For years, there have been fears of dangerous liaisons between extremist groups in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin.[60] So far, there is little concrete evidence as only three pieces of evidence allude to some low-level links: 1) Lakurawa presence by ISGS (a group from the Sahel in North West Nigeria); 2) the Group-of-Twelve’s visit to Kainji Lake in Nigeria. In this security incident in June 2020, African Parks (a non-governmental organisation), in collaboration with Benin’s security services, encountered and subsequently followed a Group-of-Twelve extremists on their journey from Burkina Faso via Benin; and 3) reported operational links between ISWAP and ISGS.[61]

But just as suffocating canaries in coal mines indicate dangerous levels of carbon monoxide, there is consistent evidence that these links are now developing. These links are facilitated by an apparent mixture of various violent extremist groups and cross-border banditry.

In order to make this argument we rely on data on the movement of violent extremists collected since early 2021 in Benin, data from 2022 up until December 2023 in Tillaberi and the Dosso regions (Niger Republic), the Est region (Burkina Faso) and, finally, on newly collected data on all forms of political violence from May to December 2023 in North West Nigeria. We supplement this with over 30 interviews conducted in North West Nigeria with informed experts and insiders and 50 sampled interviews with the population in Benin along the border with Nigeria (see Introduction).

2.1 Re-emergence of banditry in VEO zones of control, Benin

The first indication of increasing connections between Nigeria and Benin comes from western Atacora and northern Alibori – areas experiencing high levels of violent extremist activity. But there is also one curious activity: cross-border banditry in both areas since 2023. While banditry in northern Benin is not a new phenomenon, it mostly disappeared when VEOs began to operate in 2021.

After years of relatively few reports, by April 2023 kidnapping for ransom and cattle rustling resurfaced in both areas. VEOs generally kidnap in Benin to punish former collaborators and the authorities, and recruit both forcefully and incidentally to collect information. There have been at least 65 kidnapping incidents since early 2023 (some by VEOs).[62] However, since April 2023 there have been eight instances of kidnapping for ransom in areas where VEOs operate. For example, on 6 June 2023 an important member of the Fulbe community from Dassari, Atacora department, was released after a ransom of 6 million CFA was paid. On 1 July 2023, two Fulbe were kidnapped in Cobly, Atacora, with the kidnappers demanding a ransom of 10 million CFA.[63]

Cattle rustling also reappeared in 2023. VEOs can engage in cattle rustling.[64] The type of cattle rustling incidents reported so far mainly involve small numbers and occur around the parks, likely for the purpose of direct consumption. Yet, there are also incidents of larger numbers of cattle being stolen in the Materi and Kerou communes, Atacora, an area with a strong JNIM influence. Reports show that these cattle are moved to Burkina Faso and Togo in order to be sold.

Both instances are slightly atypical for JNIM operations in the area, which tend not to involve kidnapping for ransom and rustling of larger numbers of cattle for commercial exploitation.[65] These incidents may mean that the modus operandi of VEOs has simply changed, but it raises suspicions that there might be other groups operating alongside, or perhaps in collaboration with, JNIM in Benin.

Reinforcing these suspicions is a rising number of incidents that do not at all fit VEO modus operandi. For example, on 2 November 2023, an unidentified armed group robbed a man and stole his cattle while he was leaving the market in Guene, Malanville commune. On 3 December a car was highjacked by a group armed with two AK-47s and a few handmade guns between Goungoun and Baffo. On 15 December, a car was highjacked between Karimama and Sakawan by armed men. On 24 December, a motorcycle was highjacked between Guene and Torozougou at 2pm by two men armed with homemade guns. On 30 December, a bandit was caught by local people around Mokole after he attempted to highjack a car between Mokole and Tounga Ali (a new event). And on 15 January, a small alcohol shop was robbed at gun point in Fouet (Angaradebou); the bandits stole 800,000 francs and a bicycle. Hijacking cars and robbery are not consistent with VEOs mode of operations.

