The Crisis in North Africa
Implications for Europe and Options for EU Policymakers

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
Nathaniel Barr
George Willcoxon
Norhan Basuni

Clingendael Report
April 2015
April 2015

© Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright holders.

About the authors

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD), an adjunct assistant professor in Georgetown University’s security studies program, and the chief executive officer of the D.C.-based consulting firm Valens Global. His research and professional work focus on the challenges posed by violent non-state actors. Gartenstein-Ross is the author or volume editor of seventeen books and monographs, including authoring full-length studies on the Libyan civil war, the jihadist group Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia, and Egyptian jihadist group Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis’s oath of loyalty to the Islamic State. Gartenstein-Ross holds a Ph.D. in world politics from the Catholic University of America and a J.D. from the New York University School of Law. In addition to his academic work, Gartenstein-Ross consults for clients who are grappling with the challenges posed by violent non-state actors and twenty-first century conflict. His client work has included live hostage negotiations in the Middle East, risk assessments for oil and gas companies, border security work in Europe, and story and series development for major media companies. He has also advised the U.S. Department of Defense about the Libyan civil war.

Nathaniel Barr is a threat analyst at Valens Global, where he focuses on violent non-state actors and political violence in North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. He has worked extensively on a wide array of issues concerning insurgent movements and terrorist organizations. Barr was Gartenstein-Ross’s co-author on the aforementioned study exploring the Libyan civil war, and also co-authored a monograph on China’s post-2014 role in Afghanistan (FDD Press, 2014). He is a graduate of Brandeis University, holding a degree in political science and a minor in journalism.

George Willcoxon, who served as the director of research at Valens Global while working on this report, is a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of California at Berkeley. He also holds M.A. and M.P.P. degrees from UC Berkeley, and a B.A. from Princeton University. Willcoxon’s dissertation presents a theory of counterinsurgent strategic behavior that explains how counterinsurgents select from among a variety of political, economic, and military strategies. Willcoxon’s writings have appeared in such publications as the California Journal of Politics and Policy, the Diplomatist, and the San Francisco Chronicle. He began a job at the United Nations office in Beirut in March 2015.

Norhan Basuni is an independent analyst specializing in North Africa. She has spent significant time in the region, specifically in Egypt and Morocco, conducting research on Islamic/Arab civil society, counterterrorism, and global health and development strategies. She has served as a consultant to non-profit organizations, government agencies, and the private sector, and has expertise in conflict resolution, strategic communication, and humanitarian relief. Basuni is a graduate of the City University of New York, and is fluent in Arabic and French.

The authors would like to thank Simran Maker, Bridget Moreng, Karly Nocera, Ravi Patel, and Natalie Rozet for their research assistance. Karly Nocera designed the maps featured in this report.

Clingendael Institute
P.O. Box 93080
2509 AB The Hague
The Netherlands

Email: info@clingendael.nl
Website: http://www.clingendael.nl/
Contents

Guide to Acronyms 5
Executive Summary 7
Introduction 10
1. North Africa Since the Arab Spring 11
2. Key Threats and Future Contingencies 34
3. Policy Options 57
Conclusion 90
# Guide to Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAB</td>
<td>Abdullah Azzam Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABM</td>
<td>Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APC</td>
<td>armored personnel carrier</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AQIM</td>
<td>Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AST</td>
<td>Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CoE</td>
<td>Center of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCFTA</td>
<td>deep and comprehensive free trade agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense [United States]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUBAM Libya</td>
<td>European Border Assistance Mission in Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLN</td>
<td>National Liberation Front [Algeria]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIA</td>
<td>Groupe Islamique Armé [Algeria]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GNC</td>
<td>General National Congress [Libya]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSPC</td>
<td>Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat [Algeria]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HoR</td>
<td>House of Representatives [Libya’s internationally recognized government]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDPs</td>
<td>internally displaced persons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IS</td>
<td>Islamic State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IYSC</td>
<td>Islamic Youth Shura Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIEDDO</td>
<td>Joint Improvised Explosives Device Defeat Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MJN</td>
<td>Muhammad Jamal Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRAP</td>
<td>Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PJD</td>
<td>Justice and Development Party (Morocco)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAVs</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commission for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VNSA</td>
<td>violent non-state actor</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map of North Africa
Executive Summary

The Arab Spring protests of 2011 that swept through the Middle East and North Africa radically reshaped the region’s political and security environment. Longstanding regimes in Egypt and Tunisia fell in a matter of weeks, though the political orders that underpinned these regimes remained largely intact. Conversely, the violent overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi’s government in Libya upended the political status quo and forced post-revolutionary leaders to attempt to rebuild political institutions from the regime’s ashes. To the west, Morocco and Algeria have largely avoided the political turmoil that enveloped their eastern neighbors, though the threat of domestic unrest prompted both governments to adopt political and economic reforms that at least symbolically addressed the grievances of their populations.

The newly unstable regional environment has created an array of challenges for European policymakers. Most prominent, jihadist groups have flourished in post-revolutionary North Africa, capitalizing on state weakness to carve out several spheres of influence. Libya’s descent into civil war has provided a further boost to regional jihadist groups, and the proliferation of jihadist actors in North Africa poses a direct threat to European security.

But the political instability that has beset North Africa in the years following the Arab Spring also undermines European strategic and economic interests in broader ways. North Africa has quickly descended from being a bastion of continuity and consistency into a basket case, forcing European states to carefully monitor threats so as to limit spillover into Europe. Violent conflict and political disorder has undermined North Africa’s economic potential, which has in turn harmed European trade with its southern neighbor. Parts of North Africa have become strongholds for criminal networks, including drug traffickers and human smugglers, who have used North Africa as a base from which to gain entry into Europe.

This report is divided into three sections. The first section provides an overview of current political trends in each of the five North African countries. Libya’s collapse poses a direct threat both to Europe and also its neighbors, as an ongoing civil conflict rages between the Dawn and Dignity coalitions. With no real central government to speak of, Libya has become hospitable to a wide variety of violent non-state actors, including jihadist groups.

Egypt and Tunisia’s post-revolutionary trajectories have been less tumultuous than Libya’s, but both countries remain fragile. The Egyptian state, led by military strongman Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has cracked down on its opposition at the expense of civil liberties and political freedom. The country is beset by a persistent jihadist threat in the Sinai region, which has now spilled into the Nile Delta. Unlike Egypt, Tunisia has continued on its democratic path, making it perhaps the Arab Spring’s only success story. Still, Tunisia’s democratic transition is fragile, susceptible to challenges from those involved in the political process and also others who abstain from politics altogether. The latter group includes jihadists who continue to carry out attacks, including the shocking March 2015 slaughter of tourists at Tunis’s Bardo National Museum.

Morocco and Algeria stand out for their political stability and continuity. However, the poor health of Algerian leader Abdelaziz Bouteflika raises concerns about potential succession troubles. Morocco continues to struggle with high levels of youth unemployment as well as a
The Crisis in North Africa | Clingendael Report, April 2015

burgeoning domestic radicalization problem, which has manifested itself in a large number of Moroccans traveling to Syria to join militant groups like the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.

The second section of the report outlines the major threats and challenges that European countries face in North Africa, including jihadism, irregular migration, transnational crime, and economic instability:

- Jihadist groups in North Africa have already targeted European infrastructure and personnel in the region, and many factions aspire to attack Europe as well.
- The influx of irregular migration from North Africa to Europe also poses significant challenges for Europe’s ability to control its own borders. The Libyan central government’s collapse has turned the country into a refuge for human smugglers. In the past two years, thousands of migrants have traveled from ports in Libya to Europe, overwhelming European border security capabilities and placing serious strain on European states’ welfare systems.
- Political instability in North Africa also threatens Europe’s economic interests in the region, including European companies’ investments in the North African oil industry. North African instability also harms trade relations with Europe.

This section also anticipates future contingencies that may demand a response from EU policymakers, such as the death of key political figures or mass atrocities carried out by state and sub-state actors.

But the main purpose of this study is to provide a menu of options delineating approaches that European policymakers can adopt, which is covered in the third section. The report does not advocate for a specific strategy, and generally avoids policy prescriptions, but instead is designed to objectively analyze the various available options, weighing the costs and benefits of each approach. Because the report is structured as a policy menu, some options discussed herein will be directly at odds with one another. In exploring conflicting policies, this report aims to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, thus enhancing policymakers’ ability to make educated strategic decisions.

The section first explores policy approaches to address the ongoing civil conflict in Libya. Virtually all expert commentary agrees that the United Nations-sponsored negotiations between the two competing sides in that civil war should be the preferred policy option, and rightly so. If the conflict’s “irreconcilables” are defined too broadly, that will unnecessarily prolong the conflict and human suffering in Libya, and will also be riskier for the country’s neighbors. However, negotiations are not guaranteed to attain any success, and even if they do, they will not provide a complete solution to the country’s military problems. Hence policymakers should consider what steps might follow these negotiations, should they succeed or fail. This report considers several additional options beyond the negotiations:

- Pressuring regional states to end their support for proxies in the Libya conflict.
- Marginalizing Khalifa Hifter, or otherwise working to have him removed from power.
- Providing incentives for the Dawn or Dignity factions to target the Islamic State and other jihadist groups in Libya.
- Throwing Western support behind the internationally-recognized House of Representatives and the Operation Dignity military operations that are supporting it.
- Launching direct counterterrorism operations in Libya.
- Launching a peacekeeping mission.
The policy section then discusses country-specific policy options tailored to Egypt’s political conditions. These options include facilitating greater political engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood, facilitating reconciliation efforts between the Egyptian government and Sinai tribes, and implementing a guest worker program targeted at Egyptian Coptic Christians.

