



Clingendael

Netherlands Institute of International Relations

The European External Action Service
and Public Diplomacy

Dr Simon Duke

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Discussion Papers in Diplomacy



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Introduction

This discussion paper will focus on the role of the European External Action Service (EEAS) and public diplomacy. The rationale for this particular focus lies in the confluence of the institutional changes within the EU following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on 1 December 2009, which has placed the EEAS as a core facilitator at the heart of the EU's external relations. The latent potential in the Service to instil more coherence, effectiveness and visibility in the external actions of the EU may well have positive side-effects for public diplomacy.

The paper acknowledges though that there are also profound challenges to the external aspects of EU public diplomacy. Many of the challenges are specific to the EU and a good number arise from uncertainties arising from the Lisbon Treaty itself, while others are more generic in nature and apply with equal force to public diplomacy elsewhere in the EU institutions, or even to the national context. In order to understand the potential impact of the EEAS on EU public diplomacy it is therefore necessary to briefly describe the pre-Lisbon practices. The later sections will consider the Service itself and, in particular, the EU's delegations which are an integral part of the EEAS.

The paper is divided into six sections. The first considers the meaning and development of public diplomacy specifically at the European-level. For those unfamiliar with the history of public diplomacy and EU external relations, the second section will present a brief overview of the pre-Lisbon practice of public diplomacy, its challenges and shortcomings. The influence of the 'pillarisation' of the EU on public diplomacy in particular will be considered. The third section will consider the post-Lisbon context and the core role of the EEAS with regard to public diplomacy. The following section will focus on the EU delegations which are at the coalface in terms of the Union's external public diplomacy. The final section will return to the themes above and will consider the potential influence of the dual challenges and the future of EU public diplomacy. For those working on policy-related issues, there is an additional section suggesting ten policy recommendations.

Public diplomacy and the European context

A succinct version of the Commission's understanding of public diplomacy was provided as part of a booklet produced on the occasion of the EU's 50th anniversary celebrations:¹

Public diplomacy deals with the influence of public attitudes. It seeks to promote EU interests by understanding, informing and influencing. It means clearly explaining the EU's goals, policies and activities and fostering understanding of these goals through dialogue with individual citizens, groups, institutions and the media.

This rather broad definition captures the essence of the EU's internal and external public diplomacy. In essence, it is about self-image, or the image that a given actor intends to project to a third party.² The EU's public diplomacy is complicated by the imprecise nature of the EU's overall *actorness* or, put more simply, the type of actor the EU wishes to become on the international stage.³ This is in part due to the fact that the EU is an ongoing project, lacking finality but may also lie in a broader post-cold war existential crisis about who and what the EU is on the global stage.

One of the complicating factors when considering the EU's public diplomacy is that, historically, it has been directed primarily inward. The essence of this was captured in the European Commission's action plan to improve 'communicating Europe' to the citizens whereby 'it establishes a relationship and initiates a dialogue with European citizens, it listens carefully and it connects to people. It is not a neutral exercise devoid of value, it is an essential part of the political process'.⁴ Beyond the EU public diplomacy is more

1 European Commission, *A glance at EU public diplomacy at work, The EU's 50th anniversary celebrations around the world* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), p.12.

2 For a good example of this approach see, Steffen Bay Rasmussen, 'Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy Messages and Practices', Discussion Papers in Diplomacy, (The Hague: The Netherlands Institute for International Relations, 'Clingendael', July 2009).

3 On the EU's actorness, see Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, *The European Union as a Global Actor*, (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 223-248.

4 European Commission, DG Communication, Action Plan to Improve Communicating Europe, July 2005, p.2. at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/communication/pdf/communication_com_en.pdf.

normally 'directed towards foreign publics and conducted abroad'.⁵ In the case of the EU the internal aspects of public diplomacy are very much part of the construction of the identity and narratives that are employed externally. As a result, the distinctions between the internal and external aspects of public diplomacy have become increasingly difficult to maintain, especially in a saturated media environment where domestic and foreign audiences have equal access to official information.

The complex linkage between the internal and external dimensions of EU public diplomacy is perhaps best thought of as a self-reaffirming process, whereby the messages communicated internally are also directed externally as part of the Union's ongoing internal identity construction. Many issues, such as the sovereign debt crisis in the eurozone, all pose coordination challenges for the internal and external aspects of public diplomacy (arguably, far too little attention has been paid to the latter). This melding of the internal and external aspects of policies has also been termed intermestic (one that blends the international and domestic aspects of a policy or issue) which applies with particular force to the EU's public diplomacy.⁶ The international projection of the EU relies heavily upon the promotion of the 'domestic' Union as exemplar – 'you too could be like us'. When put more subtly, this is the core idea of the attraction of 'post-modern' Europe which is based upon the assumption that external partners in the pre-modern and modern world will in some sense wish to emulate the peace, stability and prosperity of the EU members that is characteristic of post-modernism.⁷ The legitimacy of the internal identity construction, the acceptance of norms and the consensus around narrative, will therefore do much to determine the legitimacy of external public diplomacy to both EU citizens (who wish to see reflections of themselves) and to third parties (who wish to see the virtues of the European example reflected towards themselves).

The draft Communication Strategy for the EU's External Policy 2006-9, presented to the Commission by the then Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, makes the symbiotic nature of the internal and external aspects of EU public diplomacy clear:

The task before us is therefore to... better inform a broader audience in third countries about the Union's policies, but also about its underpinning values and objectives as global actor [sic.]. This includes communication about the

5 Ellen Huijgh, 'Changing Tunes for Public Diplomacy: Exploring the Domestic Dimension', in *Exchange: The Journal of Public Diplomacy –Facets of Diplomacy*, Fall 2011, p.63.

6 On the origins of this term, see Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games', *International Organization*, Vol. 42, No.3, Summer 1999, pp.427-460.

7 On the post-modern nature of Europe, see Robert Cooper, *The Breaking of Nations: Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century*, (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003).

external consequences and projections of the EU's internal developments and policies.

In addition, there is a need to maintain a more sustained, open dialogue with the public within the EU on the Union's external policy. A stronger focus on this area would reflect the increasing importance of the external dimension of the Union's activities.⁸

According to this logic, if the EU promotes itself as a paragon of peaceful co-existence, or an area of 'human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights', it must be seen to be so internally or else the external public diplomacy will ring hollow.⁹ This notion is reinforced by the Treaty on European Union which, if anything, is even more explicit about the external objectives and principles than the internal aspects.¹⁰ The key external messages have either concentrated on exporting the EU's 'model' which includes its normatively laden values and principles or, on more specific matters, it often takes the form of *infopolitik*.¹¹ The idea of transferring information, either passively (through web-sites, blogs or publications) or actively (by official visits of EU officials or through the activities of the local EU delegation staff) is one that still pervades, with surprisingly little actual reference to public diplomacy *per se*.

The intermestic nature of the EU's public diplomacy is particularly hard to separate when it is borne in mind that the EU has no less than 164 national missions accredited to the EU and 36 international organizations and other representations – making it one of the largest diplomatic communities globally.¹² The first stop in terms of the external dimensions of the EU's public diplomacy is therefore Brussels itself. The EEAS has made considerable efforts to engage with the international press located in Brussels, much of

8 Draft Communication from Mrs Ferrero-Waldner to the Commission, *The EU in the World: Towards a Communication Strategy for the European Union's External Policy 2006-9*, C(2006) 329/1, p.1(emphasis added).

9 The Lisbon Treaty (consolidated version), The Treaty on European Union, Article 2, in *Official Journal of the European Union* C 83/17, 30 March 2010.

10 The Union's aims in its external relations are defined in Article 3(5) the Lisbon Treaty as follows: In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

11 On the use of this term see Philip Fiske de Gouveia with Hester Plumridge, *European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy*, (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, November 2005), pp.8-9.

12 Numbers provided at the European Commission Protocol Service, List of all missions (updated 11 February 2011), at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/corps/index.cfm?go=search.search&missions=1.

which is oriented towards the Member States themselves. A striking example would be a debate, to which press were invited, involving a critical assessment of French military operations in Mali and the weaknesses of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSDP) in which senior European Parliamentarian and EEAS officials were involved.¹³ Similarly, the official press and media sites established by the EEAS are designed to explain EU external actions as much as to the media of the EU members as to overseas media.¹⁴ Much of this, however, judging by press coverage of EU external relations in Member State media tends to appeal to the elite press.

The EU's efforts to conduct its public diplomacy have been frustrated on occasion by the public diplomacy of the Member States. Margot Wallström, at the time Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Institutional relations and communication strategy, made the point rather directly:

*As you well know, national governments like to claim credit for EU decisions that prove popular and to blame 'Brussels' for the unpopular ones. All too often they fail to explain to their citizens why and how these decisions were taken. The result is that too many people are ill-informed about European issues and many have a negative image of the EU. That can lead to big political problems.*¹⁵

The problem is equally frustrating when it comes to the external dimensions of public diplomacy which, from a national perspective, is often viewed as an integral part of *national* diplomacy (even if at arm's length on occasion). The external dimensions of national public diplomacy are often aimed at 'country projection and brand promotion' with relatively little focus on the broader and more normative goals that may be represented at the European-level.¹⁶ The inclusion of highly sensitive cultural aspects, such as those designed to foster the greater use of particular languages internationally (in the case of France this is a specific foreign policy aim which is echoed by Germany and Spain), can also shape individual national perspectives on public diplomacy and cause sensitivities at the European-level.