Even more peculiar is that these incidents involve individuals coming from Nigeria. For example, the bandit caught at Mokole was Nigerian. Moreover, armed men from Nigeria spent time in Benin (e.g. on 4 December at Tobossi, Malanville when nine bandits stayed at the home of an accomplice; on 9 December, at Gorou Soundoukou (Madecali) four armed men with AK-47s spent the night before continuing their journey to Guéné. Nigerian intelligence sources argue that a Fulbe Nigerian bandit leader had re-settled in northern Alibori.[66]

Qualitative interviews in the border areas reinforce both the inference that banditry is re-emerging and that a link with and/or from Nigeria is being forged. Around 60% of the interviewees point to the fact that bandits from Nigeria have obtained houses in Benin, particularly around Kandi and Malanville, Alibori departments, and Kalale and Sokotindji, Borgou Department. These houses in Benin host the family of bandits. One person from Malanville noted, for example, that ‘Everyone knows that bandit leaders are in Nigeria. But their family is here in Malanville or in Kandi.’[67] Another person noted, ‘There’s a gang leader who built his house in Kalale last year. The police came there looking for him several times, but he was in Nigeria.’[68] These interviews are consistent with accounts from Nigeria stating that Nigerian bandits increasingly seek refuge in Benin because the Nigerian military targets their families.[69] Some sources argue that Nigerian bandits in Benin are active in the transportation of drugs, cigarettes and fuel.

In short, there is evidence of a re-emergence of banditry in northern Benin. There is also evidence that some of this relates to bandits coming from North West Nigeria.[70]

But what is very puzzling about this is that such banditry takes place in zones where VEOs are present. This type of co-existence is uncommon for JNIM and raises a number of questions around the relationship between these groups. The least worrying relations would be a form of simple competitive co-existence, mainly because JNIM does not have complete control over the areas. But there might also be more developed relationships where there are de facto agreements. Perhaps bandits are allowed to operate as long as JNIM does not have full operational control. Or more active forms of collaboration are developed.

2.2 Kainji Lake National Park, Nigeria

A second signal comes from across the border in Nigeria: the Kainji Lake National Park. As mentioned above, early information of a link of this area and violent extremist was the Group-of-Twelve, which left Burkina Faso, via Benin, for Kainji Lake in Nigeria in 2020. There has been little information since and this section seeks to provide an update.

As a start, Barnett and Rufa'i demonstrated that Francophone extremists (most likely JNIM) attempted to move into Kainji Lake National Park around mid-2021, in an attempt to recruit local bandits and Fulbe leaders.[71] Figure 4 shows a number of incidents picking up on this line of thought. In 2021 there were two incidents that point towards an extremism problem in the Kainji Lake National Park: on 8 March 2021 a militia member killed a security guard in the park and on 4 September the district head of Wawa (Niger State, Nigeria) was abducted by unidentified militia members.[72] By the end of 2021, the Niger state government warned that these incidents were related to a VEO presence in the ‘Kainji National Park and around the vast areas of the park up to Babanna, a border town between Nigeria and the Republic of Benin’ and that the group was ‘poised to establish a caliphate in the area that will deal with issues of criminality and other related matters’. A group – though not at all clear if these involved extremists – from the same area also kidnapped a traditional ruler in the Borgu kingdom, ‘the Dodo of Wawa’.[73]

Such signals continued during 2022. On 25 January 2022, Nigerian forces attacked the park and claimed to have dislodged a group of ISWAP fighters (although no evidence was provided that this was really an ISWAP group).[74] Apparently this mission was not as successful as claimed, as in mid-2022 Nigeria’s senate called for another operation because three LGAs around Kainji Lake National Park (Kaiama, Babanna and Wawa) would have become ‘enclaves’ and experienced rising levels of ‘recurrent kidnappings’.[75] By October 2022, another operation took place when the Nigerian military, in collaboration with ‘local self-defence militias’ (which most likely include the Dambanga – a hunting militia also active in Benin) attacked the group of extremists alleged to be ‘ISWAP/Boko Haram’.[76]