The section then turns from country-specific options to policy options that address the region as a whole. These regional options can be categorized as addressing security, political, and economic concerns. The security-based policy options are:

• Providing counter-IED technology to regional governments.
• Supporting migration and border-security efforts.
• Enhancing regional governments’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities.
• Establishing a regional Center of Excellence that would provide information and analysis related to policy and technical options being considered by the region’s actors.
• Prioritizing regional security sector reform (SSR).
• Developing a counter-messaging campaign specifically designed to address the Islamic State’s strategy for organizational growth in the region.

Political reforms for the region that this study considers are anti-corruption reforms, providing human-rights training for regional law enforcement, and implementing judicial reforms. And this study also contemplates three sets of possible policies aimed at the region’s economic troubles: structural economic reforms, increasing investment in North African economies, and implementing policies designed to address the region’s problems with unemployment.

Addressing the myriad challenges emanating from North Africa requires European countries to adopt a multifaceted strategy that includes security assistance, political reform, and economic support for struggling North African countries. Ending the Libyan civil war will continue to be a priority for European decision-makers, given the destabilizing effects that insecurity in Libya has on the rest of the region. However, European policymakers will also have to strengthen the capabilities of other North African states in order to address the many problems that the region is experiencing. This report details strategies that decision-makers might adopt to mitigate current threats and preempt future challenges.
Introduction

The Arab Spring dramatically transformed the strategic environment on Europe’s southern border. Long-tenured autocrats in Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia—brutal as they may have been to their own citizens—had brought a measure of stability and predictability to the Mediterranean. But tumultuous political developments since the leaders of all three countries fell in 2011 have created a range of new threats that European policymakers will be forced to address in the years to come. The major challenges that will have an impact on Europe are:

- The proliferation of jihadist groups in North Africa, including al-Qaeda and Islamic State (IS) affiliates, poses a direct threat to Europe’s internal security, as well as to European interests in North Africa.
- The influx of migrants departing North African countries for Europe threatens to overwhelm Europe’s border security measures and immigration management capacity. Libya in particular had become a primary departure point for economic migrants, and for refugees from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East who want to receive asylum in Europe. Irregular migration from Libya to Europe has massively increased in the past two years, straining Europe's resources and prompting European Union (EU) member states to consider reassessing their asylum and social welfare policies.
- Political instability and terrorism threaten to harm trade between Europe and North Africa. The post-revolution North African states have all experienced declining economies, and if one or more of these states were to collapse economically, it would further damage Europe's already precarious economy.
- State weakness in Libya and Tunisia has created fertile conditions for drug traffickers and other criminal networks. Drug smuggling from Libya to Europe, as well as trade in other contraband goods, has expanded considerably in recent years.

This report has three goals. First, it describes the most important current trends related to security, economy, and migration in the five North African states. Second, the study identifies the biggest impacts that regional developments will have on Europe, and anticipates contingencies that could arise in the near to medium-term that might demand a European response. Finally, the report proposes a menu of policy options that European decision-makers can consider to counter the prevailing regional threats and prepare for contingencies.

There is no silver-bullet solution for the crisis in North Africa, which has progressively grown more severe over the past four years. This report does not advocate for a specific strategy, and generally avoids policy prescriptions, but instead is designed to objectively analyze the various available options, weighing the costs and benefits of each approach. Because the report is designed as a policy menu, some options discussed herein are directly at odds with one another. In exploring conflicting policies, this report aims to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, thus enhancing policymakers’ ability to make educated strategic decisions.

This report includes both country-specific policy options (tailored to the specific situations faced by Libya and Egypt) and also those that can be implemented on a region-wide scale.
1. North Africa Since the Arab Spring

The instability initiated by the revolutionary events of 2011 has been felt in different ways across the countries of North Africa. The two westernmost states, Morocco and Algeria, experienced only minor protests. Both governments quickly implemented packages of government expenditures and political reforms (often largely symbolic) that ameliorated the grievances of their protest movements. In contrast, the three easternmost states—Libya, Egypt, and Tunisia—have been beset by varying degrees of instability.

Libya has been the hardest hit, with the central government unable to reestablish its writ following dictator Muammar el-Qaddafi’s fall. After an uneasy period in which a variety of militias carved out their own spheres of influence, a match finally ignited the tinder of post-Qaddafi Libya in May 2014 when Khalifa Hifter, a former officer in Qaddafi’s military who defected during Libya’s ill-fated war in Chad, launched “Operation Dignity” to combat the country’s Islamist factions. The conflict in Libya has been escalating ever since, and extremist groups—including al-Qaeda and IS—have been able to carve out a powerful foothold in this chaos.

Extremist groups have also been able to find a foothold in Egypt following the fall of Hosni Mubarak’s regime. Though the election of Mohamed Morsi in June 2012 seemed to indicate a new, permanent role for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian national politics, Brotherhood leaders remained deeply suspicious not only of the state institutions that had carried over from the Mubarak era, but also of their more secular political opponents. Morsi’s strategy seemed to be commanding the state through fiat and plebiscites, and after his government faltered across 2012 and 2013, a new protest movement in Cairo turned out to oppose him. The military again stepped in, just as it had done to remove Mubarak, this time deposing Morsi. The Brotherhood was subsequently declared illegal, and a serious jihadist insurgency that had been building in the Sinai for years grew stronger and increasingly brutal after Morsi’s fall.

Tunisia has had the most hopeful path of the three post-revolution states, which can best be described as negotiated democratization. Despite deep mutual suspicions, liberal, secularist, nationalist, and Islamist actors have been able to come to terms with each other, negotiate a liberal constitution, hold elections, and form coalition governments. However, the Tunisian economy has faltered, and that country has also seen the growth of salafi jihadist violence, which was most brutally manifested in a March 2015 terrorist attack on Tunis’s Bardo museum that claimed 22 lives.

The sum total of these developments has transformed Europe’s security environment. Changes in the region put at risk long-standing diplomatic, security, intelligence, and commercial ties with North African states, and have created a new or newly empowered set of non-state threats ranging from jihadist groups to transnational crime, smuggling, and trafficking. This section now turns to the current trends in specific North African states.
Libya’s transition beyond Qaddafi’s misrule initially looked promising. Transitional authorities held successful elections in mid-2012 that returned a parliament that was broadly representative of Libya’s major social and political currents. The major factions in this transitional parliament worked fairly well together from 2012 to 2013, forming coalition governments and quickly resuming oil exports. This progress was unable, however, to overcome the deep regional divisions that the civil war had accentuated. The Libyan government’s inability to disband the various revolutionary militias and armed groups that emerged during and after the 2011 uprising left the central government weak and largely dependent on these same militias for internal security, thus fostering an untenable hybrid security structure.

New and reactivated jihadist networks took advantage of this environment to entrench themselves in Benghazi, Derna, and southern Libya. Meanwhile, the rough governing coalition that had led the transition faltered in late 2013 and early 2014. After various political factions resorted to “armed politics”—that is, forcing through desired legislation through the threatened employment of military might—long-simmering tensions between rival armed groups boiled over into violent conflict in mid-May 2014, when Khalifa Hifter launched Operation Dignity in Benghazi. This military campaign aimed to eliminate Islamist factions from Libya, starting with Benghazi. Hifter’s offensive tapped into the fears and concerns of the Libyan public, which had grown disillusioned with the growing influence of Islamist militias, and was alarmed by rising levels of violence. He found a large number of supporters—but also made absurdly large numbers of opponents, as Hifter refused to distinguish between jihadist groups and more moderate Islamists who might participate in the political system.
Fault lines in Libya’s armed conflict. It is worthwhile to examine the fault lines of conflict in Libya. Though the country’s divisions are often described as primarily Islamist versus nationalist, they in fact reflect several deeper divides, including ethnic, tribal, and regional tensions, as well as a clash between so-called revolutionary and counter-revolutionary forces.

The primary geographic conflict is between Zintan and Misrata. During the Qaddafi era, the Zintanis maintained close ties with two tribes, the Warfalla and the Qadhadhfa, that were closely allied with the regime. As such, Zintan was long perceived as a “regime stronghold.” As with most generalizations, this perception wasn’t universally accurate: Despite the benefits Zintan received, many Zintanis “remained rather critical of Qaddafi and his Jamahiriya state,” and some even took part in a 1993 coup attempt. The Misratans and Zintanis put aside their differences during the anti-Qaddafi uprising, and both cities played important roles in bringing down the regime, entering Tripoli simultaneously in August 2011 while the forces of the National Transitional Council were further east. But after the war the rivalry between the two cities re-emerged, fueled by Misratan accusations that Zintanis colluded with the Qaddafi regime during the war, and that the Zintanis failed to bear an equal burden in the conflict. The power vacuum that emerged after Qaddafi’s fall further exacerbated the rivalry. Misratan and Zintani forces tried to claim as much territory as possible in Tripoli, carving the capital into rival strongholds. Minor skirmishes frequently occurred between Tripoli-based Zintani and Misratan factions.

The Zintani militias’ practice of recruiting from the ranks of Qaddafi-era security brigades to bolster their capabilities also drew the ire of Misratan revolutionaries. After gaining control of key territories in Tripoli, Zintani militia leaders began recruiting from a variety of defunct forces previously affiliated with Qaddafi. These included the 32nd Brigade, which had been one of the most capable and well-trained brigades in Qaddafi’s forces, and the Maghawir Brigade, a predominantly Tuareg unit. Zintanis also recruited from the population of Bani Walid, which had long been considered a bastion of pro-Qaddafi support.