13 See Press Club Europe, Brussels at <http://www.pressclub.be/>.

14 See http://eeas.europa.eu/eueom/news/index_en.htm.

15 'Communicating Europe in Partnership', Speech Margot Wallström, Vice President of the European Commission responsible for Institutional relations and communications strategy, ECAS Conference 'Is the EU really listening to citizens?', SPEECH/07/602, 3 October 2007.

16 Jan Melissen, 'Beyond the New Public Diplomacy', Clingendael Paper No.3, October 2011 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations), p.10.

By way of contrast, the EU (as well as other bodies like the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe) are more likely to focus more on transversal policy issues, such as climate change, migration or human rights, which tends to demand a more diversified approach to public diplomacy in terms of the referents and policy scope. In the case of the EU there is increasing consciousness of the need to engage with civil society more pro-actively, as in the case of the southern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy, where two relatively recent instruments, the Civil Society Facility and the European Endowment for Democracy, are designed to foster 'real partnerships' extending beyond governments. The practical challenges are however profound and they start with understanding the nature of civil society (Who are they? Are they politically affiliated? Where does their funding come from?) and extend to more practical issues such as enabling sustained dialogues with 'diplomats' whose normal tour of duty lasts four years, as well as human and financial resource issues which tend to emphasise other aspects of diplomacy.

EU Public Diplomacy pre-Lisbon

Much has already been written on the pre-Lisbon aspects of EU public diplomacy, its actors and their various roles.¹⁷ This section will therefore only offer a brief overview and will not attempt to be exhaustive. The key purpose of this section is to highlight a number of unresolved issues surrounding EU public diplomacy and to give the reader a clearer idea of the challenges ahead for the EEAS.

The first and most obvious characteristic of pre-Lisbon public diplomacy is that it was highly fragmented. The 'pillarisation' of the EU into distinct policy areas, of which foreign and security policy was one, meant that public diplomacy was conducted by the Council Secretariat and the Commission with variable degrees of connectivity. The Council Secretariat was represented primarily in this realm by Javier Solana, the High Representative for CFSP from 1999 until 2009. He was supported by his spokesman, a number of Special Representatives appointed by the Council and a Directorate-General for Communication, Information Policy and Protocol.

On the Commission side, public diplomacy relied heavily on providing 'information' to both EU citizens as well as to a wider global public. The principal (passive) vehicle for was the network of EU Information Centres (EU-i) first established in the 1960s. The EU-i centres originally started off under the aegis of the European Commission's DG Communications but responsibility for the external relations aspects were transferred to DG External Relations (Relex) which covered the Relex 'family'. The information centres now number over 500 worldwide, with multiple centres in the larger EU strategic partners. The centres have evolved from primarily documentation centres to more demand-driven computer-based services. This approach serves as a good example of the tendency to equate the notion of public diplomacy with *infopolitik* which, bearing in mind

17 See Philip Fiske de Gouveia with Hester Plumridge, *European Infopolitik: Developing EU Public Diplomacy Strategy*, (London: The Foreign Policy Centre, November 2005); Steffen Bay Rasmussen, 'Discourse Analysis of EU Public Diplomacy Messages and Practices', *Discussions Papers in Diplomacy*, (The Hague: The Netherlands Institute for International Relations, 'Clingendael', July 2009); Mai'a K. Davis Cross, *EU Foreign Policy and the Challenge of Public Diplomacy*, November 2010, at <http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/Mai'a%20Cross%20EU%20PubD%20paper.pdf>.

the responsibility of DG Relex for providing a sizeable portion of the original staff for the EEAS, is a significant legacy problem for the still young EEAS.¹⁸

Public diplomacy within the Relex 'family' was coordinated through the Relex Information Committee (RIC). The monthly meetings of the committee assembled the relevant personnel from other parts of the extended 'family', which included DG Development, Trade, AIDCO (Europe Aid), ECHO (Humanitarian Aid), ELARG (Enlargement), PRESS, ECFIN (Economic and Financial Affairs), as well as Relex itself. The information budgets within the seven DG's represented in RIC represented around 70 officials and a budget of €30-40 million per annum.¹⁹ The committee had a second, equally important function, which was to ensure that the communications of the delegations to third parties reflected the views of the Commission as a whole and not only those of DG's Relex and Dev. At a more general level the Inter-Institutional Group for Information (IGI) meets frequently at Vice-President level to coordinate a variety of information issues.

In spite of the positive role of the RIC, the Commission's overall public diplomacy effort was disjointed. This gave rise to three principal challenges. First, as observed, there was a lack of horizontal devices to link public diplomacy across the EU institutions, including the Commission, the Council Secretariat and, increasingly, the European Parliament as well.

The second problem, which stemmed from the pillarization of EU external relations, was the heavy emphasis upon Community resources for public diplomacy. This led to the predictable situation where the foreign and security policy aspects (CFSP) had little in the way of resources and thus were stymied in their ability to present these critical aspects, whereas the Commission had the bulk of the resources but concentrated mainly on the *communautaire* aspects. The Commission's delegations were at the forefront of the Commission's public diplomacy efforts but since they did not represent the CFSP or ESDP

18 For an overview of the EU-i's see Video Oliver Nette, Deputy Head of Unit RELEX.I.5, Information & Communication, European Commission - External Relations Directorate General, Brussels, 29 July 2009, at <http://www.eurunion.org/eu/Content-Items/EU-US-Depository-Librarians-Workshop-July-29-2009-Brussels-Luxembourg-Washington-Video-Downloads.html>.

19 Draft Communication from Mrs Ferrero-Waldner to the Commission, *The EU in the World: Towards a Communication Strategy for the European Union's External Policy 2006-9*, C(2006) 329/1, Section 4.

aspects, led to the development of a 'consumer oriented' diplomacy, catering to the technical assistance and information for the local communities.²⁰

The pillarization of EU external relations also provoked sensitivities from the Member States who were generally wary of attempts to *communautairise* EU external relations. This meant that they may work through the rotating Presidency for CFSP public diplomacy, as well as through the High Representative, Javier Solana, and, on occasion, through national means – with the attendant risk of cacophony.

The third weakness was the apparent absence of a big picture within which to locate the EU's external public diplomacy. The lack of an overarching strategic perspective at the EU level, or even priorities that would join together and indicate hierarchy within the 134 country strategies, numerous thematic (counter-terrorism, non-proliferation or sustainable development) and even continental strategies (Asia, Arctic or Africa) often led to confusion regarding the principal objectives of the Union's public diplomacy. The temptation was to either stress the normative dialogue, emphasizing the EU's values and principles which, in the case of much of Asia or Russia, chimed awkwardly with the predominant trade or energy interests of the Member States. The default was therefore to provide 'basic information' to media and policy-makers.²¹ It is also worth noting that much of the pre-Lisbon public diplomacy was based around the Commission's 2006-2009 Communication Strategy, mentioned above. This has not been updated with any comprehensive Communication Strategy linking the different actors involved in the external aspects of public diplomacy. The lack of an overarching strategic perspective that informs and shapes the EU's external public diplomacy has reinforced the tendency to stress information dissemination. This led observers, like Dov Lynch, to conclude that the EU 'does not conduct public diplomacy. Its overall philosophy is that of information dissemination. This means that Union activities are information-led and passive. The focus falls heavily on 'what we say' rather than 'what they hear'.²²

20 M. Bruter, 'Diplomacy Without a State: The External Delegations of the European Commission' (1999) Vol. 6, No. 2 *Journal of European Public Policy*, pp. 199-200.

21 Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations, December 2012 Brussels, Ref. Ares (2013)32604, 11 January 2013, p.3.

22 Dov Lynch, 'Communicating Europe to the world: what public diplomacy for the EU?', EPC Working Paper No. 21, November 2005, p.31.