VEO presence around Kainji Lake came into full focus with the bold attack on Wawa Prison in October 2022. This high-security facility holds senior Boko Haram and other violent extremist fighters from Nigeria’s North East but also from the Sahel. The attack was foiled, as Nigerian forces allegedly knew about the intended attack months beforehand. Nigerian security forces pointed at ISWAP and led by the commander Abu Ekrima.[77] Barnett and Rufa'i claim that the identity of the assailants is difficult to pinpoint, as there is evidence of the potential involvement of Ansaru and even extremists from the Sahel.[78] Indeed, interview conducted in Nigeria for this report on the Wawa attack point to the involvement of multiple groups (the ISWAP-Kogi cell, Sahelian fighters and Ansaru)[79] but also find additional evidence of a strong role by Sahelian extremists. Military sources argue that the goal had been to free the few detained Sahelian “jihadists” and that one reason why the attack failed was insufficient knowledge of the area.[80] Moreover, most of those killed had ‘plaited hair, facial marks and were slim, tall, and dark in complexion’.[81] These characteristics are considered to be typical of people from the Sahel.

From early 2023 onwards, incidents around Kainji Lake clearly increased – particularly along the access roads to and from the forest (29 incidents in 2023 vs five in 2022).[82] For example, in April 2023 communal self-defence militias attacked a large unidentified armed group in the forest for four days (9-12 April 2023) during a kidnapping exchange.[83] In May 2023 local and government sources claimed that an unidentified armed group of no less than 200 men had set up a base at a former camping site, where they chased away all the rangers. From there they began to exert influence as far as the Beninese border.[84] During the remaining year most activity involved armed men on motorcycles, particularly on the three main roads in the border between Benin and Nigeria (Babanna). Moreover, other violent engagements were reported, such as kidnappings, killings – even of a child on 13 August 2023 around New Bussa – and the targeting of vehicles.

Hence, there is a clear problem in Kainji Lake National Park which involves a variety of extremist groups and bandit groups. But the key question is: which group is or what groups are now operating from the Park? We consider three related signals and then explore this question in greater detail.

2.3 Unidentified armed actors in border communes, Benin

A third canary in the coal mine comes from the border between Benin and Nigeria. Specifically, the area that overlaps with the former Borgu Empire: from Madecali to the Nigerian border, the Segbana commune (Eastern Alibori) and the Kalale and Nikki communes (Eastern Borgou).

There have been suspicions of violent extremist activities in the area since 2020.[85] For example, the Group-of-Twelve visited Kalale. Previous research in 2020 and early 2021 pointed also towards VEO procurement and recruitment.[86] Other examples include an attempt by JNIM to create a bridgehead to Nigeria[87] as well as the killing of the head of the Dambanga hunters in Kalale – which some have attributed to violent extremists.[88] Yet, all evidence found so far has involved isolated incidents.

Our quantitative data points to an alarming and atypical change from early 2023 onwards. People in eastern Borgou and eastern Alibori have observed armed actors on motorcycles (with peaks in March and October/November 2023), reported experiencing more abductions, and witnessed more violence against civilians. Figure 4 presents an overview, showing an unequivocal increase (the map shows activities by governmental and unidentified armed actors only).

Three trends stand out. First, there are many sightings of armed actors on motorcycles (sometimes transporting goods, such as fuel). In March 2023 in the Segbana commune there were various armed groups spotted on motorcycles (e.g. 1 March in Bouaina, 12 March in Bedia, 25 March in Dakou, 28 March in Moro Moro). In the Kalale commune there were also such reports on 26 February in Gidan, 31 March in Zambara, 8 April in Basso, 19 June in Basso, 2 July in Basso and many more.

Second, there have been various attempts of recruitment. In Segbana, an unidentified armed group approached mostly young Fulbe, promising wealth and other benefits with all of them being given a certain period of time to consider the offer (May 2023). In the Kalale commune, a group of eight young people disclosed that they had joined an armed group after several weeks of training and had been offered 400,000 CFA per month (June 2023).