It is thus evident that the geographic schism between Misrata and Zintan correlates heavily with another major conflict in Libya, that between so-called “revolutionary” and “counter-revolutionary” factions. The revolutionary/counter-revolutionary divide has long centered around whether Libya should pass a “political isolation” law to exclude former Qaddafi officials from positions in government. The Islamist bloc in the General National Congress (GNC), Libya’s legislative body, had aligned itself with Misratan and revolutionary actors, and upon gaining the upper hand in parliament, that coalition passed a political isolation law. The GNC also established an Integrity and Reform Commission for the armed forces in June 2013 to identify and exclude members of the military who had been involved in Qaddafi’s efforts to crush the revolution. Both of these policies were highly exclusionary, as the political isolation...
law prevented anyone who had held even a mid-level role in the Qaddafi regime between 1969 and 2011 from serving in a wide array of positions in politics, the media, and academia.\(^6\)

Though Hifter has characterized his offensive primarily as anti-Islamist, there are obvious echoes of both the Zintan-Misrata rivalry and the revolutionary/counter-revolutionary divide. For some factions who found themselves excluded from post-revolution patronage networks, Hifter’s campaign offered an opportunity to recover political power. This was the case for a number of military units disillusioned by the GNC’s lustration policies and fearful that they would be increasingly excluded by the revolutionary bloc. Some tribes aligned with Hifter had also been accused of sympathizing with the Qaddafi regime. The involvement of former Qaddafi allies and officials in the Dignity campaign led the revolutionary bloc to portray Hifter’s movement as a counter-revolutionary initiative aimed at reversing the gains of the 2011 uprising. Similarly, rivalries between the Tebu and Tuareg ethnic groups in the southern town of Ubari in the Fezzan region overlapped with national-level tensions.\(^7\)

The growing tensions in Libya culminated in Hifter’s May 2014 launch of Operation Dignity in Benghazi. The announced launch of his offensive was followed two days later by Operation Dignity-aligned forces storming the parliament building in Tripoli and calling for the GNC’s dissolution.\(^8\) The GNC’s leading political bloc—composed of Islamist political parties, former revolutionaries from Misrata, and members of the Berber ethnic group, among others—viewed the raid on the GNC as a direct assault on its power.

The course of the Dignity-Dawn armed conflict. Following its defeat in the June 2014 parliamentary elections, the Islamist-Misrata bloc launched a military campaign of its own, dubbed Operation Dawn, which aimed to seize control of the capital of Tripoli and reassert its political influence. In August 2014, the Dawn coalition succeeded in driving pro-Dignity forces from Tripoli, leaving the capital’s airport, which had been the primary base for pro-Dignity forces, in ruins.\(^9\) Upon removing Dignity forces from Tripoli, political forces aligned with the Dawn coalition reconvened the GNC, which had originally been expected to transfer power to the victorious House of Representatives (HoR) following the June 25 elections. The GNC’s refusal to hand over power left Libya fragmented, with two separate parliaments and two governments, both claiming legitimacy—and both fighting each other militarily.

After seizing control of Tripoli in late August, the Dawn coalition tried to overrun other Dignity strongholds, turning much of western Libya into a war zone. Within weeks, Dawn forces had successfully forced pro-Dignity tribal militias out of the western suburbs of Tripoli. Dawn forces then moved south toward the Nafusa mountains, where Zintani forces managed to beat back the Dawn advance. Zintani forces mounted a counteroffensive against Dawn along


\(^7\) The Ahmed al-Shareef Brigade (also known as Brigade No. 25), which was largely Tebu, announced its support for Operation Dignity on June 8, while Tuareg forces allied with the Misratan-Islamist coalition later attempted to seize control of Tebu-held oil fields in Ubari. See “Libya: Tebu Brigade Combining Petroleum Facilities Guards, Border Guards Joins ‘Operation Dignity,’” *Libya Herald*, June 8, 2014 (describing Brigade No. 25’s support for Hifter); Jamal Adel, “Libya: Fighting Erupts Between Tribal Militias in Awäbari,” *Libya Herald*, September 17, 2014 (reporting later Tuareg attack on the Tebu-held Sharara oil field).


the Libyan coast west of Tripoli, focusing their efforts on seizing control of Libya’s Ras Jdir border crossing with Tunisia. The fight for control of western Libya devolved into a bloody stalemate, with both sides incapable of decisively gaining the upper hand.

Meanwhile, Hifter’s offensive in Benghazi experienced fits and starts in the early months of the campaign, with Dignity forces struggling to seize and hold territory within the city. In response to the Dignity campaign, Islamist militias, including Ansar al-Sharia in Libya, consolidated their forces under the Benghazi Revolutionaries Shura Council coalition and launched a counteroffensive in the summer of 2014, driving Dignity forces back to the outskirts of Benghazi. Only in mid-October 2014 did Dignity forces, with strategic guidance from the Egyptian military, experience lasting success in seizing territory and driving Islamist militias from their Benghazi strongholds. In recent months, Dignity forces have made significant gains in the city, though Islamist militias continue to put up strong resistance in certain parts.

The Islamic State comes to Libya. Amid the ongoing battles between Dignity and Dawn, IS has carved out a small, yet extraordinarily brutal, sphere of influence in parts of Libya. IS also has been able to fulfill one of its key organizational imperatives by drawing a great deal of attention to its presence in Libya, thus maintaining the perception that IS continues to have momentum—and parlaying that perception into a more robust Africa network.

The first Libyan city where IS’s presence started to garner international attention is Derna, where the Islamic Youth Shura Council (IYSC) first announced its support for IS in June 2014. In October 2014, IYSC managed to convince a large number of analysts and media outlets—falsely—that Derna had entirely come under IS’s control. Despite IYSC’s hyperbolic claims, Derna remained divided between various armed groups, including factions loyal to al-Qaeda that had IYSC outgunned in that city.

Though IS’s influence in Derna was always exaggerated, the group managed to shoot into far greater prominence this year. Most notorious among its recent activities, on February 15, 2015, a Libyan IS affiliate released a sordid new video. Employing IS’s signature slick special effects, the video showed IS militants marching a group of twenty-one prisoners—whose only crime was being Coptic Christians, and foreign—along a beach that may actually have been a green screen. The Coptic prisoners were forced to sit down, and after one jihadist delivered a short speech, they were simultaneously beheaded.

This slaughter of Egyptian Christians was one of a spate of high-profile attacks IS carried out in Libya in early 2015. Another high-profile IS attack occurred in Tripoli on January 27, when IS struck the country’s most prominent hotel, the Corinthia Hotel, killing nine. IS militants also targeted the Algerian and Iranian embassies in Tripoli; and IS claimed credit for a suicide attack in the Dignity-controlled town of Qubba that killed at least forty. IS also finally came to control territory in Libya when it seized the town of Nawfaliyah in February 2015. But IS abandoned Nawfaliyah, at least temporarily, when it launched an offensive against the city of Sirte.

---


IS’s string of high-profile attacks seems designed to serve two major purposes. The first pertains to the competition between IS and al-Qaeda for supremacy over the global jihadist movement. Since its February 2014 expulsion from the al-Qaeda network, IS has been explicitly attempting to lure a wide variety of al-Qaeda affiliates to leave al-Qaeda’s orbit, and instead take an oath of bayat (loyalty) to IS. In Africa in particular IS consistently exaggerated its power and influence—much of these exaggerations related to Libya—and used this narrative that it was building a robust Africa network to encourage al-Qaeda-aligned groups to defect to IS. This strategy of inflating its successes paid off in March 2015, when the Nigerian jihadist group Boko Haram announced that it had decided to pledge bayat to IS.\(^{12}\)

The second purpose of IS’s high-profile attacks seems to be fragmenting the Dawn coalition. As previously explained, Dawn is commonly thought of as Islamist but in fact comprises several sets of interests. IS seems to be trying to peel away hardline members of the Dawn coalition from their more moderate brothers in arms.

Illustrating this stratagem, IS’s attack on Tripoli’s Corinthia Hotel occurred on Dawn-controlled territory, placing the cell of IS attackers directly up against Dawn security forces. Likewise, IS’s advances into Sirte led to a direct military confrontation with Operation Dawn.\(^{13}\) IS’s beheading of twenty-one Egyptian Christians seemed intended as a direct provocation to Egypt. Greater Egyptian involvement in Libya, IS likely reasoned, would have an even more polarizing effect, as Egypt, which is Hifter’s biggest benefactor, is deeply loathed by many within the Dawn coalition.

Paradoxically, one of the most helpful factors for IS in surviving the Libyan civil war may be the fact that the group’s foothold in the country has been consistently exaggerated: Libya’s two major warring factions may believe that they simply have higher priorities than IS—namely, each other. Further, Hifter has a clear incentive to bring the fight to IS last, only after the other Dawn factions have been weakened. Among the factions Dignity has fought since its launch are al-Qaeda-linked jihadists, yet that fact never captured outside states’ interest. In contrast, IS’s over-the-top villainy serves as the perfect foil for Operation Dignity. IS’s presence in the conflict has finally made Western states take notice, and the fact that IS is among Dignity’s foes increases the chances that Dignity might receive outside support.