EU Public Diplomacy and the EEAS

With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty public diplomacy is no longer conducted exclusively by the Council Secretariat and the Commission, but also by the EEAS. The advent of the EEAS held the promise of linking together strategic communication, public diplomacy and stakeholder engagements in ways that had hitherto eluded the EU with the intention of creating an overall communication culture extending across the EU institutions involved in external actions (which is nearly all). Catherine Ashton, the first High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who is also a Vice-President of the Commission, under the Lisbon Treaty contributed to these expectations in her 'Step Change' document when she spoke about the need for 'a professional communications structure in order to engage all stakeholders and public opinion. This is important within the EU as well as to the outside world'. The EEAS must also, 'above all', have a 'strong and substantive media operation, in order to deal effectively with a global, 24 hour news culture that requires information and comment'. There is also the need to manage 'dialogue with civil society, NGOs, and other nonstate actors, and make use of new electronic and social media, etc, in attracting interest, shaping debate and building understanding on foreign policy issues'. Finally, she noted the need for better integration of the EU delegations 'in the promotion of EU interests, requiring better briefing and debriefing of Delegations'.²³

Other ideas regarding the EEAS and public diplomacy soon landed on the table. A Greek non-paper (a discussion document not representing an official position), presented to the Political and Security Committee, argued that there is a need to 'ensure that the EU's means and resources in the field of public diplomacy are commensurate with the EU's new ambitions for a more coherent and active foreign and security policy'.²⁴ The Greek

23 The European External Action Service: A step change in external policy for the Union: Delivering on the promise of the Lisbon Treaty, (undated) available at http://www.europolitics.info/pdf/gratuit_en/267601-en.pdf

24 Quoted in Paul Sturm, 'Shoring up the EU's public diplomacy in CSDP, in *European Security Review* No. 52, ISIS Europe, November 2010, p.4.

non-paper had many positive attributes, but it also dodged some important questions. The first issue is *what* should be communicated in terms of the central themes of EU public diplomacy or, as it was put by Herman van Rompuy, the first President of the European Council under the Lisbon Treaty, 'how to deal, as Europe, with the rest of the world'.²⁵

José Manuel Barroso, the first President of the European Commission under the Lisbon Treaty, also demonstrated a keen awareness of the strategic challenges faced by the EU. In his State of the Union address he argued forcibly that,

*As the strategic partnerships of the 21st century emerge, Europe should seize the chance to define its future. I am impatient to see the Union play the role in global affairs that matches its economic weight. Our partners are watching and are expecting us to engage as Europe, not just as 27 individual countries. If we don't act together, Europe will not be a force in the world, and they will move on without us: without the European Union but also without its Member States.*²⁶

The essence of these questions were posed by the Lisbon treaty (amending the founding treaties of the European Union) which aimed to make a more coherent, effective and visible EU. These were the key headings that EU leaders, heads of state and government, think tanks and others were supposed to be debating. Whatever debates started were soon extinguished by the global financial crisis and the subsequent handwringing about global economic governance within and beyond the EU. In an unfortunate confluence, the potential great debate about the EU's role in the world was rapidly overtaken by the sovereign debt crisis in the euro zone with, as yet, unclear consequences for the EU's wider public diplomacy.

In practice, the EEAS's response to the 'perfect storm,' described above, has been mixed. In the shorter-term the sovereign debt crisis, or the 'eurozone crisis' as it is often known, has undoubtedly thrown up some severe challenges for EU public diplomacy. Since the internal market is the core of post-war European integration, any threat to its stability or even existence is bound to have negative knock-on effects for the external aspects of public diplomacy.

25 Address by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, to the College of Europe, *The Challenges for Europe in a Changing World*, PCE 34/10, Bruges, 25 February 2010.

26 José Manuel Durão Barroso, President of the European Commission, State of the Union 2010, Speech/10/411, Strasbourg, 7 September 2010, p. 8.

Too little attention was paid to the external implications of the sovereign debt crisis since it was viewed within the EU as an internal matter, but it nevertheless led to external questioning of one of the key tenets of the Union's external public diplomacy which is that the EU is first and foremost promoting its own model of integration and its achievements as exemplar. The degree to which the EU's export of its model of regional integration may have already been weakened was nicely captured by the European Council on Foreign Relations as follows:

As a conflicted and divided Europe drifted towards economic stagnation and political gridlock, so the model for which the EU stands – that of an expanding and ever more effective multilateralism as a solution to the problems of a globalised world – was also discredited in the eyes of others. Emerging powers such as Brazil and China understandably wondered why they should pay to help rescue a continent which is proving unable to get its act together even though it has the resources to do so – let alone why they should listen to its lectures about regionalism and good governance.²⁷

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has also 'started to question' the much touted European model.²⁸ These observations serve to underscore the intermestic nature of the EU's public diplomacy by illustrating the dangers of any perceived disjuncture between the development of the EU internally and the promotion of the EU to external partners. Hence, the credibility of initiatives in the southern Mediterranean in the light of the Arab spring may be similarly undermined if the impression is gained that the Union's ability to deliver on the three 'M's' (money, markets and mobility), the concept of 'deep democracy' or the principle of 'more for more,' is compromised internally.²⁹

It was against this upheaval and flux in the international system that the EEAS was born. The EEAS was though only part of a more substantial institutional upheaval in the external relations of the EU which also included the introduction of the role of High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the Commission (henceforth HR/VP). The treaty also saw the European Council become an

27 Julian Vaïsse and Hans Kundnani et al., *European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012* (European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2012), p.5.

28 Björn Fägersten, 'European foreign policy and the eurozone crisis: A Swedish perspective', *UI Analysis* (Swedish Institute of International Affairs), p. 10.

29 The idea of 'more for more' was adopted in the aftermath of the Arab spring and is designed to reward those partners in the southern neighbourhood of the European Neighbourhood Policy who wish to embark upon more extensive political reforms, notably those referring to democratisation, human rights and reform of the judiciary.

institution in its own right, with a full time President. The virtual disappearance of the rotating Presidency system, held by Member States for six months, was a further significant change. The former role of the rotating Presidency of the Council was now assumed by the President of the European Council, the High Representative and a permanent chair of the Political and Security Committee (PSC).³⁰

In public diplomacy terms the Lisbon Treaty changes offered the potential for a more consistent message, especially in the absence of the rotating Presidency which tended to introduce new priorities into external relations following the proclivities of the particular Member State for the duration of their tenure at the helm. On the other hand, the list of actors at the top levels remained extensive and would require considerable coordination between those aspects of public diplomacy falling under CFSP (involving the President of the European Council, the High Representative, the EEAS and the Member State) and those falling under the Commission (involving the President of the Commission and nearly all Directorates-General which in some way, shape or form have an external mandate). The challenge facing the potential actors at various levels vis-à-vis public diplomacy was therefore one of coordination if key themes and messages were to be disseminated effectively regarding the EU's external action. Going back to the discussion above, it is also important to bear in mind that communicating the EU's external relations is at least as important within the EU as it is to third parties.

Of all of the actors mentioned, the EEAS's extensive (but vague) coordination role would be of considerable importance. In the initial concept of the EEAS the newly appointed HR/VP, Catherine Ashton, recommended that within its central administration there should be 'departments for inter-institutional relations, information and public diplomacy, internal audit and inspections, and personal data protection'.³¹ An annex to this document lists the departments and functions to be transferred to the EEAS from the Commission and Council Secretariat. These include 'all information and public diplomacy sections and staff' from DG Relex's External Service (i.e. the delegations and Relex K staff).³²

30 EU High Representative Catherine Ashton appoints the Permanent Chair of the Political and Security Committee Policy, Brussels, A 231/10, 16 November 2010.

31 Ibid. P.17.

32 The July 2010 Council decision lists in an annex those department and functions to be transferred to the EEAS which, in numerical terms means that for AD posts 585 will be transferred from the Commission (DG Relex), 93 from DG Development, and 436 posts transferred from DG Relex's External Service (i.e. the delegations). In addition 411 were transferred from the Council Secretariat. 118 new posts will be created in the period 2011-2013 at AD level. The total is number of positions created in the EEAS at AD level is therefore

The High Representative's 25 March 2010 draft Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, stated that the High Representative would be responsible for 'communication and public diplomacy' and that there should be a department for 'information and public diplomacy'. An attached organigram, showing 'Basic Structures' of the EEAS dutifully represented a box for Communication and Public Diplomacy.³³ The draft was rapidly rejected by the European Parliament, necessitating a major redraft which was then presented by the High Representative on 26 July 2010. The new draft also foresaw a department for 'information and public diplomacy' and again specified that all information and public diplomacy sections and staff in the (Commission's) External Service should be transferred to the Service.³⁴

Following the adoption of the decision by the Council and the approval of the necessary amendments to the financial and staff regulations by the European Parliament, the EEAS became a working reality on 1 January 2011. It was soon apparent that no role, in public diplomacy terms, is more important than that of the HR/VP herself. During 2011, the first year of the Service's existence, the High Representative and the EEAS issued 593 statements and declarations (including 328 statements by the High Representative, 128 Spokesperson's statements, 51 local EU statements and 86 declarations of the High Representative on behalf of the Member States. The figures for 2012 were broadly similar.³⁵ Although it is contestable whether statements and declarations fall under public diplomacy as such, the sheer volume posed two, as yet, unresolved problems for the development of EU public diplomacy.

The first issue is whether the volume of statements and declarations gives the recipients a clear idea of where the priorities of EU external action lie. In the event that they do not, a type of Gresham's law for public diplomacy may apply whereby bad messages drive out good. Of course, the sheer number of statements and declarations may also betray the lack of clear strategic focus and priority that underpins EU external actions.

1,643. Moreover, the Council decision states that 'at least one third of the all EEAS staff at AD level' shall comprise staff from the Member States (and that permanent officials of the Union should represent at least 60% of all EEAS staff at AD level). This implies that around 350 temporary agent posts will have to be filled by diplomats.

33 Proposal from The High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to the Council, *Draft Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service*, 25 March 2010, 8029/10, pp. 7 and 17 (and Annex 'Basic Structures').

34 Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 26 July 2010 (2010/427/EU), Official Journal of the European Union L 201/30, 3 August 2010, Article 4, 9(6) and Annex.