Third, there has been a sharp increase in abductions. In November 2023 in Segbana, an unidentified armed group abducted two individuals in Guene Laaga (Segbana, Alibori) demanding a ransom of 5 million CFA for each person. This was the fifth kidnapping in two months. On 9 November 2023 some individuals received threatening phone calls warning that they would be abducted or killed if anyone collaborated with the authorities in Segbana. In Kalale, abductions, among other activities, were reported on 29 September in Tasso, and on 6 July and 15 June in Sakabansi. In the interviews our sources said, ‘Now the kidnappings have started. They kidnap you and then they call your family to tell them to pay 10 million. It’s really serious.’[89]

A qualitative probe into the dynamics pointed to a clear link with Nigeria. One key piece of evidence is that the increase in activity in Benin around March 2023 is matched with similar dynamics on the Nigerian side of the border. One source from Nigeria reported that by February/March 2023 larger groups of VEOs had transited the Kainji Lake National Park on the eve of the 2023 presidential elections. An estimated 35-50 members were on foreign motorcycles heavily loaded with goods, some of the fighters were dark in complexion, and carried flags with Arabic inscriptions.[90] Another source from a small Nigerian town (Gidan Malam) bordering Benin witnessed movements into Nigeria by a group carrying different types of weapons and being accompanied by women and children.[91] A local hunter and farmer from Nigeria confirmed that three separate groups had been seen moving towards Benin after stopping in the village of Gidan Malam to buy goods.[92] Two other sources confirmed the mass migration of this group.[93] Hence, four qualitative sources provide strong evidence for a cross-border link.

Another stream of evidence comes from events around October 2023. Nigerian sources report that fighters left the Kainji Lake National Park and returned to Benin with more fighters than when they first entered Nigeria. The fighters in question spoke both Fulfulde and Arabic, while some spoke French.[94] One witness said that the fighters had moved in three groups and that all of the groups moved at night with their children, women and weapons.[95] Local communities fled when they saw them, but the fighters urged these communities to remain calm as they said that they meant no harm to the general public.[96] They bought some goods in the shops and left the same night.

All this combined makes for a third indication of the emergence of strange liaisons between Nigeria and Benin and dangerous ties between extremists and bandits. There has been a clear increase in activities in Borgou Department which seem to bear the hallmark of banditry (mainly kidnappings). This activity is connected to Nigeria as the movements by large groups of armed actors between Benin and the Kainji Lake National Park (Nigeria) in March and October 2023 indicate. ‘Banditry’ in the Borgou may thus not be what it seems; at a minimum it is best qualified as a blurring of banditry and violent extremism but it might be violent extremism in disguise.

2.4 Forêt de Trois Rivières, Benin

A fourth signal comes from the Forêt de Trois Rivières (an area adjacent to Segbana, Gogounou (Alibori) Kalale, Bembereke commune (Borgou)). This forest has had the status of a classified forest since 1949 and is the largest forest in Benin.[97] While agricultural activities are officially prohibited, it is an important economic area with cotton and agricultural production. The thick vegetation is more dispersed at this location.[98]

The forest is under similar pressures to the W-Arly-Pendjari Complex (WAP complex): a burgeoning population in need of a livelihood, a need for environment protection, the effects of economic interests of larger corporations and hunting groups, as well as tensions between forest guards and parts of the population. For example, in early August 2023, forest guards sought to enforce the park law by targeting farmers who ‘own’ fields in the forest and its surroundings in Nassiconzi (Kalale Commune). Some farmers were denied access to their fields while others were arrested and forced to pay 75,000 CFA despite having lost their agricultural lands – and thus their incomes. More than 100 farmers were affected. In the following days the same thing occurred in Zambara and Kalale. Less than a year before (October 2022) there had been a riot, clashes and arrests in Gbessakperou, Kalale, when local people attacked forest guards after the guards had warned the population not to encroach into the forest.[99]

But coming from this forest are also growing signs of movement by armed actors. In interviews with sources from communes bordering the forest (both in Alibori and Borgou) regular references were made to sightings of armed men in the forest.[100] People in Zambara and Segbana (directly adjacent to the forest) but also in Bessassi, Basso and Neganzi (all very nearby) and in some communes in Alibori pointed towards the sudden presence of armed men in the forest.