What would happen if IS succeeded in gaining significant ground in Libya? Its emergence as a more powerful force would threaten to supercharge some of Libya’s most negative security trends, including deteriorating security conditions, attacks on religious minorities, and an outflow of refugees. European states would be vulnerable to terrorist attacks, either in Europe itself or against European interests in the region. IS is unlikely to experience unchecked growth in Libya: It is so brutal and uncompromisingly expansionist that as IS grows stronger, it would become a higher priority military target for both Dawn and Dignity, and would likely provoke Western states and Libya’s neighbors intervene against it in large or subtle ways. Nonetheless, IS’s growth is one of Europe’s security concerns related to Libya.

Other jihadist groups. IS has grabbed the headlines, but Libya is also home to a wide array of other jihadist groups that are of international concern. Soon after the fall of Qaddafi’s regime, jihadist groups capitalized on the breakdown of Libya’s security apparatus to establish safe havens and training camps in southern Libya.

---

\(^{12}\) For an analysis of how IS’s exaggerations of its Africa successes played into Boko Haram’s decision to join the IS network, see Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “The Islamic State’s African Long Con,” *Foreign Policy*, March 16, 2015.

The Muhammad Jamal Network (MJN), which is connected to al-Qaeda, is one such group. The connections between al-Qaeda emir Ayman al-Zawahiri and the MJN became clear after its leader Muhammad Jamal’s November 2012 arrest: As the U.S. State Department’s terrorist designation of Jamal explains, his "confiscated computer contained letters to al-Zawahiri in which Jamal asked for assistance and described MJN’s activities, including acquiring weapons, conducting terrorist training, and establishing terrorist groups in the Sinai." MJN has operated camps in Libya that include training for suicide missions, and has been able to smuggle fighters into other countries through al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula’s established networks.

Jihadist groups in southern Libya generally have focused on establishing camps and supply lines rather than seizing and holding territory. Locals near Ubari, for example, reported that jihadist factions have kept a low profile, purchasing a large farm to use as a training camp, and that they have tried to ingratiate themselves with local tribes. Jihadists have used southern Libya as a base from which to smuggle arms and fighters to groups operating in active battlespaces in Niger and Mali.

Jihadist groups have also fled to Libya to escape recent military operations in such neighboring countries as Mali, Tunisia and Algeria. When France launched Operation Serval in northern Mali in early 2013 to dislodge al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) from the area it had come to control, many militants fled to southern Libya. Other jihadists who have reportedly found shelter in Libya include Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia leader Abu Iyadh al-Tunisi and al-Murabitun leader Mokhtar Belmokhtar. Sometimes these groups use the ungoverned space in southern and western Libya as a staging ground for attacks outside Libya’s borders. For example, jihadist groups relied on Libyan territory to mount their counteroffensive in Mali and elsewhere in the Sahel against French and African forces.

Irregular migration. The deterioration in security has turned Libya into a hub of irregular migration from North Africa to Europe. With border security virtually non-existent, human smugglers have established robust operations in Libya, sending thousands of economic migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa and refugees from war-torn countries into Europe. Consequently Libya has become the primary departure point for irregular migration to

Europe, as this report discusses in detail in Part II. This has forced European border officials to dedicate extensive resources to trying to stem the tide of migrants from the country.

*Criminal networks.* The deterioration in Libyan security has been a boon not only for human smugglers, but for a vast array of criminal networks that have exploited Libya’s security vacuum to expand their operations. Though West African cocaine traffickers have historically preferred sea and air routes over land routes for shipping their product to Europe, analysts have recently observed an increase in drug smuggling through Libya.\(^{21}\) This suggests that traffickers may be altering their routes to take advantage of Libya’s weak enforcement capabilities. Libya remains both a key transit point and consumer market for the North African cannabis trade.\(^ {22}\)

Other criminal networks have also blossomed in Libya, including weapons and oil smuggling. During the 2011 uprising, Libyan rebels ransacked Qaddafi’s weapons arsenals, resulting in a robust illicit arms trade throughout the region.\(^ {23}\) The Libyan government’s subsidization of oil for its citizens also has helped an illicit oil trade emerge, with smugglers shipping subsidized oil to places like Malta.\(^ {24}\)

*The Libyan economy.* Political instability and civil conflict have taken a severe toll on Libya’s economy. Though oil production quickly recovered in the wake of the 2011 revolution, persistent conflict over control of oil facilities began to noticeably slow production in mid-2013, and Libya’s GDP declined by almost 10% that year.\(^ {25}\) Since the outbreak of the Dignity-Dawn conflict, oil production has declined even further, coming to a virtual standstill at some oil terminals and production facilities.\(^ {26}\) The World Bank has noted Libya’s key economic priorities at this point:

> Immediate priorities are to restore political and economic stability and help manage growing public expectations at the same time as meeting demands for rapid improvements in basic services. The Libyan authorities need to continue to focus on restoring security and the rule of law, fully restoring public services and operations, exercising budget discipline, and rebuilding government institutions…. Other priorities include rebuilding infrastructure, reorienting the economy away from hydrocarbon dependence, and setting up a governance framework that promotes private sector development, job creation, and inclusive growth.\(^ {27}\)

Libya’s booming black market in both licit and illicit goods has also hindered the formal economy’s growth.

---


\(^{27}\) World Bank, “Libya Overview.”
Current Trends in Egypt

Though Mohamed Morsi’s election in June 2012 seemed to indicate a new, permanent role for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian national politics, Brotherhood leaders seemed unwilling or unable to come to terms with the state institutions that had carried over from the Mubarak era, and were deeply suspicious of the secular-leaning opposition. Morsi’s strategy seemed to be commanding the state through fiat, power grabs, and plebiscites, rather than through negotiation and incremental change.

Morsi’s government faltered across 2012 and 2013, eventually leading to a new protest movement in Cairo. The protests gained steam in the summer of 2013 and reached an apex in late June, when around 500,000 Cairenes and millions of others across Egypt took to the streets, demanding the Morsi regime’s resignation. The military, claiming to represent the will of the Egyptian people, stepped in and deposed Morsi’s government. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who had been Morsi’s minister of defense, has now been installed as Egypt’s sixth president. Many observers see this outcome as the de facto restoration of Mubarak’s regime, but with a new helmsman.

The post-Morsi government has declared the Brotherhood to be illegal, and thousands of Egyptian dissidents have been arrested and jailed, many without charges. While the regime’s repressive tactics have generally been effective in stamping out political opposition, many observers fear that they will contribute to polarization and the growth of extremism in the longer term.

The re-emergence of Egyptian jihadism. There already has been significant growth in jihadist activity in the wake of both Mubarak’s fall and the coup that toppled Morsi. However, the requisite conditions for the growth of jihadism in the Sinai were present at the start of the Arab Spring. As the political scientist Hassanein Tawfik Ibrahim has noted, militant Islamic groups “represented a major challenge to the Egyptian political regime from the mid-1970s until the mid-1990s.” Though they experienced a major setback at the end of this period, by the beginning of 2011 these groups had already begun to make a comeback.

That setback occurred in 1997, when the militant group Gama’a al-Islamiyya overplayed its hand, slaughtering 62 people—mainly foreign tourists—at the Temple of Hatshepsut in Luxor. Though Gama’a likely expected to devastate Egypt’s tourist industry, instead the citizenry turned against the militant group, rallying behind the government’s escalating counterterrorism measures. Mubarak’s regime experienced extraordinary counterterrorism successes after the Luxor massacre, but Egyptian jihadist groups began to bounce back following the 9/11 attacks. The first significant post-9/11 terrorist incident in the Sinai Peninsula occurred in October 2004, when a series of car bomb blasts struck Sinai resorts, killing 34 people, including 13 Israeli tourists. The Abdullah Azzam Brigades (AAB) claimed responsibility. There were other significant attacks as well, including a July 2005 incident in which car bombs detonated in Sharm El-Sheikh, a major Sinai tourist area, killing at least 88 people and wounding over 110. AAB claimed credit for this attack as well.

The jihadist presence in Sinai became noticeably more powerful following Mubarak’s fall for several reasons, including that a significant pool of the movement’s talent either escaped or was released from Egyptian prisons. The coup that overthrew Morsi was followed by an even bigger surge of jihadist activity. Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) which ultimately pledged its allegiance (bayat) to the Islamic State in November 2014, emerged as one of Sinai’s most powerful militant groups. As the U.S. State Department’s terrorist designation of ABM explains, the group carried out a large number of attacks in a short period, including:

- such attacks against Israel as an August 2012 rocket strike on Eilat and a September 2012 attack on an Israeli border patrol.
- an October 2013 suicide bombing targeting the South Sinai Security Directorate in al-Tor.
- the January 2014 downing of an Egyptian military helicopter.
- the targeting of government officials, including the attempted assassination of Egypt’s interior minister in September 2013.

While jihadist activity remains largely concentrated in the sparsely populated Sinai, a growing number of attacks in the Nile Valley region raises concerns about spillover from the Sinai. Egypt’s economy has felt the impact: Tourism, which remains one of the primary drivers of Egypt’s economic growth, has declined.

Although ABM’s declaration of allegiance to IS has raised its prominence in the international media, the decision to join IS seemingly weakens rather than strengthens the group. One reason is that the oath has caused internal fractures. The major post-bayat rift is between the group’s al-Qaeda loyalists and those who support the new allegiance to IS. Though it is somewhat of an oversimplification to think of these factions as neatly divided geographically, Western officials have said that the faction most opposed to the pledge to IS is based in the Nile Valley. This faction’s concerns relate not only to ideology and affinity but also to strategy, as it is concerned that IS’s “reputation for careless violence will alienate other Egyptians, especially the disaffected Islamist youth that Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has sought to enlist.” Many Egyptian jihadists with ties to Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Gama’a al-Islamiyya, the two major Egyptian militant groups active in the 1990s, are more prone to introspection on issues of reputation due to the debates that followed the Luxor massacre and subsequent government crackdown. The Sinai jihadists were largely not a part of that intellectual milieu, and thus less prone to introspection about the costs of brutality.