35 Figures from David Spence, Evidence given to the European Union Sub-Committee for External Affairs, House of Lords, on the European External Action Service, 12 December 2012, p.48, available at <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-committees/eu-sub-com-c/EEAS/WrittenevidencevolumeEEASv1.pdf>.

The second issue relates to the ability of the EEAS, as well as other related parts of the EU and the Member States, to follow up statements and declarations with meaningful and coordinated regional or national public diplomacy efforts. Here one of the core challenges is the often shorter-term policy perspectives (determined by factors such as terms of office or the duration of an Action Plan or agreement) versus the often longer-term engagement demanded in effective public diplomacy.

The role of the HR/VP, as envisaged, was to be supported by a department for information and public diplomacy, but this did not come into being *per se*. Instead responsibility for public diplomacy was scattered around the EEAS, starting with the first organigram of the EEAS which included a division called 'Foreign Policy Instruments' (FPI).³⁶ The FPI was created by the Commission in October 2010 and falls under the political responsibility of the HR/VP (in her *latter* guise). The instruments falling within the FPI are 'under the responsibility of the High Representative/EEAS' but, 'the Commission shall be responsible for their financial implementation under the authority of the High Representative in her capacity as Vice-President of the Commission'.³⁷ The FPI includes responsibility for 'Public diplomacy and election observation' which includes the budgetary aspects.³⁸ Part of FPI's mandate is to implement tenders on 'media relations and media promotion through notably audiovisual, web products and printed products and well as through other communication and information initiatives related EU actions and policies in the field of external relations'.³⁹ To complicate an already confusing picture, some aspects of public diplomacy nevertheless fall under the HR/VP such as the communication and public diplomacy aspects of election observation missions under the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

Elsewhere in the Service provision is made for a Strategic Communication division providing support services to the Corporate Board (the most senior EEAS officials beneath the HR/VP as well as Lady Ashton herself). The Strategic Communication division primarily provides direct support to the HR/VP, which includes her spokespersons. The modest division also has broader responsibilities relating to the wider Service including liaison and coordination, the delegations, as well as producing different forms of output for the media and public.

36 See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/organisation_en.pdf.

37 Council Decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 26 July 2010 (2010/427/EU), Official Journal of the European Union L 201/30, 3 August 2010, Article 9(6) and Annex.

38 European External Action Service, Organigram (supplied to author February 2011).

39 European Commission, Framework Service Contract Number FPIS 2011-01, March 2010.

Contrary to the envisaged integrated department, public diplomacy in the EEAS is therefore conducted through Strategic Communications while the FPI manages the EU delegation's Information and Communication budget and DG BUDGET rules apply.⁴⁰ It is also conducted more broadly through the relevant Directorates-General of the Commission with varying amounts of coordination with the EEAS. In spite of the fact that the FPI works very closely with the EEAS and other parts of the Commission, it seems increasingly anomalous for the FPI to retain the budgetary authority over a significant aspect of the Service's public diplomacy. The July 2013 review of the EEAS appears to recognise this when reference is made to 'on-going discussions on transferring responsibilities for external relations communication activities and budgets (including the management of EEAS and delegation websites) from the FPI to the strategic communications division in the EEAS'.⁴¹

The review is not clear on exactly how this might be accomplished but since the EEAS budget covers administrative credits and, within the existing budgetary structures, one possible way of shifting the public diplomacy budget towards the Service itself would be to redesignate this part of the Commission's budget as administrative credits. The FPI is also a vestige of the pre-Lisbon structures and, in particular, DG Relex of which it was part. Under this guise public diplomacy (and thus the funding structures) tended to reflect media relations and information. As has been argued, these are important components but are not public diplomacy *per se*. This legacy would appear to have moved the Service away from the original intention which was to link communications, public diplomacy and election observation under a common roof. The lack of an obvious link between the FPI, Strategic Communication and Strategic Planning, as well as the relevant desks in the crisis management bodies, leaves the HR/VP as the critical but over-stressed link. The attendant complications include potentially slow response time, by the time all of the parties are consulted, and it may also promulgate the top-down communications tendencies that have already been noted in the early years of the Service. The placement of the responsible structures and the funding authority within the EEAS (proper) would facilitate more effective 'mainstreaming' of key messages that should apply to the horizontal and geographical desks and, beyond that, to the delegations themselves.

40 Under Budget Line 19 11 02 (Information Programmes for third countries).

41 *EEAS Review*, p.9 (available at www.eeas.europa.eu).

A further anomaly of the EEAS in public diplomacy terms is the role of the Special Representatives.⁴² There are currently 12 Special Representatives, of which four are based in the countries or regions they represent, with the remainder in Brussels. The Special Representatives appear on the EEAS organigram reporting directly to the HR/VP. Yet, the Special Representatives are not part of the EEAS and their staff and funding fall outside the EEAS. They do, of course, have connections to the Service and to the delegations but their primary relationship is often the Member States themselves, through the Political and Security Committee. Since Special Representatives are appointed to crisis prone or post-crisis countries or regions, their role in terms of public diplomacy is of special importance. The 2013 EEAS Review suggests two options, the first being more implicit and the second explicit. The first is to review the role of the Special Representatives and to ask whether they are still essential, given the advent of the EEAS and senior officials in the EU's delegations. If they are still deemed to be of use, the second option would be to consider integrating the staff (around 200 political advisors) and administrative support (around €28 million) in the EEAS.⁴³ In terms of public diplomacy both of the steps suggested above would be a significant step towards creating a more integrated public diplomacy for the EEAS and the Union itself.

The arguments so far may give the reader the impression that the EEAS is in a public diplomacy crisis, both in terms of the onslaught of negative comment on the EU's role as well as structural and administrative confusion. There have been, admittedly rare, opportunities for the Service to promote a positive image of the Union and to reinforce the centrality of norms and principles in the Union's external action. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 to the EU was an open goal in public diplomacy terms. The Nobel Committee based its award on the stabilising role that the EU has played in the transformation of much of Europe from war to peace, as well as its role in promoting democracy and human rights. The 'fraternity between nations' was seen as a form of 'peace congress' which is one of the criteria referred to by Alfred Nobel in his 1895 will.⁴⁴

It would also be incorrect to leave the reader with the impression that the positive aspects of EEAS public diplomacy are circumstance driven or a matter of serendipity. One particularly striking example of a positive public diplomacy drive, based on wider policy initiatives shared across the EU institutions and with a number of international partners, is the 'Working with women' initiative. This has multiple facets to it, a broad geographical

42 See *EEAS Review*, pp.3-4.

43 *Ibid. Loc cit.*

44 For a full statement of the decision of the Norwegian Nobel Committee see http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/laureates/laureates-2012/announce-2012/.

spread, and is designed to foster awareness of women's issues over a sustained period of time. The tools of public diplomacy range from the well conceived web site, to conferences in different venues, surveys and cultural and awareness events built around key days, such as the International Day for the Elimination of Violence against Women or International Women's Day.⁴⁵ The initiative also stands as a good example of a highly coordinated external public diplomacy exercise.

There are, however, counter examples of coordination challenges stemming from the first year of the EEAS's existence which coincided with the crisis in Egypt in January 2011. The death of demonstrators in Egypt led to a statement by the High Representative on 27 January 2011, followed by another on 28 January. The following day, 29 January 2011, the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, issued a statement on events in Egypt, saying pretty much the same as the statements of the High Representative. The situation was then compounded by separate statements from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, David Cameron, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel, and the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy (from 16 May 2007 until 15 May 2012), again calling for the avoidance of all violence against unarmed citizens. It could be argued that the same essential message coming from multiple sources strengthens the EU's external actions, but in this case it led to consternation and confusion.

Any coherent external public diplomacy must also complement the internal public diplomacy efforts conducted through the Commission's DG Communication. Post-Lisbon coordination in this domain falls to the RIC's successor, the External Relations Information Committee (ERIC), which carries out the same coordinating role as its predecessor under the aegis of the Strategic Communications Division in the EEAS. The same division produces the daily Lines to Take (LTT) which is distributed to all Heads of Delegation and Press and Information Officers. These are crucial to the work of delegations, especially if they are provided in a timely manner taking into account time differences with Brussels.

Although the EEAS should be the obvious centre of gravity, any such role may pose its own problems, especially since Trade and Aidco quite clearly indicated their desire for arms-length relations with the EEAS from 2005 onwards. It remains an open question as to whether DG Trade and DG Development and Cooperation (as it became on 3 January 2011 through the fusing of DG Development and DG EuropeAid) will take kindly to being coordinated via the EEAS in terms of public diplomacy. It could be legitimately argued

45 See http://www.eeas.europa.eu/special-features/features_working_women_en.htm.

that any such coordination functions would follow from the HR/VP's specific responsibilities in her latter role, as well as her treaty-based duty of 'coordinating other aspects of Union's external action' (TEU Article 18(4)).

