musab al-Barnawi (the son of ‘Boko Haram’ founder Muhammed Yusuf) in 2016. Al-Barnawi relocated commanders to the North West seeking to recruit bandits and to establish ISWAP cells. But senior ISWAP defectors have argued that once they had reached the North West, al-Barnawi lost command as some commanders joined bandit gangs.[31]

ISWAP tried again in 2019. This time it forged links with North Western communities along the border with Niger Republic: Magaba, Dankwo and Derin-Deji, Kebbi State.[32] ISWAP offered cost-of-living support through monthly stipends being paid to some members and it reportedly leveraged discontent among certain communities by sponsoring clerics (both from the community and outsiders) critical of corruption and democracy.[33]

In July 2022, ISWAP was successful, for the first time, in launching an attack on Kuje Prison (close to Abuja) in collaboration with other extremist groups.[34] Another attack followed on Kainji Lake prison (some sources claim ISWAP presence in the adjacent Park, see below). ISWAP participation in this operation mainly came from the presence in Kogi State and ISWAP main presence in North East.[35] The leader for some of these operations was Abu Ekrima who headed a recruitment and prisons break cell. Throughout 2023, Abu Ekrima visited four times Benin (specifically in Kalale).[36]

1.3 Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP)

Another Islamic State-related group – the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP, formerly known as Islamic State in the Greater Sahara or ISGS) – has also operated briefly in North West Nigeria.

In October 2018, violent extremists suspected of being affiliates of ISGS entered the communities of Tangaza and Gudu in Sokoto State in North West Nigeria from the Republic of Niger. These communities referred to them in Hausa as ‘Lakurawa’.[37] The group was initially welcomed at local level because the Lakurawa provided protection against bandits. However, the relationship deteriorated due to ISGS’ strict mode of governance. In 2019 an unconfirmed attack in Sokoto State bordering the Republic of Niger was claimed by the Islamic State official media.[38]

In Benin, ISGS operations date back to 2019 when some ISGS presence was reported in Malanville commune and Karimama communes, with reports of their locations in Park W, Woro Chateaux, Malanville town and Karimama. Shortly afterwards, in 2020, ISGS presence was reported across the border in Katanga, Niger.[39] However, it was only in September 2022 that ISGS re-appeared. ISSP claimed responsibility for two attacks near Guéné, Alibori department. The first on 2 July in Torouzogou and the second on 4 July near Alfakoara.

Since September 2022, there have been no claims by ISSP in Benin. At the same time, ISSP presence in the form of localised networks and collaboration with other violent groups continues. A key example comes from Rountu Tanda, a hamlet along the Niger-Benin border.[40] Before 2022, one individual lived with his family and close associates in Rountu Tanda, before moving to an undisclosed village in Benin where he pledged allegiance to JNIM. Yet later, the individual with two associates travelled to Abala (Mali) where they pledged allegiance to ISGS. The individual was killed in October 2022 by JNIM but associates kept their allegiance to ISGS (they moved temporarily to Benin but returned). Since August 2023 tensions between this ISGS group and JNIM have mounted; JNIM issued threats in August 2023 but in December 2023 and January 2024 infighting took place in the village and surroundings, including targeted killings by JNIM on 19 December, 19 January and 23 January (the latter failing, as the person fled towards the Nigerian border).[41]

1.4 Darul Salam (/JAS)

A third extremist group is Darul Salam, a peculiar offshoot of Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’adati wal-Jihad (JAS), better known as Boko Haram. Boko Haram has been most successful in establishing a foothold in the North West and forming alliances with bandits. Three reasons might explain this.

First, its commanders have enjoyed a considerable degree of operational autonomy enabling them to merge with bandit groups that are loosely structured. Second, Boko Haram seems to have refrained from condemning bandits who have targeted Muslims, as the group has aligned itself with the ultra-takfiri ideology which rationalises its tactics by declaring ‘non-convert’ Muslims to be ‘apostates’. This includes almost anyone who does not opt to live under the Boko Haram caliphate.[42] Third, Boko Haram may readily claim bandit activities as its own: a gang qualifies as a ‘cell’ as long as it attributes attacks to religious motives, regardless of whether this claim bears any truth.[43]

‘Darul Salam’ is currently the most significant violent extremist group operating in Nigeria’s North West. After the killing of Boko Haram’s leader Shekau by ISWAP in North East Nigeria, an estimated 2,000 Boko Haram fighters relocated to North Western Nigeria in Zamfara, Niger and Kaduna States. As Barnett and Rufa’I show, one ‘Sadiku’, collaborated with the remnants of the defunct Darul Salam to facilitate the relocation of Boko Haram fighters to the North West.[44] Sadiku is known to have pledge allegiance to Boko Haram leaders (Shekau and Bakura). Generally, people and security forces across Nigeria tend to reference ‘Darul Salam’ when being interviewed. Darul Salam is linked to attacks on the Abuja-Kaduna railroad, the Kuje Prison escape and the attempted Wawa Prison escape.