A second problem with ABM’s pledge is that al-Qaeda has deeper roots than IS in both the Sinai Peninsula and North Africa more broadly. In the Sinai, al-Qaeda has a strong relationship with not only AAB but also the Muhammad Jamal Network and al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula/Ansar al-Jihad. Elsewhere in North Africa, al-Qaeda has done an effective job of finding a foothold in the post-Arab Spring environment, including in neighboring Libya. ABM’s pledge to IS thus will likely have the immediate effect of disrupting the associations that have benefited ABM. However, the problems caused by this disruption could be mitigated over time if other jihadist groups in the Sinai Peninsula and the region choose to align with IS.

A third problem with the bayat to IS is reputational, as IS is known for its brutal tactics. While it is possible that ABM’s oath of bayat to IS will not have a significant impact on its operations, the oath may herald a move to tactics that are even more overtly cruel than those it employed previously. If ABM’s tactics come to more resemble those of IS in Syria and Iraq, ABM could experience more open conflict with the Sinai Peninsula’s Bedouin population and Egyptian Christians, and it may find itself further alienated from the Egyptian population.

But even if ABM’s pledge to IS weakens the group, Sinai jihadism is in an overall state of growth rather than decline. It will continue to trouble the Egyptian state.

**Drug trafficking and smuggling.** Egypt’s location at the crossroads between the Middle East, North Africa, and East Africa has made it a central hub in the international drug trade. While cocaine and hashish are smuggled into Egypt from West and North Africa, traffickers from Afghanistan and Southeast Asia’s Golden Triangle transit heroin through Egypt via East Africa. Egypt has also experienced a growing trade in illicit antiquities, many of which have

---

34 Kirkpatrick, “Militant Group in Egypt Vows Loyalty to ISIS.”
35 Ibid.
been illegally removed from Egypt and fenced in European markets. Analysts are concerned that revenue from such antiquities sales may be used to fund North African jihadist groups.

The Egyptian economy. Egypt faces economic problems similar to other countries in North Africa, including high unemployment rates and an unsustainable budget deficit. Thus Egypt has relied heavily on the largesse of such Gulf Arab states as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Kuwait, which have propped up the Egyptian state to the tune of about $20 billion. The World Bank notes that this influx of cash “has helped the authorities to stabilize the economy and to partially meet the country’s energy and food needs.” The Gulf States appear committed to sustaining their economic support for Egypt: At a recent investment summit in March 2015, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Oman jointly pledged $12.5 billion to boost the Egyptian economy.

Since taking power, Sisi has stressed the importance of private investment. His government subsequently proposed “a bundle of investment-friendly macroeconomic reforms in the areas of fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate policies, as well as legal reforms aimed at redefining relations between the state and the private sector.” Sisi may ultimately have to reduce the Egyptian government’s involvement in the economy in order to secure more private investment, potentially a very disruptive political step.

Egypt has made progress on some of the fundamental economic issues that bedevil it, including its budget deficit. In July 2014, the Egyptian oil ministry finally slashed fuel subsidies, thus increasing prices by up to 78 percent. This alleviated some of the budgetary pressures created by the state’s energy subsidies. Egypt also passed tax increases on cigarettes and alcohol to increase government revenues.

But significant obstacles remain. Though unemployment has declined in the last few quarters, the lack of job opportunities continues to be a pressing concern, especially for young Egyptians and recent university graduates. Subsidies still account about 30% of Egypt’s budget, even after recent cutbacks. Reducing the remaining subsidies will prove challenging, as the Egyptian public has grown accustomed to government subsidization of basic goods—and, given the struggling Egyptian economy, many people depend on it. Further cutbacks could foment domestic unrest.

40 “Gulf States Offer $12.5 Billion in Aid to Egypt,” Al Arabiya, March 13, 2015.
**Water resources.** Egypt’s struggle to secure adequate water resources could threaten its political stability. The United Nations has warned that, based on current population trends and the anticipated adverse effects of climate change, “Egypt could be water scarce by 2025.”

Growing irrigation of farmlands has placed an increasing strain on Egypt’s fixed water supply. Inefficient water management has further exacerbated water-supply issues.

Low water levels and persistent pollution have already endangered and angered local communities that rely on the Nile for drinking water. Looking ahead, water shortages may exacerbate societal tensions and fuel communal violence. Disputes over control of Nile water flows could also magnify tensions between Egypt and its southern neighbors, Sudan and Ethiopia.

**Current Trends in Tunisia**

Tunisia has experienced far less turmoil since the overthrow of dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali than have its neighbors who underwent similar transitions. Thus Tunisia is often held up...

---

48 Cunningham, “Could Egypt Run out of Water by 2025?”
as a model of successful transition to democracy in the Arab world. Nonetheless, it has also experienced rising levels of jihadist violence, and confronts several significant challenges.

**Jihadism.** The devastating terrorist attack at Tunis’s Bardo museum on March 18, 2015 followed a period in which a growing number of jihadist attacks in western Tunisia demonstrated that the movement was rebounding from a state crackdown. The salafi jihadist groups Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia (AST), Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi, and AQIM—all of which are connected in a variety of ways—pose a security challenge in Tunisia and beyond.

The salafi jihadist movement grew far more quickly in Tunisia after Ben Ali’s fall than most observers predicted, and post-Ben Ali jihadism has gone through four distinct phases. In the movement’s nascent phase, which lasted until December 2012, AST did an effective job of fostering a social movement built around salafi jihadist beliefs by operating legally and in the open, and focusing its activities primarily on *dawa* (evangelism). Even during this period in which AST prioritized *dawa*, the group also embraced violence, its primary use of violence being *hisba*, a concept denoting “forbidding wrong.” For AST, *hisba* entails the enforcement of religious norms within, and sometimes beyond, the Tunisian Muslim community. AST and other Tunisian salafi jihadists often sought to enforce these norms through vigilante violence.

The second phase for Tunisian salafi jihadism was a period of escalation in its fight against the state. In December 2012 militants shot and killed Anis Jelassi, an adjutant in the Tunisian National Guard, in the Kasserine governorate in western Tunisia. This incident prompted Tunisian authorities to identify, for the first time, a militant group known as Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi, which is tied to both AST and also AQIM. (In 2015, Uqba ibn Nafi would publicly identify itself as a battalion of AQIM for the first time.) The February 2013 assassination of secularist politician Chokri Belaïd was another escalation. Though Belaïd was killed by an AST member, it remains unclear if AST’s leadership ordered or authorized his assassination, or if the cell responsible for his death acted on its own initiative.

Belaïd’s assassination prompted great anger domestically, but no crackdown against AST. Thereafter there were several more escalations in the conflict between AST and the government. The state stepped up its security operations in western Tunisia, and soldiers patrolling there suffered from frequent landmine attacks. The state also retaliated against AST in other ways, including interrupting public lectures and other *dawa* activities, and cancelling the group’s annual conference, which was scheduled to be held in Kairouan.

The period of jihadist escalation hit its apex in late July 2013. In a single week, AST members gunned down another prominent secularist politician, Mohammed Brahmi, while Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi mounted a particularly brutal operation. In the latter incident, an ambush in


52 The obligation of “commanding right and forbidding wrong” is an important Islamic concept, discussed in the Qur’an. See Qur’an 3:104, 3:110, 9:71. As Michael Cook explains, the idea of *hisba* is derived from this obligation. Michael Cook, *Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in Islamic Thought* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010).


western Tunisia’s Jebel el-Chaambi mountains killed eight soldiers, five of whom had their throats slit.55

These two attacks moved the Tunisian government to action and precipitated the third stage of post-Ben Ali jihadism, that of state crackdown. The crackdown was going well, from the state’s perspective, in early 2014. Jihadists had become less visible on Tunisia’s streets, many key leaders were arrested, and the media and citizens had largely (though not entirely) rallied behind the government’s counterterrorism policies. But over the course of 2014, the crackdown phase gave way to a fourth phase, that of jihadist recovery, during which attacks against Tunisian security forces increased.