The specific issue of providing public diplomacy for CSDP is of particular importance since it is essential to be clear about why and how the EU intends to take action in the crisis management context, especially if the use of military force is involved. Prior to the advent of the Lisbon Treaty public diplomacy duties in this realm were spread between the High Representative, the rotating Presidency, the Political and Security Committee, the European Commission, the Member States (especially in the event of a framework nation operation) and the EU Mission Commander. At a more general level CSDP-related diplomacy was supported by the Council's Press Service and publications such as the EU Military Staff's *EU Security and Defence News* and the Council Secretariat's web portal with CSDP mission news.

In the post-Lisbon context the appointment of a Managing Director for Crisis Response and Operational Coordination may provide one possible central point for the coordination of these aspects of public diplomacy with those elsewhere in the EEAS.⁴⁶ The issuance of a 'Handbook for Spokespersons in CSDP missions and operations' is also intended to harmonise the public diplomacy of the various crisis management structures that may be involved in missions or operations, such as the Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, the EU Military Staff and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability. The PSC, mentioned above, has specific responsibility for drafting the specific tasks when it comes 'master message' which will then underpin the public diplomacy for a given CSDP operation.

Since CSDP operations are often complex and may involve civil protection or humanitarian dimensions, the suggestion put forward by the July 2013 EEAS Review to create a co-located emergency response facility, bringing together the EEAS Situation Room and the Commission's Emergency Response Centre, might also have beneficial effects for the coordination of public diplomacy efforts.⁴⁷ Ultimately, more streamlined and linked crisis response mechanisms, both within the EEAS and beyond, would provide a useful platform for a coherent public diplomacy effort to support the EU's development of a Comprehensive Approach.

46 EU High Representative Catherine Ashton appoints EEAS Managing Director for Crisis Response Brussels, A 244/10, 2 December 2010.

47 See *EEAS Review*, July 2013, p.5.

The EU delegations and Public Diplomacy

One of the most significant changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, from a public diplomacy perspective, was the advent of EU delegations following the attribution of legal personality to the EU by the Lisbon Treaty. Prior to this, the delegations had only represented those areas of external action represented by the Commission. Broadly speaking, the strategic elements of the EU's public diplomacy and information efforts in external relations are coordinated through the headquarters while the actual delivery and technical aspects are addressed by 139 delegations and their staff. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty these were delegations of the Commission but they are now delegations of the Union, meaning that they can represent the combined interests of the EU's external action. The sheer number of delegations is also worth noting, even if many are staffed by only a handful of senior administrators 13 have no political section, with the Head of Delegation the only AD official from the EEAS).⁴⁸ The EU's global representation is far larger than the bilateral representation of most of the EU's members.

The role of the delegations has also been highlighted post-Lisbon with the disappearance of the rotating Presidency of the Council in much of EU external relations. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty the rotating Presidency devoted substantial resources and effort to public diplomacy in order to promote the national priorities of the six month period. Post-Lisbon the external representation of the EU has fallen to the delegations but with little in the way of extra resources and certainly nothing like those available to many of the Member States. Cuts in the external relations budget in 2012-2013 promise little significant improvement (with little prospect of significant change in the next financial perspective 2014-2020). The centrality of the delegations to post-Lisbon public diplomacy can be roughly estimated by the amount of the external relations budget that is earmarked for the delegations (it is though very difficult to ascertain exactly what portion of the expenditure can be attributed to public diplomacy since any such expenditure is likely to

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* p.10.

be spread across several headings). For 2010 the most relevant part of the budget is Title 19, Chapter 19 10, which covers policy strategy and coordination for the EU external relations area. These figures remain ostensibly unchanged for 2011.⁴⁹ Approximately €12.5 million was committed for information programmes for non-member countries and an additional €2 million for 'The EU in the World'. The first figure includes programmes run from the headquarters such as the EU visitors programmes, publications on external relations, audiovisual material, the development of electronic media, support for the information activities of 'opinion leaders' and visits of journalists. The figure also includes the de-centralised activities conducted by the delegations which include relations with the media, information products, organisation of events and cultural activities, newsletters and information campaigns. The latter figure, although nominally external in nature, is fundamentally about convincing EU citizens that the Union is producing tangible benefits for EU citizens through external policies. By way of comparison, these figures are dwarfed by the €105 million spend on internal communication tools in 2010.⁵⁰ Put in rather general terms, most of the funding available for external public diplomacy goes to the Delegations but to around 10 per cent of the amount is spent on information and communication within the EU.

In December 2012 the EEAS (Strategic Communication Division) and DG DEVCO (Communication and Transparency Unit) jointly issues an *Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations*. The significance of this document lies in the combined provenance of the document but it also reminds the reader that the majority of the administrative staff in the delegations are not EEAS but Commission staff – primarily from DG DEVCO. The importance of jointly promoting the visibility of the EU across the EU's external actions was thus emphasised in this important document. In it, the delegations are encouraged to concentrate their 'messaging and action' around five priority areas, 'inspired by the promotion of EU values and based on the delivery of peace, security and prosperity'.⁵¹ They are:

49 Draft General Budget of the European Union for the financial year 2011, Volume 3, Section III, Commission, p.III-792 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/DB_2011/EN/SEC03.pdf.

50 The three areas include Communication and the Media, Going Local Communication and Analysis and communication tools. It does not include the €112 spent on administrative support for DG Communication. See General Budget 2010, Volume 4, Section 3 (Commission), Title 16 available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/budget/data/D2010_VOL4/EN/nmc-titleN17942/index.html.

51 *Information and Communication: Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations*, December 2012, Ref: Ares(2013)32604, 11 January 2013, p.4.

- Promoting the EU as a major partner in democratic transition (in particular in its wider neighbourhood);
- Promoting the EU as the world's biggest cooperation and development donor;
- Promoting the EU as a global economic power responding to the crisis and using trade as an engine for change;
- Promoting human rights through high-level political dialogue with our partners and strategic cooperation programmes;
- Promoting the EU as a security provider responding to global security threats.

Several challenges face the delegation staff in achieving these goals. The first and most obvious issue is that there are huge disparities in terms of staffing and capacities between the delegations. All delegations will have a Press and Information Officer, but in some delegations this position may only be part of a wider mandate and the training and aptitude for such a role may be limited. Most of them will be locally engaged staff, supervised by the head of the relevant political section. This has the important advantage of allowing the EU to take advantage of local knowledge, languages and to adapt communications to the local setting.

The changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty have also had an impact on the delegations due to the changed role of the rotating Presidencies which has meant an additional burden for the delegations. Among other factors, this now means that the amount of the press information budget that can be allocated to cultural events has increased from 10 to 20 per cent.

A second challenge lies with coordinating EU public diplomacy with the Member States. The delegations have been encouraged to share their public diplomacy strategy with the local EU member's representations. Ideally this will lead to joint public diplomacy strategies like those in Brazil or Mexico. At worst, the dangers of ill-coordinated public diplomacy result in a counter-productive bifurcation of efforts as in the case of North Africa where there is a risk of reversion to old habits, whereby Brussels preaches on democracy and human rights, the member states pursue the short-term national interests, the North African countries note and exploit the hypocrisy, the European

authority and influence fade'.⁵² Most delegations will hold regular coordination meetings with the local EU Member State press and/or cultural counsellors. Where appropriate (and where staffing allows) task forces may be created to implement specific projects.

The third dilemma rests in the question of who the objects of public diplomacy are, especially given the diverse human and capital resources represented in the delegations. An important aspect of the delegation's outreach is dialogue with civil society and this is actively being promoted in particular parts of the world, like the southern Mediterranean. The small numbers of administrative staff may preclude the kind of extensive engagement with civil society often desired, especially since the Heads of Delegation find their time filled with financial management tasks. There is also the question of who 'civil society' are since, if the basic background to civil society groups are not known, along with their political and financial affiliations, well-intentioned attempts at engagement may be counter-productive. That said, the 'message' being communicated has to be tailored to the specific audience since local considerations, cultural aspects and the history of the EU's relations with the country or region in country will vary widely. An example of this would be the Al-Jisr project where the EU delegation in the Gulf has been supporting the Gulf Research Centre project on public diplomacy and outreach with the aim of increasingly mutual awareness and fostering EU-Gulf Cooperation Council relations.

As mentioned, the ability of an individual EU delegation to engage in public diplomacy activities varies enormously. An example at the top end of the scale is the delegation in Washington D.C. where there is a Press and Public Diplomacy (PDD) Section, created in January 2006. The delegation's website states:

*The Delegation's Public Diplomacy mission is a key priority because of the strategic importance of the EU/US partnership... To maintain these fundamental relations and make the partnership even more productive, it is important that we engage with each other on all levels of our societies. It is important that we continue to learn about one another: how our political, economic and social systems function and how we make decisions that advance our common goals.*⁵³

The section, all told, includes around eighteen staff (roughly one-third of which are AD-level or equivalent). The Washington DC delegation was the first to explicitly embrace the term public diplomacy in their work, as opposed to the normal emphasis on information

52 Nick Witney and Anthony Dworkin, *A Power Audit of EU-North Africa Relations*, (European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2012), p.5.

53 See <http://www.eurunion.org/delegati/ppd/ppd.htm>.

and public affairs. The size of this delegation and the presence of a dedicated public diplomacy team means that (in EU terms) they are able to offer an unparalleled range of support programmes and instruments.⁵⁴ The number of activities run by the PDD Section is unusually broad, due to the resources that the delegation can devote to the section (but it still compares unfavourably with the larger EU Member States representations in Washington DC).