Someone from Bessassi said, ‘It’s not the banditry that bothers us most. What bothers us is that we’re afraid and we’re very worried because the young people are meeting a lot of armed people inside the forest, which is protected. We don’t know if they’re up to something.’[101] In Zambara village, someone said, ‘We’ve seen a few armed people come and go in the bush. Sometimes they gather in the protected forest to rest and get water from the river. Sometimes they even carry large quantities of petrol on their motorbikes.’ Another person stated, ‘Armed men are seen passing by from time to time on their way to Nigeria. They are often on motorbikes.’[102] In Neganzi someone made a direct reference to violent extremism: ‘In Neganzi, we’ve been encountering more and more armed jihadis in the bush recently.’[103]

These impressions by the population are supported by quantitative data collected for this report (see Figure 6). There were seven confirmed incidents throughout 2023 that were in or directly adjacent to the forest (and more observed movements by unidentified armed actors within 15 kilometres thereof).[104] On 16 April 2023, an armed group shot and injured a hunter in the forest. The hunter had been searching for game when he came across the group who had captured/kidnapped three people. As the hunter tried to save them, he was shot but managed to escape. On 12 June 2023, four members of an unidentified armed group were spotted on two motorcycles in Neganzi heading towards Forêt de Trois Rivières .

Apart from the accidental altercation with the hunter, there is no known engagement between these groups and the surrounding communities. Similarly, the interviews did not point to any contact with the general population. This suggests that the forest might for now only serve as a conduit to and from Nigeria. Moreover, as mentioned above, there seems to be a link through the transportation of fuel by these unidentified armed groups, particularly around the economic hub of Basso. All of this should once more raise serious concerns of a violent extremist link; the forest seems to play a role in the link between Sahelian extremists and Nigeria.

2.5 Kebbi State – Nigeria, Benin, Niger

A distinct signal comes from the border between Kebbi State (Nigeria), Benin and Niger Republic; hence the Hausa-Fulani area that overlaps with parts of the former Sokoto caliphate. In this area, a different dynamic seems to be at play albeit with similar characteristics of banditry and violent extremism.

From the above is clear that banditry in North West Nigeria is particularly pronounced in Sokoto and Zamfara State. Yet, sources familiar with banditry in North West Nigeria argue that from early 2022 onwards, cattle were moved towards – among other areas – Kebbi State to protect them against bandit activity in Zamfara and Sokoto. But the effect was less availability of cattle in Zamfara, Katsina and Sokoto, which in turn led bandits to follow the herds and arrive in Kebbi State. This happened in 2022/2023. Also internal competition among bandits seems to have led some bandit leaders, particularly older ones, to move into Kebbi State.[105]

Quantitative evidence supports the idea of an influx of bandits into Kebbi. An official in Dole-Kaina (Nigeria, but close to the Benin border) noted a sudden increase in kidnappings in his area, with an estimated 22 kidnappings between March and October 2023 versus just three kidnappings in all of 2022. The official attributed this increase to the influx of Fulbe and Tuaregs from other parts of Nigeria.[106] Data collected for this project on incidents of political violence and disorder in the area similarly shows that for the first time there is some banditry in Kebbi State (Figure 7, bandits in blue).