AST’s recovery was facilitated in part by the deterioration of security in neighboring Libya. Indeed, Tunisia has come to see the situation in Libya as its primary security challenge: Tunisian prime minister Mehdi Jomaa, for example, said that the greatest threat Tunisia faces emanates from Libya.56 Not only could Libya’s chaos spill into Tunisia, but also AST and other jihadist groups have used Libya to escape from Tunisia’s policing operations: AST emir Abu Iyad al-Tunisi, for example, has connections with a variety of Libyan political Islamists and jihadists, and reportedly found safe haven in Libya after Tunisia tried to capture him.57 Growing numbers of Tunisian militants have also entered Libya to attend training camps.58

Tunisian jihadism is deeply connected to other jihadist efforts in the region. Just as Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi now publicly identifies as a battalion of AQIM, so too is AQIM the most significant connection for AST, as the Tunisian group appears to be subordinate to AQIM within the al-Qaeda hierarchy. AQIM has been extremely clear about its affinity for AST and the fact that they share a common goal since AST’s emergence, and has released several statements in support of AST. But the Tunisian government has claimed that AQIM’s connections to AST run far deeper than just public expressions of support. The government has leveled several allegations about AST’s relationship with al-Qaeda, including claiming that a handwritten “allegiance act” had been entered into between AST emir Abu Iyad al-Tunisi and AQIM emir Abdelmalek Droukdel.59 If the claim of an allegiance act is accurate, then AST appears to have been functioning, since at least the signing of the document, as an unacknowledged al-Qaeda affiliate.60

---

56 “Tunisia Prime Minister Sees Main Threat from Libya,” Associated Press, January 5, 2015.
59 “Tunisia Says Ansar al-Sharia was Planning More Assassinations, Bombings,” Tunis Afrique Presse, August 29, 2013.
60 Allegations of an allegiance act are consistent with claims made by captured members of Katibat Uqba ibn Nafi. Algerian security forces arrested Riadh Toufi, one of the Katibat’s founding members, on November 18, 2013. “L’armée algérienne arrête un libyen en relation avec les terroristes de Chaâmbi,” Mosaïque FM, November 18, 2013. During his interrogation, Toufi described Abu Iyad as nothing more than a “marionette.” He claimed that AQIM held all the power, and that Abu Iyad followed AQIM’s dictates. “Tunisie : Abou Yadh, marionnette de Abou El Hammami!”, Investir en Tunisie, November 21, 2013. AST’s response to these revelations was a rather unpersuasive denial claiming that it was “not tied to any outside group.” However, the statement also acknowledged that “regarding our loyalty to Qaedat al-Jihad and the jihadi formations, we have declared it from the first day and we are not ashamed to renew today our declaration with a louder voice.” Thomas Joscelyn, “Ansar al-Sharia Responds to Tunisian Government,” Long War Journal, September 3, 2013.
The dangers posed by Tunisian salafi jihadism are compounded by the fact that record numbers of Tunisian youths have left the country to join IS and other extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. Around 3,000 Tunisians have fought with rebel groups in the Syria-Iraq theater, making Tunisia, a country of only eleven million, the world’s largest contributor of foreign fighters.\(^{61}\)

**The Islamist-secularist divide.** There is longstanding and deep-rooted distrust between Tunisia’s secularist and Islamist political factions. However, the recent formation of an inclusive coalition government in February 2015 is a positive step toward political stability. This secularist-dominated coalition includes members of Ennahda, Tunisia’s largest Islamist political party, as well as representatives from a number of smaller political parties, such as the liberal Afek Tunis party.\(^{62}\)

However, Tunisia’s political transition remains susceptible to challenges. The conflict between Islamist parties like Ennahda and secularist parties such like Nida Tunis could play a spoiler role in the country’s transition. Some Nida Tunis loyalists have expressed their displeasure with the party’s decision to include Ennahda members in the governing coalition. Members of Nida Tunis have protested outside the party’s Tunis headquarters, and numerous politicians within the party openly condemn the move.\(^{63}\) The Popular Front, another secularist party, went even further, announcing that it will stand in opposition to the government because of Ennahda’s inclusion. Conversely, some members of Ennahda also oppose participation in the coalition.\(^{64}\)

Renewed conflict between secularists and political Islamists could set back Tunisia’s democratic transition, and could potentially trigger violence between ideological adversaries. Even if political squabbles do not escalate to violence, disagreement between secularists and Islamists could result in political gridlock, impeding Tunisia’s ability to pass much-needed economic reforms and address the country’s security threats.\(^{65}\)

**Tunisia’s economy.** Tunisia’s economic situation has slowly improved in the last two years, though the country is still beset by deep-seated structural economic issues. Restrictive labor policies offer employers little flexibility in their hiring and firing decisions, thus inhibiting job creation. Excessive market regulation, including limits on the number of firms allowed to produce goods for the domestic market and high taxes on companies that sell locally, creates high barriers to entry and discourages private investment. The World Bank has also identified Tunisia’s investment policy as a key economic obstacle:

> The investment policy, which is centered on the separate treatment of companies producing for the domestic market (onshore) and companies producing for exports (offshore), is at the root of the development challenges facing Tunisia today. This segmentation, which limits links between firms in the two regimes, has resulted in greater imports of intermediate products and fewer products made in Tunisia (that is, less value

---


64 Ibid.

added in Tunisia). The onshore-offshore dichotomy was initially helpful in the 1970s but is now contributing to keep both sides of the economy trapped in low productivity.66

These structural problems have hindered job creation and resulted in high levels of unemployment and underemployment, which have had a disproportionate impact on Tunisian youth. Though the unemployment rate has declined since 2011, when unemployment peaked at 18.9%, unemployment remains above 15%.67 Many recent university graduates find themselves either unemployed or working in jobs that are not commensurate with their level of education: Over 30% of university graduates were unemployed in 2012, more than double the unemployment rate for the same cohort in 2005.68

Youth unemployment poses significant social and political challenges, as young unemployed or underemployed Tunisians may be a prime source of discontent and unrest. Unemployed youths may also be vulnerable to the appeal of jihadist ideology. Many Tunisians who have traveled to Syria and Iraq to join jihadist militant groups come from the ranks of the country’s unemployed and underemployed university graduates.69

Other economic challenges include high energy subsidies and excessive government intervention in the economy.70 Energy subsidies in particular have shifted foreign investment toward energy-intensive sectors at the expense of other sectors. While the government has taken limited steps to reduce subsidies,71 more reforms are needed to improve the country’s long-term economic outlook.

67 Ibid., p. 38.
Algeria—once the region’s most benighted country, during the bloody days of its civil war—has been largely immune to the political turmoil that has swept North Africa and the Middle East. Though Algeria shares many of the challenges that plague post-revolutionary countries in North Africa—including corruption, limited political freedom and uneven economic growth—the regime has demonstrated a remarkable degree of resilience.\textsuperscript{72}

Indeed, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who has served as Algeria’s president for 15 years, was recently re-elected to his fourth term.\textsuperscript{73} A number of political opponents claimed that Bouteflika’s electoral victory, in which he received over 80\% of the vote, was fraudulent, and boycotted the inauguration ceremonies. Presidential runner-up Ali Benflis arguing that recognizing Bouteflika’s victory would have made him “complicit in fraud.”\textsuperscript{74}

Other signs that Algeria’s stability may be eroding have begun to emerge. Protests have erupted in southern Algeria over the government’s decision to begin hydraulic fracturing (fracking) in the region. Solidarity protests against fracking have also spread to Algiers.

\textsuperscript{72} Yahia H. Zoubir and Ahmed Aghrout, “Algeria’s Path to Reform: Authentic Change,” \textit{Middle East Policy} 19:2 (Summer 2012) (noting that at the time the Arab Spring commenced, Algeria “presented all the ingredients for a social explosion: corruption, nepotism, deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, restricted freedoms, housing shortages and bad governance,” but that “against all odds, the regime has remained in place”).

\textsuperscript{73} Patrick Markey and Lamine Chikhi, “Algeria’s Bouteflika Wins Re-Election with 81.5 Percent: Official Results,” Reuters, April 18, 2014.

\textsuperscript{74} “Abdelaziz Bouteflika Sworn in for Fourth Term as Algerian President,” \textit{Guardian} (U.K.), April 28, 2014.
prompting Amar Saadani, secretary-general of the ruling National Liberation Front (FLN), to warn in an FLN meeting that “we fear the possible advent of an Arab Spring from the south.”

Succession concerns. There are growing concerns about Bouteflika’s health, and the impact that a leadership succession would have on Algeria’s stability. Now 77, Bouteflika has been hospitalized several times since experiencing a “mini-stroke” in 2013. These incidents have left the president largely incapacitated, and have effectively left Algeria without a head of state. Still, Bouteflika’s poor health does not appear to have had a significant destabilizing effect. Moreover, the Algerian government is in the process of considering constitutional reforms to help ensure a smooth transition of power when Bouteflika is finally forced to leave the political scene.

Political reforms. The Algerian government was able to maintain stability through the region’s political cataclysms through a combination of political reforms and public sector expenditures. After Bouteflika announced in February 2011 that he would suspend Algeria’s state of emergency, which had been in effect for 19 years, he pledged to adopt constitutional reforms that would allow free elections and greater press freedom. However, the political reforms implemented since 2011 have been largely insignificant, and most observers agree that Algeria is still governed by “Le Pouvoir,” a small group of unelected military officers and civilian officials.

Algeria’s economy. Algeria’s tenuous economic situation is also a concern. Algeria is in dire need of bold economic reforms—unemployment hovers at around 30 percent, and oil and gas production dropped from 65 billion cubic meters in 2005 to only 45 billion in 2013—but Bouteflika’s efforts to mollify domestic discontent by redistributing oil wealth and providing subsidies to the population have done little to improve Algeria’s long-term economic prospects. Algeria relies on hydrocarbons for about 98% of its export earnings and 60% of its budget revenues, and the recent drop in global oil prices is likely to increase the country’s budget deficit.

A worsening economic situation in Algeria also raises political concerns. The government is quite generous with its subsidies, viewing them as a tool to assuage discontent. Indeed, when protests swept North Africa in 2011, Algeria “granted zero-interest loans to thousands of unemployed young people and increased the salaries of thousands of public sector employees in an attempt to prevent social unrest from spreading.” Such subsidies are largely funded by Algeria’s energy export revenues—and without subsidies, the government stands to lose a significant amount of legitimacy. With oil prices in decline, Algeria already has announced ten “save-money measures,” including a public sector hiring freeze.