Programmes tend to concentrate around outreach programmes targeting youth, joint or collaborative events held with the EU Member States' embassies and consulates and social media outreach. The *EU Rendez-Vous* programme includes senior EU and U.S. leaders discussing challenges of mutual concern for transatlantic relations in the Washington DC area. Nine events were held in 2012 attracting more than 1,100 people.⁵⁵ Somewhat predictably Europe Day is a key date in the public diplomacy calendar with Ambassadors and consuls of the EU Member States travelling around the U.S. to promote awareness about the EU, its policies and matters of common concern across the Atlantic. In addition, 'open houses' (at the Member State embassies) are organised around the 9 May celebrations. The open houses in 2012 attracted 23,600 visitors to the 28 venues (including Croatia), with the United Kingdom topping the list.⁵⁶ Beyond Washington DC, the ten EU Centers of Excellence established at prominent American universities serve as venues for more academic pursuits at the undergraduate and graduate levels, as well as general and local outreach programmes.⁵⁷ On occasion Member State consulates dotted around the U.S. are also used for outreach activities. The delegation undertook 255 speaking engagements in 2012, of which 40 were in Washington DC. The 2012 budget for all of the individual press and information activities, including those that are project based, amounted to €579,574. If other grant-based instruments are included, just under €1 million should be added which is rather modest by the standards of the larger and some of the medium-sized Member States.

The importance of transatlantic relations also explains why the European Parliament opened a liaison office (EPLO) on 29 April 2010 in Washington DC, aimed primarily at strengthening links at all levels with U.S. Congressional bodies and to support the

54 For an overview see 'Engaging the World: The EU's Public Diplomacy', EU Insight, No. 42, July 2010 (Washington DC: Delegation of the European Union to the United States).

55 Information provided by the EU Delegation to the United States, Washington DC.

56 Information provided by the EU Delegation to the United States, Washington DC.

57 The grant of €3.1 million covers nine universities as well as a consortium of Washington DC area universities. For full details see <http://www.euintheus.org/what-you-can-do/apply-for-a-grant/eu-centers-of-excellence/current-grantees-eu-centers-of-excellence/>. EU Centres have also been established in Australia (3), Canada (3), Japan (4), New Zealand (1) and Russia (6).

transatlantic legislative dialogue. The modest EPLO office is separate, although for legal and practical reasons it is housed within the delegation.

Some of the other larger delegations also able to offer increasingly sophisticated public diplomacy support and services. For instance, the delegation in Moscow has a Press and Information Department; Tokyo has a Press, Public and Cultural Affairs section, while Beijing has a Press and Information Section. These are, however, atypical since the vast majority of the other delegations have to suffice with one-person press, information and cultural affairs officers. In all instances the EEAS HQ (Strategic Communications) will provide a 'daily flash' with broad lines to take and all delegations are provided with a handbook for public diplomacy. The daily flash includes the Commission's daily Lines to Take (LTTs). In particular instances, such as the conclusion of a Council meeting, heads of delegation may also be briefed by phone on the main outcomes of the meeting, especially if it pertains directly to their country or region. In specific instances these may be supplemented by engagement with local governments or civil society organisations through electronic and social media (particularly where the latter may be otherwise difficult to engage with).

The delegations are also encouraged to engage in media which is designed primarily to communicate the EU's 'values, policies and results of its projects towards third country stakeholders'.⁵⁸ The relevant delegation staff have access to not only the LTT's but also the daily 'flash' (press briefings) from Brussels, various audio-visual services and alerts for forthcoming events. The delegation budget will also cover specific Brussels-based training for non-EU journalists based around a semi-standardised four day module organised with the European Journalism Centre.⁵⁹

The European Parliament has been particularly active in promoting other aspects of public diplomacy, most notably the role of cultural diplomacy 'in advancing the EU's interests and values in the world' and has also stressed that this should include 'digital diplomacy'.⁶⁰ The Parliament's Committee on Culture and Education has called for one person in each EU representation overseas to coordinate interaction between the EU and third countries on cultural relations. As mentioned above, the cultural aspects of the EU's public diplomacy demand careful coordination between and with the Member States.

58 Information and Communication Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations, December 2012 Brussels, Ref. Ares (2013)32604, 11 January 2013, p.3.

59 See <http://www.ejc.nl/>.

60 Marietje Schaake (rapporteur), Draft Report on the cultural dimensions of the EU's external action, Committee on Culture and Education (2010/2161), 29 November 2010, p.5.

Some countries attach particular linguistic or cultural significance to specific countries, or they have well-developed forms of outreach such as BBC World Service, Radio France Internationale, Deutsche Welle. The EU will obviously not replicate these but the delegations could play a particularly useful role in the preservation and defence of the cultural richness of the EU members. This could have important practical effects in, for example, the WTO context where the EU members may be faced with demands to liberalise the markets for cultural property. This will demand efforts on the part of the Member States to link up their public diplomacy efforts in a more consistent manner so that better coordination can take place between the national and European efforts. Little exists to promote consultation on the cultural aspects of public diplomacy at the moment beyond the Consociato Institutorum Culturalium Europaforum Inter Belgas.⁶¹

The EU's public diplomacy in this sphere is centred mainly around the delegations but far more could be done to engage wider publics beyond the EU by radio. This remains, in EU terms, a largely forgotten media but one that could reach more people than the internet or *in situ* events. For many in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond, radio still remains the most important medium for news. Community radio use is growing particularly rapidly (it has expanded 1,386% over a six year period in sub-Saharan Africa) and this has the benefit of often traversing borders.⁶² Although the production of radio programmes would have cost and human resource implications, the production of local language programmes with the assistance of locally engaged staff at the delegations, which are then offered to key regional or national broadcasters, may have significant effects for boosting EU public diplomacy without incurring huge outlays.

As noted above, the inclusion of the CFSP (foreign and security policy aspects) and CSDP (the common security and defence policy) elements into the delegation's public diplomacy is a further significant post-Lisbon development with implications for the EU's public diplomacy. This will obviously be of more concern for those delegations located in or proximate to crises or post-crisis countries or areas. In these instances the EU's public diplomacy has to clearly explain the rationale for any CSDP mission, its aims, objectives and timeframe. In these instances delegation staff will liaise with the relevant authorities for the civilian or military missions in the region which may include a Special Representative who would incur much of the public diplomacy burden.

61 The CICEIB currently represents Alliance Française, the British Council, the Cervantes Institute, the Danish cultural Institute, the Finnish cultural institute, the Goethe-Institut, the Italian cultural institute, the Louvain Institute, the Austrian Cultural Forum, and the Czech Cultural Center.

62 Jane Coaston, 'In Africa, radio connects communities across borders', at <http://www.pedaid.org/blog/entry/in-africa-radio-connects-communities-across-borders> .

The challenge for the delegation is not only that of resources, both financial and human, but also the question of being able to present a coherent public diplomacy which is at the same time tailored to the country or region in question, but still retains overall coherence for the EU as a whole. The on the ground challenges involve identifying the relevant interlocutors which may be obvious when it comes to government or official level contacts, but less apparent when it comes to civil society or potential agenda shapers. The question of how to approach public diplomacy also has to be determined and this has often been on a project-based service (following the DG DEVCO model) but this is now changing with the introduction of outsourcing to create a 'single visibility campaign'. This model has been followed in Indonesia and Brunei, to internal acclaim, but the obvious risk is that branding and public relations, which may be part of public diplomacy, detract from the building up and maintenance of long-term relations that should be at its heart.⁶³

Other challenges will also depend upon the locale, but these may include the demographics of the country/region, literacy rates and internet penetration. In many instances the internet and social media are becoming increasingly important and this poses the challenge of being able to communicate effectively using these important new tools. Until recently the maintenance of up-to-date delegation websites was a rather hit or miss affair (often depending upon the inclination and aptitude of the press officer) but this has now been improved with the introduction of a common template and joint management by the headquarters (including the FPI, EEAS and DEVCO). Press and Information Officers can also access the daily midday press briefing held in Brussels, either by telephone or by video (web-streaming). This, alongside the LTTs, represents a significant effort towards communicating a coherent message to external partners (as well as to interested parties within the EU).

The inclusion of the whole gamut of the EU's external relations interests in the delegations will also require closer coordination with the diplomatic services of the Member States so that activities and messages may be coordinated. The integration of EU positions and priorities into national public diplomacy can only strengthen EU policy delivery. This presupposes reciprocal support and information exchange between the EEAS and the national diplomatic services. Since most of the temporarily assigned national diplomats will work in the EU delegations, it is more than a matter of curiosity that the obligations regarding information exchange between the EEAS and the national embassies appears to have shifted subtly. In the draft Council decision of 25 March 2010,

63 See Information and Communication: Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations, December 2012, Ref: Ares(2013)32604, 11 January 2013, p.20.