Yet, there is similar evidence for extremist presence too. One piece of evidence is from Southern Kebbi (Bagudo LGA, Nigeria). Specific information comes from Tsamiya, a village on the Benin-Nigeria border that is a connection to Segbana town (in Benin). The son of Sadiku (a key figure in Darul Salam who pledged allegiance to Boko Haram’s leaders) was married in this village.[107] Members of different extremist groups attended the ceremony, including some from the Benin Republic.[108] Significantly Alhaji Bello Dogo – a senior Darul Salam figure who, with others, resettled in Benin after 2020 – was among those who attended the wedding.[109]

There is also information that points to a more settled extremist presence. One piece of evidence comes from Dole-Kaina – a border town between Nigeria and Niger within a kilometre of the Benin border, people have reported cross-border movements of armed actors into the village from the Benin Republic (officials argue these are violent extremists).[110] In the area, there are two reported incidents of recruitment.[111] Other sources mention an unknown number of extremists in Lollo, Maje and Tungar Alhaji (the black stars, Figure 7) arguing that some of these come from Benin.[112] Nigerian security officials also report that extremists have increased their presence.[113]

2.6 What group(s) operate(s) along the Nigerian-Benin border?

The big question is: who is responsible for activity in Kainji Lake, the presence of armed actors in Benins border communes, the movement in Forêt de Trois Rivières and activity in Kebbi state’s border with Benin? The honest answer is that this is not fully clear. The landscape is fragmented with variable degrees of evidence for Darul Salam, ISWAP, JNIM and bandit groups.

The centre: Darul Salam in Kainji Lake and the Borgou

A starting point is the presence in Kaijni Lake. From the available data presented above – particularly in relation to the Wawa attack – there is some evidence of varying quality for JNIM, ISWAP, Darul Salam and Nigerian bandits in and around Kainji Lake Park. Recent evidence suggests, for example, that the alleged ISWAP leader of the Wawa attack – Abu Ekrima – visited an individual in Kalale (Benin) four times throughout 2023 and engaged in (online) recruitment.[114] Another source reports recent ISWAP presence in Kainji Lake forest.[115]

While likely a mixture of groups, evidence at least points to sustained operations of Darul Salam/JAS in the (former) Borgu Empire. For example, one security source argues that the key group is Darul Salam – the group formed around resettled JAS fighters by Sadiku.[116] Another points to senior Darul Salam individuals who hail from Babanna, a town just across the border with Nigeria.[117] A third source – with links to one of the groups – claims that Darul Salam is mainly operating from Babanna and Dakari (where Mamman and Mohammed Umar would lead operations).[118] A local source from Dakari reported that bandits threatened a family member, who invoked Darul Salam for help. When the bandits killed the family member, Darul Salam paid the funeral bill.[119]

This is reinforced by the fact that presence in Kainji Lake Park and in Benin for the past three years has involved a mixture of bandits and extremists – which fits Darul Salam more open attitude to bandits. For example, some sources point to links between extremists in Kainji Lake Park and some bandit leaders (e.g. Darul Salam helped to resettle bandit leader Alhaji Buba to Kainji Lake).[120] Further evidence of bandit activity is extreme violence around the park towards the population (e.g. the killing of a child) which does not match the violent extremist groups (except for ultra-takfiri groups such as Boko Haram). Despite evidence that all extremists seem to have had a (temporary) presence in the area, this turns the odds against sustained presence of Ansaru, JNIM and ISWAP. Ansaru has been clashing with bandit groups over the past years. ISWAP and JNIM are generally too doctrinal for bandits as they impose too many restrictions. Instead, this fits the looser and more flexible relationship that (some parts of) Darul Salam have with bandit groups.

However, evidence suggests that Darul Salam’s relationship with the bandits might have changed. By the end of 2022 and the early months of 2023 a conflict would have emerged between bandit leader Alhajij Buba and Darul Salam (who had helped Buba resettle) after complaints by the population and a conflict with another bandit group.[121] Vigilante groups (the Dambanga hunters, see below) would have collaborated with Darul Salam in fighting this bandit group. Since then some sources report a stronger community approach by Darul Salam, including forming relationships with local leaders.[122] One source from a hunting group reported restrictions on hunting, including restrictions on hunting in the park and the performance of medical rituals and enforcement of prayer instead.[123]