---

75 Adam Aa-Sabiri, “Is a Late ‘Arab Spring’ Knocking on Algeria’s Doors from the Desert?,” Al-Akhbar, January 19, 2015.
76 “Algeria’s Bouteflika in French Hospital, Reason Unclear,” Reuters, November 14, 2014.
Jihadist groups. While attacks in Algeria are infrequent, jihadism remains a real threat. AQIM is a product of the Algerian civil war, a direct descendent of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). The GSPC in turn was an offshoot of the Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA), a jihadist group which rose to prominence following the Algerian military’s decision to cancel the second round of the country’s 1992 parliamentary elections in order to prevent an Islamist party from coming to power. In response to the cancellation of these elections, GIA launched a vicious militant campaign against the Algerian state, attacking military and civilian targets alike. GIA’s brutality proved internally divisive, and in 1998 a group of militants, disillusioned by the wanton killing of civilians and concerned that GIA was alienating local supporters, broke from the group and formed the GSPC.83

Al-Qaeda supported the GSPC because it had soured on the GIA’s overtly brutal methods as strategically counterproductive.84 Following the 9/11 attacks, as al-Qaeda leaders in Pakistan searched for a new safe haven, Osama bin Laden reportedly sent an emissary to Algeria to meet with the GSPC. Though the emissary was killed by Algerian security forces, his trip may have marked an inflection point in the relationship between al-Qaeda and GSPC: Following the trip, ties between GSPC and al-Qaeda grew more robust. In 2003, the GSPC publicly declared that the group “strongly and fully support[s] Osama bin Laden’s jihad against the heretic America.”85

Upon assuming control of the GSPC in 2003, Abdelmalek Droukdel sought to further strengthen ties with al-Qaeda. In 2005, he issued a message praising bin Laden, and in September 2006 al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced that al-Qaeda had officially accepted GSPC as an affiliate.86 Early the following year, GSPC officially changed its name to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb.87 Thus, in addition to having its roots in Algeria, AQIM continues to view Algeria as a primary target.

AQIM has been active in the regions near Algeria’s borders, including Tunisia and northern Mali. Following the January 2013 French intervention to dislodge AQIM from northern Mali, the AQIM offshoot al-Murabitun retaliated by taking hostages at Algeria’s In Amenas gas complex. Regional instability plays into AQIM’s hands.

The Islamic State has also sought to capitalize on the deterioration of security in the Sahel region. In 2014, a group of fighters from AQIM’s Center Zone led by Gouri Abdelmalek defected to the Islamic State, and announced the establishment of a new group, Jund al-Khalifa (Soldiers of the Caliphate).88 The group achieved international notoriety in September 2014 when it released a video of the beheading of a French hiker whom it had kidnapped in Algeria’s Djurdjura National Park. Since releasing that video, Jund al-Khalifa has kept a low profile as the Algerian security services have vigorously pursued it.

84 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
In January 2015, Algerian security forces killed Gouri Abdelmalek and two other militants in an operation in the city of Isser, delivering a significant blow to the nascent group. 89

**Current Trends in Morocco**

Though Morocco has avoided the kind of political upheaval that has consumed other North African states, it has not been entirely immune from internal pressures. In the spring of 2011, thousands of Moroccans participated in protests that came to be known as the February 20 movement, calling for stricter limits on the monarchy’s influence in politics. King Mohammed VI responded by promising a new constitution that would address the protesters’ concerns. 90 The potential for instability remains a key issue for the Moroccan regime.

**Constitutional reforms.** The new Moroccan constitution introduced in 2011 took a number of steps towards strengthening the democratic system, though the monarchy retained significant control over the political process. 91 Among other things, the new constitution guarantees that the prime minister will be selected by the political party that receives the most votes in parliamentary elections, rather than being appointed by the king. It also grants

---


the prime minister the power to appoint government officials, an authority that the king previously held. However, the king retains the right to dissolve the parliament.

In the wake of these reforms, the Justice and Development Party (commonly known by its French acronym, PJD), has established itself as the kingdom's most powerful political group. In some ways the PJD has asserted its authority. Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, who is the PJD’s secretary general, presided over local elections in June 2013 even though the interior ministry, which the king controls, was initially appointed to handle many of the election proceedings. In other ways, the PJD has been deferential to the monarchy, deferring to the King’s circle of advisers on an array of issues, even those that pertain to religion. The PJD has sought to use this relationship with the monarchy, fluctuating between assertion and deference, to its advantage: PJD often emphasizes that, as Benkirane put it, the party’s “relationship with the king is not always perfect,” thus maintaining its distance from the monarchy’s unpopular political decisions.

Critics have expressed concern over the pace of the constitutional reforms, which have been implemented unevenly. Opposition activists point out that the king continues to play an outsized role in the political process.

Jihadism. Morocco’s holistic counterterrorism strategy is highly regarded across Africa. The strategy includes both hard and soft power initiatives. As part of the hard power component, the Moroccan military has stood up three units focused exclusively on the sub-state threats of terrorism, drug smuggling, and irregular migration. In addition, the Moroccan government has rolled out numerous initiatives aimed at addressing unemployment, poverty, and other potential drivers of radicalization. Many countries—including Tunisia, Libya, Mali, Guinea, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria—have sought the Kingdom’s assistance in training religious leaders to play a role in the fight against violent extremism. But the threat of terrorism is always present: Moroccan security forces went on high alert in July 2014 after receiving threats.

Morocco’s deadliest encounter with terrorism came in May 2003, when a dozen suicide bombers conducted synchronized attacks against soft targets in Casablanca, including a hotel, a club, and a Jewish community center. These attacks killed 33 civilians and wounded more than a hundred. The Casablanca attacks prompted Morocco to implement its comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.

92 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Pollock, “Rule the Casbah.”
97 Monjib, “Winners and Losers in a New Political Climate.”
98 Bozonnet, “Political Stability in Morocco Cannot Silence the Murmurs of Discontent.”
At present Morocco’s main concern with respect to jihadist groups is the challenge posed by foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq. According to the International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, which has compiled the most comprehensive publicly-available estimates of foreign fighters from across the globe, around 1,500 Moroccans have joined Sunni militant groups in Syria and Iraq.\textsuperscript{102}

Morocco’s Operation Hadar (Arabic for vigilance) has significantly increased the military and police presence at “central sites in all large cities, as well as at airports and train stations.”\textsuperscript{103} The stated purpose of this operation, as articulated by minister of the interior Mohammed Hassad, is to ensure “the security of citizens and foreign visitors.”\textsuperscript{104} But the military presence in cities has been off-putting to some Moroccans who fear that Operation Hadar portends a “return of a sort of surveillance state that existed” under the country’s previous monarch, Hassan II.\textsuperscript{105} In addition, Morocco has recently launched a number of raids against foreign fighter recruitment cells.\textsuperscript{106}

\textit{Morocco’s economy.} Morocco’s political stability has helped to attract investment from private companies, boosting economic growth. In addition, Morocco is the largest recipient of European Union funds under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), through which Morocco has received €1.3 billion from 2007 to 2013.\textsuperscript{107} Currently Morocco’s main economic concern is its high youth unemployment rate (19.1%), which is problematic both from an economic and also security perspective.\textsuperscript{108} The government is making efforts to create jobs, but structural economic issues continue to inhibit substantive progress in reducing unemployment. Specifically, rigid labor market policies and high barriers to entry have stymied job creation and created imbalances in the job market. Thus youth unemployment has risen in recent years despite the growth in Morocco’s GDP.\textsuperscript{109}

Overall, Morocco is the most stable country in North Africa. While the country’s reputation on human rights and democratic political reforms is far from unblemished, Morocco has made progress in these areas. Morocco faces no imminent threats to its political stability, and it may end up being a linchpin of EU efforts to address North Africa’s crisis.

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{102} Peter Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000; Surpasses Afghanistan Conflict in the 1980s,” International Centre for the Study of Radicalization, January 2015, \url{http://icsr.info/2015/01/foreign-fighter-total-syriairaq-now-exceeds-20000-surpasses-afghanistan-conflict-1980s/}.
\bibitem{103} Rime El Jadidi, “Can Morocco Face Terrorist Threats with Security Arrangements?”, \textit{Al-Akhbar}, December 23, 2014, \url{http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/23008}.
\bibitem{104} Ibid.
\end{thebibliography}
2. Key Threats and Future Contingencies

Current trends in North Africa are deeply concerning. It is likely that this region to Europe’s south will experience even graver problems in the future. This section begins by examining the biggest challenges to European interests, then examines key contingencies that may force policymakers to action in the future. Many of these contingencies—which relate to state failure dynamics, regime instability, or leadership transitions—may not materialize, but they are worth considering because Western policymakers have too often been blindsided by developments in the region. Attempting to anticipate the problems of tomorrow can only improve foresight and thus reactions.

Challenge: Jihadist Terrorism

The terrorist threat to Europe has grown markedly in recent years, a shift that can be attributed primarily to the surge in European citizens and residents who have joined jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, including IS and the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra. The current European foreign fighter outflow—which far exceeds the previous flow of foreign fighters to other battlegrounds like Somalia, Afghanistan, and Chechnya—comes as concerns are growing about the potential for homegrown or lone-wolf terrorism in Europe.

As jihadist groups gain a greater foothold in the Middle East and North Africa due to state failure, Europe also faces a heightened risk of externally-planned terrorist operations. In North Africa, the eruption of civil conflict and degradation of security in Libya have fostered a fertile environment for an array of extremist groups, including those affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula and Tunisia’s mountainous western border have become hotbeds of jihadist activity.