However, Darul Salam is a complex outfit.[45] A key point is that it remains unclear how much operational control Sadiku has over ‘Darul Salam’ (with some arguing that Darul Salam and Sadiku’s men remain distinct entities).[46] Moreover, there are likely bandits among reported ‘Darul Salam’ presence. For example, various of Sadiku’s fighters have collaborated with local bandits under the cover of ‘Darul Salam’ but seemingly for economic purposes, as they extract revenue through abductions and cattle rustling.[47] Ideological disagreements result in occasional rifts. Finally, it is not clear how independent some of the ideological Darul Salam commanders (hence not bandits) operate from the Sadiku network (including not for groups collaborating with these commanders).[48]

Because of this complexity ‘Darul Salam’ is best used as a catch-all for all non-ISWAP, non-Ansaru Nigerian jihadists/extremists.[49] Some but not all of the fighters may have pledged loyalty to the current JAS leader (via Sadiku).

1.5 Ansaru

A fourth extremist group that operates in North West Nigeria is Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina FiBiladis Sudan, known as Ansaru. The group – also a splinter of Boko Haram – was active between 2011 and 2014 but following the arrest of its leader in 2016 it became completely dormant.[50] In 2019 the group resurfaced but in name only as it shares little else with the defunct group and its members.[51]

Early on, Ansaru was linked to aggrieved Fulbe herdsmen communities, but Ansaru ‘2.0’ sided with non-Fulbe Muslim communities plagued by bandit gangs mainly made up of Fulbe herdsmen.[52] However, this relationship remains ambiguous. Ansaru released a Fulfulde note urging the Fulbe to join its movement in 2019.[53] Ansaru allegedly collaborated with the notorious bandit warlord Dogo Gide (Kwiambana Forest, Kaduna and Zamfara State and more recently Niger) in order to protect him during an attack on another gang leader and through arms deals.[54] In around 2020 there was talk of Ansaru attempting to form a relationship with other smaller violent groups located in Zamfara State (Munhaye, Tsafe, Zurmi, Shinkafi and Kaura Namoda Local Government Areas (LGAs)).[55] Due to these ties there have been some reports of bandit-related activities such as cattle rustling, kidnapping for ransom and the sharing of operational knowledge (e.g. assembling IEDs – improvised explosive devices).[56] Ansaru ‘2.0’ was suspected of communicating with its Sahelian counterpart, JNIM, which might be an indication that parts of its membership are still composed of the initial Ansaru that was active until 2014.

Ansaru seems to be largely dormant, after having lost its stronghold Damari in July 2022. Yet some cells could exist in Kaduna State (Birnin Gwari), Zamfara State (Rafi Forest), Western Katsina (Batsari, Dan Musa, Funtua and Kankara LGAs) and in the Falgore Forest in Kano State.[57] Around December 2023, Ansaru reportedly clashed with Dogo Gide in the forest of Gajeren Kauye bordering Katsina State after their alliance broke down.[58]

1.6 Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)

A fifth extremist group is Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). JNIM operates in the Sahel and increasingly the littoral states. The extent to which it operates in North West Nigeria is so far unclear and the subject of investigation (below).

JNIM is the main violent extremist actor in the Sahel and coastal African states, and it operates in a hierarchical but decentralised fashion. There is a central leadership and regional commanders who run Katibats as well as local area commanders who run Markaz’.[59] In the context of North West Nigeria, two Katibats might be relevant: a Katibat led by Idrissa Dicko (Mouslimou) and a Katibat from Torodi (led by one Abu Hanifa), both operating in Benin from bases in the Sahel (Burkina Faso and Niger, respectively).

The Katibat led by Mouslimou has an open presence in the Est and Centre-Est regions of Burkina Faso (its main bases are in the Est region) but with a variety of area commanders along the borders with Ghana, Togo and Benin. This Katibat originates from the Ansarul-Islam movement (not to be confused with Ansaru in North West Nigeria) from northern Burkina Faso and includes remnants of ISGS who joined the movement after being defeated from 2018-2020 in the Est region. Katibat Mouslimou operates in two areas in Benin: Western Atacora and the Bariba Plain (an area between Parc Pendjari and W in Atacora and Alibori). This Katibat has a Fulbe membership but also seems to operate on a cross-ethnic basis (e.g. with the Gourtmanche occupying leadership positions) using religious and socioeconomic narratives to expand and recruit.

The Katibat led by Abu Hanifa is a Katibat with a presence around Torodi (Niger) along the border with Burkina Faso’s Est region. It is probably responsible for activities in northern Alibori department as well as along the Benin-Niger border. Some argue that this Katibat originally stems from Katibat Serma and has an important Tolebe core (a sub-group of the Fulbe often of Nigerien origin).