'The Union delegations shall work in close cooperation with the diplomatic services of the Member States. They shall, on a *reciprocal basis*, provide all relevant information'.⁶⁴ In the final version, of July, the same passage now reads, 'The Union delegations shall work in close cooperation and share information with the diplomatic services of the Member States'.⁶⁵ The problem of information exchange between EU delegations and national embassies may be lessened if the provisions of the July Council decision on the EEAS are in fact followed, whereby:

*The staff of the EEAS shall carry out their duties and conduct themselves solely with the interests of the Union in mind...they shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government, authority, organisation or person outside the EEAS or from any body or person other than the High Representative... EEAS staff shall not accept any payments of any kind whatever from any other source outside the EEAS.*⁶⁶

The coordination of the public diplomacy of the Member States with that of the EU is a sensitive issue. It would of course be illusory to hope for a 'single voice' since it has long been accepted that diversity is part of the character of the Union. The emphasis is therefore on fostering a 'single message', wherever possible. The regular coordination between the delegations and the EU representations on EU public diplomacy strategy and the sharing of LTTs is designed to encourage the communication of a common EU position. On those cases where there is a clear common interest and position, such as in the immediate aftermath of North Korea's February 2013 nuclear test, the communication of a coherent message is relatively straightforward.⁶⁷

In this and other cases the public diplomacy impact is magnified by the association of the acceding country (Croatia), the candidate countries (the former Yugoslav Republic of Montenegro, Iceland and Serbia), the potential candidate (Albania), the EFTA countries (Lichtenstein and Norway), members of the European Economic Area, as well as the

64 Proposal for a Council Decision of (date) establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 25 March 2010, Article 5(9) (emphasis added).

65 Council decision on the organisation and functioning of the EEAS, (2010/427/EU), 26 July 2010, Article 5(9) L 201/30 Official Journal of the European Union, 3 August 2010.

66 Ibid. Article 6(4).

67 See Declaration by the High Representative on behalf of the European Union on the alignment of certain third countries with the Council Decision 2013/88/CFSP amending Council Decision 2010/800/CFSP concerning restrictive measures against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 7302/13, Brussels, 8 March 2013 and; Remarks by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton on nuclear threats and human rights in North Korea, A133/13, Strasbourg, 13 March 2013.

Republic of Moldova and Armenia, who often associate with the declaration. On other occasions the Ukraine has also associated.

It remains to be seen whether temporarily assigned national diplomats serving in the EEAS, who may be in the Service for 4-8 years, will lead to closer public diplomacy efforts on the part of the EU and its members. Up to one-third of the administrative (AD) staff will be temporarily assigned national diplomats. In mid 2013 308 diplomats from the Member States were serving in the EEAS (out of 935 authorised AD posts), of which 174 were serving in delegations (out of 376 occupied AD posts in delegations).⁶⁸ National diplomats now constitute one-third of the overall EEAS AD staff (32.9%) but represent 46.3% of AD staff in delegations. Given the heavy involvement of national diplomats in the EU delegations, it is worth reiterating Lord Hannay's suggestion that public diplomacy is an area where the national diplomats may be able to make a significant contribution:

*...the demands of public diplomacy, which are clearly overtaking those of the more classical diplomatic tasks, will require an effective response from the [EEAS] if it is not to find itself playing second fiddle to those national diplomats who are more and more getting to grips with this new dimension.*⁶⁹

Most national diplomats will be used to thinking of public diplomacy as an integral part of diplomatic practice whereas for the EU official who has served in delegations prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the main emphasis was on management and the effective and legal dispersal of funds. The advantages to the delegation may stem from the willingness of EU members to allow them to tap into existing national networks, especially in the foreign and security policy aspects which were not covered via the delegations prior to the Lisbon Treaty. The experience of dealing with diverse groups or individuals may also play to the strengths of national diplomats. It is, however, possible that the new expanded role of the EU delegations may prove attractive to a number of Member States since the EU delegation does not represent the predominant views of any one Member State. In this sense the EU delegations may be seen as carrying less 'baggage' than a number of members, especially when former colonial dependencies are involved. This may be of particular interest to the newer and often smaller Member States who may be looking for ways of balancing the influence of the larger and older members.

68 Staffing Report, (Brussels: EEAS), 1 June 2013, p.4.

69 Lord Hannay of Chiswick, 'How will we know if the European Union's External Action Service (EEAS) has got off to a good start?', Europe's World, Autumn 2010, available at http://www.europesworld.org/NewEnglish/Home_old/Article/tabid/191/ArticleType/articleview/ArticleID/21730/language/en-US/Default.aspx.

E(U)-Public Diplomacy

A growing aspect of diplomacy, as noted above, is 'digital diplomacy' which has obvious applications for public diplomacy. Growing numbers of young people, in particular, are connected with social media, podcasts, media events, cultural events, blogs and other e-information strategies (as the Arab Spring demonstrated).⁷⁰ At one end of the spectrum this has been embraced by former Secretary of State Hilary Clinton who launched her 21st Century Statecraft initiative which is designed to complement 'traditional foreign policy tools with newly innovative and adapted instruments of statecraft that fully leverage the networks, technologies, and demographics of our interconnected world.'⁷¹ Although the human and financial resources dwarf anything equivalent in the EU or the Member States, the initiative has nevertheless served to inspire.

The EEAS (as well as DEVCO and TRADE) have recognised the increasing importance of the media and established accounts on social networking and media sites such as Facebook, Twitter and Flickr.⁷² Senior EU officials, like the President of the European Council, Herman van Rompuy, have established enthusiastic followings on the Chinese Sina Weibo platform. An increasing number of EU delegations are present on social platforms with encouragement from the EEAS (and Commission) to do so. This is a role that the local staff could usefully expand upon since they will be best attuned to which communication strategies are likely to reach the desired target group(s) and, importantly, the local languages or dialects employed. Although this aspect of public diplomacy has developed relatively recently, it has now become established within the EEAS with communication on all Service-related issues on a systematic basis. More generally, when the EU is operating in countries with high internet penetration, the emphasis is increasingly upon electronic information products, rather than paper products. This also implies the need to devote the necessary resources and time to updating and upgrading the relevant EU websites. This is currently not done on a

70 The EEAS created a Facebook page in mid-May 2011 and has two twitter accounts.

71 See <http://www.state.gov/statecraft/index.htm>.

72 See <https://www.facebook.com/EuropeanExternalActionService>; https://twitter.com/eu_eeas; <http://www.flickr.com/photos/eeas/>.

systematic basis and much may depend upon the aptitude of individual staff members, the provision of the necessary skills and training, as well as the time and resources to maintain and update the various web-sites.

Since the medium should never be confused with the message, 'e-diplomacy' has its place in public diplomacy, but it also has limitations. It is an increasingly important tool for outreach to publics beyond the government in question and therefore of importance in contacting opinion makers, influential bloggers, journalists and civil society. The events leading up to the Arab spring were a particularly important reminder that EU public diplomacy must extend beyond the official dialogues to embrace other subjects of contemporary multilevel diplomacy. The challenges with social media engagement lie with the difficulties in maintaining sustained dialogues on often complex subjects through a medium that naturally condenses and simplifies.

A closer examination of the EEAS Facebook, Flickr (where the EEAS maintains a photostream) or Twitter accounts shows evidence of some interactivity ('likes', retweets and comments) but this is often not sustained. Many of the comments posted on the EEAS Facebook site elicit no reaction from the EEAS side. This is largely due to understandable human resource issues, but it also stymies the idea of dialogue and engagement and risks making this type of e-diplomacy rather wooden and staged. A number of the delegations could also consider greater engagement with local communities through social media and it may also provide useful feedback for the delegation staff. Twitter could be more useful if there were more accurate tools to track, and measure social media results (like hootsuite). Much of the material on the social media sites qualifies as information, with links to official policies or documents. In this sense the use of social media can complement other forms of public diplomacy and the wider strategic objectives of the EU.⁷³ Social media may be an important tool in fighting for 'rights and liberties' but it should also complement the relevant sectoral dialogues at official level.⁷⁴ Finally, there is also the question of cross-platform coordination to make sure that the efforts of the EEAS, DEVCO and TRADE are communicating the same meta-messages. This coordination is ensured by the ERIC group, referred to above.

73 One example would be the use of International Women's Day to fight violence against women. See http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2013/080313_womensday_en.htm .

74 *Information and Communication: Handbook for EU Delegations in Third Countries and to International Organisations*, December 2012, Ref: Ares(2013)32604, 11 January 2013, p.12.

The path ahead

The ability of the EU generally, and the EEAS more specifically, to respond to the relative decline of traditional diplomacy and the rise of public diplomacy will depend upon a number of inter-related factors. It is perhaps helpful at this juncture to return to the earlier notions of identity, norms and narratives.

First, effective public diplomacy depends upon a clear understanding of *what* is to be communicated. This implies a keener sense of identity or what exactly the EU stands for on the international stage. What is it that is distinct about the international role of the EU? If, as is often argued, the normative approach of the Union is its distinguishing factor, this has to be reflected systematically and the promotion of double-standards avoided. The narrative of the EU has to be re-written at the same time. The 'founding myth' of the phoenix rising from the ashes of war is one that has increasingly less resonance with a generation of Europeans whose grandparents may not even remember World War II, let alone to young Chinese or Indians whose perceptions of the world are changing very rapidly. This is a formidable challenge for public diplomacy which demands some fundamental strategic thought and direction if it is to stand any chance of success. In practical terms this implies adopting something akin to the Communication Strategy of 2006 entitled 'Europe in the World.' In the absence of such an approach, the only message that risks being communicated to the Union's external partners is one of confusion, the inability to address internal challenges accompanied by mounting doubts about the model of regional integration that the EU extols externally. This will compromise the legitimacy and authority of the EU's public diplomacy, both at home and overseas.