This leads to our final observation on the dangerous connections that are emerging in the border area. ISWAP has certainly been present alongside Darul Salam and bandits (albeit not as a leading group). Yet, also Sahelian extremists are linked to those present in Kainji Lake. Sahelian extremists were not only reported around the Wawa attack, but the data in this report points at continuous movement by unidentified armed groups between Benin and this area in Nigeria (which based on the movement of these groups is highly likely JNIM). This is reinforced with evidence from Benin, where Nigerian bandits appear in Beninese territory (adjacent to) where JNIM is operating. Moreover, evidence from an informed security analyst suggest that links exist between JNIM and Darul Salam in Kainji Lake and Baguda LGA (Niger state).[124] All in all, this suggests dangerous liaisons between Sahelian and Nigerian extremists in the form of co-existence between JNIM and Darul Salam/JAS.

The north Kebbi-Alibori border: bandit-extremist liaisons

A similar though less detailed observation holds for the Kebbi-Alibori border where there are dangerous liaisons between extremists and bandit groups. But what extremists operate there?

The identity of these groups is more unclear. One – unlikely – group could be ISSP. There was movement from Abala into the Dosso region of Niger Republic (particularly around October and November 2023) with a focus on Fulbe camps around Falwel.[125] From Falwel the information dries up but sources suggest that there are movements towards the Benin border, as well as Sokoto and Kebbi State, Nigeria.[126] However, there is no information on ISSP settling in the area.

Another theory is that Darul Salam also has a presence along the Kebbi-Alibori border. This would be consistent with the information from the marriage ceremony in Kebbi state where Darul Salam figures were present. A Nigerian official also pointed to Darul Salam, but this source also argued that these ‘extremists’ kept their families in Benin, which actually indicates bandit groups.[127] A source with links in these extremist groups suggests that Darul Salam is present but only with a small cell operating in Baguda LGA. This cell would also be in touch with Sahelian extremists.[128] But this cannot explain all activity, particularly not further north.

A final possible explanation comes from information on collaboration between a small Sahelian extremist group – according to a JNIM source – operating in Benin along the Nigerian border[129] and a Nigerian cattle-rustling syndicate operating in Baguda LGA led by one Turji (nicknamed after Bello Turji).[130] A separate piece of evidence involves the arrest of a Nigerian herder coming from Benin asking for (specific types of) cattle for the Sahel in exchange for arms and training of bandits in Nigeria.[131] On a different occasion, one source reported that bandits from Niger State were trained in Benin on how to use IEDs (they were transferring these skills to bandit groups in Zamfara state).[132]

Hence, the only clear conclusion that can be drawn from this evidence is that there are links between bandit groups and extremists, as well as evidence of some links forged between the Sahel and Nigeria along the Kebbi-Alibori Border. The available information does not allow drawing any conclusion on exactly which groups operate in the area and/or are dominant. The landscape seems very fragmented.

The Sahel and Lake Chad

But one thing keeps generating questions. JNIMs doctrinal stance does not fit in with Darul Salam and/or bandits groups. The major unknown therefore is what type of relationship is forged.

Is the relationship between JNIM and these groups based only on short-term common interests (e.g. around fuel trading or joint places for Rest and Recuperation (R&R))? A form of clandestine cohabitation? Or is there a longer-term collaboration in the making that bears similarity to the jihadization of banditry processes that took place in the Sahel (e.g. Tillabery, Nigeri and the Est Region, Burkina Faso)? For example, the reported changes in the Darul Salam approach towards local populations seem to be more consistent with the JNIM approach. It remains unclear how relationships will unfold.

2.7 Summary

It is generally accepted that violent extremism is a problem in northern Benin. Currently, attention is overwhelmingly devoted to northern Alibori and western Atacora and this problem is viewed as a ‘spillover’ from the Sahel. But this is only part of the story.

Suffocating canaries in coal mines indicate dangerous levels of carbon monoxide. A variety of strange signals in Northern Benin along the border with Nigeria are like these canaries: they point at dangerous liaisons between violent extremist groups along Benin’s border with Nigeria. Closer relationships with bandit groups seem to facilitate this. This chapter points to a number of disturbing signals which, in combination, point to a problem of violent extremism: