The Arab Uprisings reached Libya in early February 2011. Political opposition first crystallised and turned into rebellion in Cyrenaica in the east (especially in the city of Benghazi) because of its marginalisation by Gaddafi and its historical affiliation with Libya’s Sanusi monarchy. Political exiles returning from abroad, local elites, and defectors from Gaddafi’s military apparatus rapidly established the National Transitional Council (NTC) to represent revolutionary interests, both in Libya and internationally. While the NTC attempted to coordinate revolutionary armed groups and efforts across Libya and to spread the revolution to Gaddafi’s strongholds in Tripolitania (in the west), it never managed to establish hierarchical control over the plethora of militias that sprung from the first revolutionary fires. By August 2011, most of Libya was under revolutionary control, including Tripoli. In October, Sirte and Bani Walid, Gaddafi’s last strongholds, fell and the revolution was over.[9] The ensuing ‘evolution of the revolution’ continues today.
The period from late 2011 until the end of 2018 can be divided into four main conflict phases. While any division of the Libyan conflict into time periods is to some extent artificial, it nevertheless helps in discerning broad shifts in the nature of the conflict and the implications these have for the prospects of future SSD. Table 1 below summarises these four main conflict phases and outlines the context they represented for SSD. From this, the paper distills four key strategic implications for future SSD in Libya.
| February 2011–May 2013 |
May 2013–July 2014 |
July 2014–March 2016 |
March 2016–December 2018 |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| (1) Contested order |
(2) Violent division |
(3) Broken compromise |
(4) Deeper fragmentation |
|
| From/to |
From the revolution to the Political Isolation Law |
From the Political Isolation Law to the 2nd civil war |
From the 2nd civil war to GNA settlement in Tripoli |
From GNA settlement in Tripoli to the Tripoli Protection Force |
| Short description |
This period saw the collapse of the authority of the personalised networks of rule around Colonel Gaddafi, a relatively peaceful period of party-political competition and the abrupt closure of this new political space through the adoption of the Political Isolation Law. As ‘revolution after the revolution’, it brought about a major shift in the parameters for political competition and increased incentives for using coercive capability since the law eliminated a significant part of the Libyan elite from formal national roles. |
This period witnessed the rise and consolidation of General Haftar as well as the strengthening of Libya’s Islamists, resulting in the superficial unification of many eastern factions and their mobilisation in the ‘Dignity’ coalition. This subsequently clashed with more Islamist-type forces organised in the ‘Dawn’ coalition in Tripoli in 2014. Not only did these developments produce Libya’s 2nd civil war, they also led to two distinct claims to legitimate national governance. |
This period saw an international/local push in response to the 2nd civil war to re-establish a functional form of national unity government. Initially, this took the form of the GNC, followed by the HoR and culminating in the GNA on the basis of the 2015 Libya Political Agreement mediated by UNSMIL. The GNA focused immediately on fighting IS / violent extremism. |
This period witnessed the failure (2017) of the Libyan Political Agreement (of 2015), largely due to the non-inclusion of key armed groups, anti-Islamists, tribes and elements loyal to Gaddafi. Despite efforts to revive it (such as the Libyan Action Plan), re-entrenchment of the loose west-east split helped ensure its expiry. Moreover, this period featured clashes in Tripoli between different armed factions to establish spheres of influence over parts of the GNA administration and, in response, the token creation of the Tripoli Protection Force. |
| Key characteristics |
Division between ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘loyalists’ Reconfiguration of Libya’s political space resulting in a zero-sum game Fragmentation of a diverse array of actors/groups The end of national politics by ‘terminating’ the National Front Alliance (secular-ish) |
Rise of the ‘city states’: Misrata, Zintan, Tripoli Rise of Islamists, radicals and those who supported military rule A national split based on two loose military coalitions using patronage and resources as glue Local-level fighting also continued for reasons such as control over resources and revenge |
International concerns about radical forces create pressure to form the GNA Armed groups pursue their self-interests more blatantly Consolidation of localised, ‘city-state’ logic Establishment of the militia cartel in Tripoli |
The GNA remains ineffectual due to the split with the LNA, lack of control over Tripoli, and the power of armed factions National mediation/negotiation process is frozen Rising tensions and clashes at the country’s southern borders with Niger and Chad |
| The context for SSD |
If there was a moment for a national-level SSD effort, it was probably here. But with old security institutions discredited and the country awash with arms as well as revolutionary fervour, it would have had to be interest-based with clear incentives for armed groups to consolidate. On this basis, it could have focused on laying the foundations of new national institutions. |
National-level SSD efforts would automatically serve partisan and exclusionary political purposes in this period due to the Political Isolation Law and the emergence of the Dawn and Dignity groupings. |
Given the limited legitimacy and wherewithal of the GNA, SSD efforts could have become a ‘statebuilding strategy’ par excellence. But the GNA had little leverage and armed groups dictated terms. Instead, there was a strong international focus on combating violent extremism. |
National-level SSD efforts being absent, a political agreement and/or powerful sponsors on both sides would have strengthened a particular side. Local SSD efforts would have needed to depart from the idea that national security institutions need to be established and/or that a centrally-run Libyan state in the Weberian sense is feasible. |
Strategic implications for future Security Sector Development
The preceding overview highlights that the institutional basis for work on Libya’s security sector is mostly absent in the sense that there is not even a semi-(dys)functional state security architecture that can serve as a foundation. There are professional remnants of the former Libyan Army, but after seven years of conflict these no longer exist in the conventional military sense. What does exist is a highly diverse range of armed groups that are mostly hybrid in nature in terms of their relationship with one or several of Libya’s existing ‘governments’, meaning that they collaborate and compete depending on what best serves their interests.[11] Moreover, skewing the playing field for political competition by adopting the Political Isolation Law had the far-reaching consequence of splitting the country down the middle between those who had cooperated with the Gaddafi regime out of necessity, for profit or for ideological reasons and those who were instrumental in his downfall. The lessons of the de-Ba’athification experience of 2003–2005 in Iraq were clearly ignored in Libya and it is safe to say that that the passage of this law laid a foundation stone for the later Dignity–Dawn division. With this in mind, the preceding overview suggests four strategic implications for future SSD.
Security sector development (SSD) amounts to a multisectoral (re-)development of a country’s security sector, including state and non-state actors, through a combination of savvy political processes and high-quality programming that balances governance, institutional and capability dimensions in a manner that delivers greater levels of people-centred security.
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) is typically conceived of as a process that reduces the number of active combatants and/or the availability of military-grade weaponry in public spaces by incentivising commanders, combatants and local communities to replace sources of status and influence, transform self-identification mechanisms and perceptions of violent masculinity, improve livelihood prospects and address at least some reconciliation and justice demands.
While linkage between SSD and DDR appears logical on paper, it is difficult in practice. The main challenge is that the slow pace and longer time horizon required for effective SSD sit uncomfortably with the urgency of DDR in (post-)conflict environments. DDR is ideally driven by the security priorities and capability requirements that follow from an SSD process but in practice it will often not be possible to wait for such SSD outputs.
Source: Sources: OECD/DAC, Handbook on Security System Reform: Supporting security and justice, OECD: Paris, 2007. Relevant UN, EU and AU SSD policy documents contain definitions that are similar on key points; Luckham, R., ‘Whose violence, whose security? Can violence reduction and security work for poor, excluded and vulnerable people?’, Journal of Peacebuilding, Vol. 5, Issue 2, 2017; Van Veen, E. and M. Price, Securing its success, justifying its relevance: Mapping a way forward for Security Sector Reform, The Hague: Clingendael, 2014; see also the research work of Plural Security Insights at link (accessed 21 March 2019); the United Nations Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRS), here and here; McFate, S., The Link Between DDR and SSR in Conflict-Affected Countries, Washington DC: USIP, 2010 v. De Vries, H. and E. van Veen, Living Apart Together? On the Difficult Linkage between DDR and SSR in Post-Conflict Environments, The Hague: Clingendael, 2010; CIGI online commentary.
A first strategic implication of the preceding analysis for future SSD efforts is that any reconfigured or newly-established security forces will need to be balanced in their geographic and ethnic composition. The focus of their development should be on the gradual professionalisation of individuals and organisations in terms of their behaviour and performance standards. This must include the creation and infusion of such forces with public and organisational values that can gradually heal the cleavages that have emerged in the Libyan political-security landscape. Newly-minted national affiliations and a national identity will be key to organisational success.
As highlighted in Table 1, despite being endorsed internationally, the GNA has limited domestic legitimacy. This means that the conventional state-centric focus on rebuilding a formal security apparatus for the GNA, based on the assumption that such an apparatus would derive its legitimacy from the newly-established ‘state structure’ the GNA represents, is wrong. Instead, such an approach is likely to create or reinforce structures of power and dominance that serve vested interests and reflect the capture of what symbols and institutions the Libyan state features in Tripolitania. Indeed, a recent Clingendael survey of perceptions of legitimacy of various security providers across Libya demonstrates clearly that the sources and status of such providers – state, hybrid and non-state – are too varied to support the assumption that GNA-linked security providers are considered sufficiently legitimate in the areas where they hold sway.[12] In fact, it can be argued that the artificiality of the creation of the GNA in terms of its shallow support base and coalition of convenience has become a long-term problem by investing the international community in a governance mechanism that has serious legitimacy and capability deficiencies. The overlap between Western fears of the rise of violent extremist groups, which required a quick response, and the expectation of both the Dawn and Dignity groupings to profit handsomely from national resource rents via the Libyan Central Bank and National Oil Corporation after the LPA, reduced the focus on the need to gradually establish legitimate and capable governance with sufficient attention paid to Libya’s socio-territorial diversity.
A second strategic implication of the preceding analysis for future SSD efforts is that they must start from an inclusive political deal that is negotiated based on the interests of key elites (including militia leaders, armed groups and hardliners) and from which they stand to profit in terms of position, prestige, privilege and/or wealth.[13] At the same time, the deal should contain provisions that require armed groups to make concessions to a gradual process of SSD, including penalties that forfeit profits in case of non-compliance. A credible monitoring and verification mechanism with sufficient enforcement power will therefore also need to be part of the deal.[14]
Furthermore, the preceding analysis has detailed how the Libyan conflict has fragmented since its early revolutionary days in terms of its number of armed groups and their interests. The near-total absence of either a semi-functional state power or an actor sufficiently powerful to compel others to bend to its will, has created both insecurity and autonomy that have forced many Libyans to fall back on pre-existing structures like tribal networks. Such autonomy enabled armed groups to tap into lucrative illicit sources of revenue such as human trafficking and the drugs trade, creating new interests that became harder to address once entrenched. The various efforts to create a new government from a weak institutional basis were also instrumental in maintaining this fragmentation since its very weakness forced it to co-opt armed groups by putting them on the state payroll without having the means to enforce its authority. Today, Libya features an advanced degree of plural security provision that has become entrenched and that is reflective of the many political and economic interests that have developed since 2011. These interests will not easily converge in actual practice. As a result, viewing SSD as an operational pathway for consolidating Libya’s current array of security actors is problematic if this aims to work towards the establishment of a state monopoly on the legal use of violence in the short to medium term.
A third strategic implication of the preceding analysis for future SSD efforts is that they need to generate a framework that authorises coalitions of armed groups to act as decentralised security providers (e.g. through a system of permits) for well-defined geographic areas and/or to address particular types of security problems. This should happen in parallel to the creation of national institutions (see the first strategic implication) and central levers of control (such as a centralised payroll, centralised security training and a strong Inspector-General) as well as local accountability mechanisms (e.g. local councils or NGO fora). This will ensure that, at least to some extent, decentralised security providers are oriented towards providing citizen-centred security and providing citizens with some options for redress. It has to be accepted, however, that the quantity and quality of security provision will vary throughout the country for a good while to come.[15]
A fourth strategic implication of the preceding analysis for any future SSD efforts is that they must have a critical mass of foreign support behind them in terms of both unity of effort and volume of assistance. Practically, this means that one or two lead foreign countries, together with their Libyan counterparts, will need to set the direction, doctrines and standards for SSD in Libya while benefiting from tacit or active support from most of the other foreign countries actively involved in the area of security in Libya. A supporting secretariat and multi-donor trust fund run by a competent international organisation can provide administrative incentives to help ensure that efforts are coherent. If donors engage bilaterally, SSD efforts may well contribute to prolonging the conflict as they are likely to benefit one side more than another. Table 1 also highlights how foreign countries’ national interests in Libya generated a volume of support and interference that was not enough to make a decisive difference, but sufficient to prevent conflict resolution. In other words, once basic foreign priorities were adequately addressed in the short term – such as violent extremism, refugee flows or achieving a particular military advance or stalemate – tangible military, economic and diplomatic support started to lag.
The next section provides brief descriptions of 12 security initiatives attempted in Libya between 2011 and 2018 in order to assess whether the four strategic SSD implications reflected in Figure 1 (resulting from a top-down analysis of the course of Libya’s civil war) make sense in the context of specific security interventions (a bottom-up analysis of security initiatives).