The second consideration is that the EU's current external public diplomacy is highly decentralised. Bearing the above argument in mind, however, centralisation is desirable only if the EU has a clearer message to communicate externally. The key element in any centralisation is the HR/VP herself. Beneath her there is the evident need for enhanced coordination between the EEAS, the Commission, the European Council and the European

Parliament. This will clearly demand dedicated support within the EEAS to facilitate any such enhanced coordination and will also make it essential that the FPI fosters closer ties and working linkages with the offices for Strategic Planning, Strategic Communications in the EEAS, as well as the relevant Cabinets of the senior external relations actors. The work of ERIC is to be applauded, but it risks being compromised by ongoing resistance to more general political and policy coordination at various levels. In this context coordination between the 'triangle' of trade, development and the EEAS (representing the CFSP and CSDP aspects) is of particular importance.

In the event that there is no clear strategic view of the EU's global role, the relevance of centralisation may well be reversed. In this scenario a more decentralised model of public diplomacy, emphasising the role of the delegations, may come to the fore. This would be based on country and regional strategy papers, with the horizontal or thematic ones woven in as appropriate. Public diplomacy would then become 'local'. The danger of this lies in possible inconsistencies, which may then become apparent due to mass communications and the ease of comparison. The possible dilution of key platforms, like human rights, would further erode the EU's identity, weaken its narrative and the legitimacy of any public diplomacy.

The danger of this type of inconsistency and weakening may also be promoted by the lack of coordination between the EEAS and the Member States. The temptation of the members to offload the more normative agendas on to the EU, while they pursue their more pragmatic interests, should be avoided. The Lisbon Treaty, under Article 24.3 TEU does, after all, oblige the Member States to both 'support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity', as well as complying with 'the Union's action in this area'. Complementary public diplomacy at the European and national levels would be a visible way of demonstrating such a commitment.

Finally, the ability to respond to the challenges for public diplomacy outlined above will depend upon coordination, notably by the HR/VP, access to the requisite expertise and the necessary resources. Any serious effort will involve giving public diplomacy a more central role within the EEAS proper, linking it to strategic communication and planning and, critically, to the delegations. The influx of national diplomats into the EEAS should be exploited to upgrade the general expertise in public diplomacy. More emphasis should be given to effective training for public diplomacy as well as for 'e' (public) diplomacy. The question of whether this can realistically be done depends in part on the political will of the EU's leaders and those of the Member States to define the EU's global role more

accurately and to thus say something about the type of actor the Union is and should become. The rest depends upon human resources, skills and budgetary support at a time of mounting pressure at the national and EU levels.

Ten Policy Recommendations:

The policy recommendations below are drawn from the text. In some cases they represent challenges that go beyond public diplomacy to reflect broader underpinning issues with EU-level diplomacy. Others are more specific in nature and relate to the EEAS, the delegations or resource issues. The recommendations will therefore be listed from general to more specific but not necessarily in a hierarchical manner:

1) *The context for public diplomacy*: Further strategic elaboration is required in order to ascertain priorities between various sub-strategies and so that the nature of the EU's actorness and the core 'messages' to be communicated externally are clearer. Such an exercise might usefully unwrap often used terms like 'effective multilateralism,' 'the rule of law,' 'more for more,' and engagement with 'civil society' so that they become more than slogans and can be operationalised for public diplomacy. This would also make it easier to establish a focus for public diplomacy efforts rather than risk disparate and potentially conflicting communication. It may also allow the HR/VP and others to focus on key messages linked to priorities rather than the current scattershot approach. Less could be more

2) *Internal and external public diplomacy are linked*: There needs to be greater appreciation of the 'self-referential' link between the internal and external aspects of public diplomacy or its 'intermestic' nature as it is called in the main body of the text. This could usefully be reinforced by the HR/VP in her latter coordination capacity with, if necessary, extended meetings of the Relex Group of Commissioners to include other relevant Commissioners. Any strategic elaboration, of the type discussed in the point 1, should emphasise the linkages between the internal and external aspects of public diplomacy

3) *Move away from the information culture*: Information is, undeniably, an integral part of public diplomacy. But it nevertheless remains a supporting effort for the wider public diplomacy aimed at creating sustained partnerships including, but going beyond, the government of the third country or region in question. There is a need to adopt longer-term perspectives on public diplomacy including,

but going beyond the 'information culture' inherited from the former DG Relex, to stress dialogue or two-way communications. In some instances this may imply the development of a more 'listening culture'

4) *Effective use of common meetings, manuals, procedures and vademecum*: The development of the joint EEAS-DEVCO *Information and Communication Handbook* is to be applauded, yet it has highlighted the need for further common procedures and the fostering of shared outlooks across EU external relations and with the Member States. In this regard common manuals and understanding of procedures could be explored, initially through ERIC and the use of the intranet (like EEASzone) could also be exploited to establish and propagate best practices. There is a need to involve DG TRADE more deeply in joint public diplomacy programmes in particular since this remains a critical part of the EU's overall external public diplomacy. The Relex Group of Commissioners, which has fallen into abeyance, should meet more regularly to foster not only common outlooks but also lines for coordinated public diplomacy efforts

5) *Closer coordination within the EEAS*: Public diplomacy remains disparate within the EEAS and could be facilitated by a clearer responsibilities and resources for Strategic Communication within the EEAS, including the transferral of the applicable funding elements from the Foreign Policy Instrument (FPI). The role of Special Representatives should be reconsidered and, in the event that senior figures in delegations assume their tasks, corresponding human and budgetary resources should be made available to the EEAS. This would grant the EEAS more autonomy in its public diplomacy but, at the same time, it would be accompanied by tighter coordination at higher levels

6) *Closer coordination between the EEAS and the Member States*: Public diplomacy at the national level exists, logically, to promote national goals and interests. Nevertheless, greater efforts could be made to promote the joint promotion of agreed goals in a mutually reinforcing manner through the relevant sections of national foreign ministries. The promotion of Joint Public Diplomacy Strategies should build upon encouraging early efforts (like Brazil and Mexico)

7) *Judicious use of e-diplomacy*: Electronic (public) diplomacy offers powerful outreach potential, especially in regions where internet penetration and social media saturation is high or growing. It also needs to be treated with caution and

its limitations recognised (often short-term and not necessarily ideal for communicating and promoting more complex messages)

8) Triumph of hope over resources: The financial and human resources devoted to the external aspects of EU public diplomacy currently limits the development of public diplomacy. A serious public diplomacy effort will require access to more substantial finances and expertise. What has been achieved so far is remarkable, given the shoe string budgets and relatively small numbers involved. It is, though, difficult to see how EU-level public diplomacy can develop within the existing constraints that apply equally to headquarters and many (but not all) delegations

9) Capacity building: Public diplomacy requires multiple skills and many of these are subject to minimal training and much of it is learnt on the job. Dedicated training should be offered to the relevant AD officials and, in the context of the delegations, those local staff supporting public diplomacy and this should include the requisite media skills, awareness of technologies and associated policy areas (intellectual property, third party rights, intellectual property etc). Existing Press and Information Officer regional seminars and common portals (like capacity4dev) offer useful models for inspiration

10) The Common Security and Defence Policy a special challenge: CSDP missions make particular demands upon public diplomacy since clear communication is essential in terms of the mandate, duration and nature of a mission in order to garner the necessary public support. Existing initiatives, like the annual CSDP Press and Public Information Course, might be usefully extended to develop 'best practices' for CSDP missions which are reviewed by the respective military and civilian bodies and incorporated into 'lessons learned.'

Brief author bio:

Dr Simon Duke is a Professor at the European Institute of Public Administration (EIPA), Maastricht, Netherlands. He was educated at The University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, and the University of Oxford, where he completed his M.Phil and D.Phil. Prior to EIPA he held positions at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the Mershon Center (Ohio State University), the Pennsylvania State University and the Central European University. He is the author of several monographs on European and transatlantic foreign and security issues. He has also published on similar themes in numerous academic journals. He also serves as adjunct faculty at the Federal Executive Institute in Charlottesville Virginia and is co-Executive Editor of the *Journal of European Integration*.

The European External Action Service and Public Diplomacy

This paper contributes to a hitherto rather neglected field of research. It examines the evolution of public diplomacy in the EU's external actions generally and, more specifically, in the context of the evolving EEAS. It argues that there is an urgent need for better coordination and streamlining of the Service's public diplomacy efforts and that this should be complemented by due attention to the related strategic and resource issues. The more critical observations are balanced by the recognition that much has already been achieved and that there are some notable success stories. For those with an interest in the policy implications of the advent of the EEAS on public diplomacy, a number of specific recommendations are offered for consideration.

About the author

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Colophon

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