Incitement to violence. Jihadist actors in North Africa looking to strike Europe have a number of options. One involves appealing to Muslim populations in Europe to conduct attacks in their host countries. This approach was popularized by such al-Qaeda figures as Anwar al-Awlaki, and the Islamic State subsequently developed an extraordinarily robust social-media campaign. IS’s supporters post an estimated 90,000 propaganda messages per day on such social media sites as Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube. More important than the sheer volume of pro-IS social media posts, though, is the jihadist group’s mastery of social media, both in terms of its communications proficiency and ability to “game” the technical aspects of platforms like Twitter. As J.M. Berger has noted, at one point IS created an Arabic-language “app” called Dawn of Glad Tidings that would automatically post IS-created tweets from anyone who installed it. These tweets were carefully “spaced out to avoid triggering Twitter’s spam-detection algorithms.” IS has also been adept at helping its topics reach Twitter’s “trending” panel: as Berger writes, its media operations enlist “hundreds and sometimes

thousands of activists to repetitively tweet hashtags at certain times of day.” IS has also shown off its professional-quality film production capabilities.

IS and its supporters have repeatedly appealed via social media and other platforms for Muslims to launch attacks against the countries where they are located. In part because of IS’s strong ability to communicate its message, the group has all too often found that members of the target audience were receptive to carrying out violent acts in its name. North African jihadist groups could adopt this strategy at little cost; but at the same time, they don’t present a unique threat in this regard, as calls to attack Western states can be issued from anywhere in the world. North Africa’s proximity to Europe is unlikely to be uniquely helpful for such propaganda efforts.

**Externally-planned attacks.** However, this proximity may allow North African jihadist groups to take a more hands-on approach by directly planning and orchestrating operations, and infiltrating militants into Europe. One possible infiltration plan would involve sending militants on boats carrying migrants from Libya. An online IS propagandist has broached this possibility, stating that after the operatives arrive, they could conduct attacks in southern European cities and target Mediterranean shipping routes. North African jihadist groups could also look to provide training or direction to local cells in Europe, similar to the role al-Qaeda played in the attack that struck London on July 7, 2005.

Jihadist groups may also try to carry out attacks against European interests in North Africa. The January 2013 attack on the Tigantourine oil facility, located near the southeastern Algerian town of In Amenas, provides a profile of potential attacks against Western facilities and interests. In that attack, a group of around 30 al-Murabitun militants, operating under the command of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, seized control of the oil facility—which was jointly operated by Algerian state oil company Sonatrach, British company BP, and Norwegian company Statoil—and took dozens of non-Algerian oil workers hostage. The Algerian military launched an offensive and eventually retook the facility, but 37 foreigners died during the multi-day ordeal, including four hostages whom militants executed as the Algerian military began its assault.

While spectacular attacks like the In Amenas operation require significant resources and extensive planning, jihadists may also conduct less resource-intensive attacks against European interests and citizens in North Africa. The September 2012 attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt provide one set of templates for such lower scale attacks. Additionally, for over a decade, North African jihadists have relied on the kidnapping of Europeans as a means of generating revenue through ransoms. In 2013 alone, jihadists reportedly made at least $66 million in ransom money, with almost all of it coming from European governments. But jihadists have also demonstrated a willingness to kill hostages if it serves a political or propaganda purpose. AQIM killed Philippe Verdon, a French geologist captured in Mali, in March 2013, claiming that the killing

---

was retaliation for France’s military operation in Mali. Similarly, the IS-aligned Jund al-Khilafa filmed the beheading of Hervé Gourdel, a French mountain climber. IS affiliates will likely prove more eager than groups affiliated with al-Qaeda to slaughter their captives.

**Foreign fighter returnees.** Returning foreign fighters seemingly represent the single greatest terrorist threat to Europe today. The latest estimates hold that around 4,000 residents of Europe have gone to fight with rebel groups in Syria and Iraq. North Africa could soon become a new theater for European foreign fighters. Particularly if the Turkish government takes effective steps to tighten border controls with Syria, would-be European foreign fighters may join jihadist forces on other frontlines where travel is less cumbersome. Libya in particular may become an attractive location for European foreign fighters.

The prospect of Europeans increasingly joining jihadist forces in North Africa would place further strains on European intelligence agencies that are already struggling to keep up with current threats. Analysts worry that European foreign fighters may evade surveillance and perpetrate attacks, acting either on direct orders from jihadist groups or on their own initiative. These returnees are likely to be better trained in weapons and explosives than their often bumbling homegrown counterparts.

Foreign fighter returnees have featured in recent actualized and foiled plots in Europe. One of the most notable incidents occurred in May 2014, when Mehdi Nemmouche, who served as a prison guard for the Islamic State and was reportedly involved in torturing Western hostages, opened fire inside the Jewish Museum of Belgium in Brussels, killing four civilians. Returnees also have been involved in a number of foiled plots:

- In October 2013, French police arrested Lyes Darani, who reportedly fought in Syria. He was found in possession of a bomb manual and a letter that included a pledge to become a suicide bomber.
- In November 2013, Kosovo authorities arrested six ethnic Albanians on charges of plotting an attack in Kosovo. Police recovered a sniper rifle, a handgun, and explosives material. Two of the arrestees reportedly fought with rebel groups in Syria.
- In March 2014, French police arrested a returnee from Syria who was believed to be planning an attack on targets in the French Riviera. Police who raided the man’s house found 900g of explosives that had been packed into cans stuffed with screws and nails. The 23-year-old arrestee is believed to have been associated with the Cannes-Torcy cell, which French officials described as one of the most dangerous terrorist cells operating in France since the 1990s.

---

117 Neumann, “Foreign Fighter Total in Syria/Iraq Now Exceeds 20,000.”
• In May 2014, Dutch police arrested a 21-year-old man who was planning to commit an armed robbery to “finance jihad.” Dutch prosecutors alleged that he had fought with jihadist groups in Syria for six months before returning to the Netherlands.124

• In July 2014, Mohamed Ouharani, who reportedly trained with the Islamic State, was arrested in a suburb of Paris and charged with planning to carry out an attack similar to those conducted by Merah and Nemmouche.125

• In January 2015, Belgian authorities disrupted a cell of three foreign fighter returnees in the town of Verviers who had recently returned from Syria, and were reportedly dispatched by IS leadership with the explicit purpose of carrying out an attack. During the raid, the suspects opened fire on police and two jihadists were killed.126

Challenge: Migration from and through North Africa

Political instability, poor economic conditions, and civil conflict in North Africa have contributed to massive outflows of migrants to Europe since 2011. Since the spring of 2011, the Central Mediterranean route, which refers to irregular migration from North Africa to Malta and southern Italy, has emerged as an important route for North Africans and sub-Saharan African migrant workers seeking economic opportunities and asylum in Europe. In the summer of 2013, the Central Mediterranean route became the primary passage for

---

irregular migration into Europe. The overwhelming majority of migrants traveling via the Central Mediterranean route depart from Libyan coastal ports, with smaller numbers leaving from Tunisia and western Egypt.

Smaller flows of irregular migrants from North Africa and West Africa have attempted to cross into Europe via the Western Mediterranean route, which includes both sea travel from North Africa to the Iberian Peninsula, as well as land travel to Ceuta and Melilla, two Spanish enclaves on the Moroccan coast. Though the sea route has long been the predominant route for irregular migrants traveling to Spain, land crossings via Ceuta and Melilla increased significantly from 2011 to early 2014.127 Still, irregular migration outflows via the Western Mediterranean route pale in comparison to migration via the Central Mediterranean route.

This section now examines the specific migration situation for relevant North African countries.

**Libya.** Within the past year and a half, Libya has become the primary point of departure for migrants seeking to cross the Mediterranean and enter Europe. According to the most recent report from Frontex, the EU’s primary border management agency, 79% of the 75,267 migrants traveling to Europe via the Central Mediterranean route from July-September 2014 departed from Libyan ports.128 The upswing in migration flows from Libya to Europe can be explained primarily by the deterioration of security in the country.

**Central Mediterranean Route Migration (data from Frontex)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Number of migrants detected via Central Mediterranean route</th>
<th>Percent of migrants departing from Libya</th>
<th>Largest contingents of migrants, by nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1 2011 (Jan.-Mar.)</td>
<td>Over 20,000</td>
<td>Likely minimal</td>
<td>Tunisians (Over 20,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 2011 (Apr.-June)</td>
<td>26,167</td>
<td>Libya was the single greatest source of irregular migration to Europe in Q2 2011</td>
<td>Tunisians (4,268); Sub-Saharan Africans, including Nigerians, Ghanaians, Ivorians and Central Africans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 2011 (July-Sept.)</td>
<td>12,673</td>
<td>Unknown; Libyans submit almost 1,000 applications for international protection in Q3</td>
<td>Tunisians; Sub-Saharan Africans (particularly Nigerians)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4 2011 (Oct.-Dec.)</td>
<td>1,989</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Afghans; Egyptians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 2012 (January-March)</td>
<td>1,589</td>
<td>Libya is seen as an increasingly appealing departure point for irregular migration</td>
<td>Not available</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Quarter</th>
<th>Number of migrants detected via Central Mediterranean route</th>
<th>Percent of migrants departing from Libya</th>
<th>Largest contingents of migrants, by nationality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q2 2012 (Apr.-June)</td>
<td>3,685</td>
<td>Not available, although likely that majority of Somalis left from Libya</td>
<td>Somalis (1,094); Tunisians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 2012 (July-Sept.)</td>
<td>3,427</td>
<td>Not available</td>
<td>Tunisians (over 1,000); Somalis (854); Eritreans (411); Egyptians (287)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4 2012 (Oct.-Dec.)</td>
<td>3,476</td>
<td>Most East and West Africans leave from Libya because of weak police enforcement and porous borders, while North Africans generally leave from their countries of origin</td>
<td>Eritreans; Somalis; Gambians; Tunisians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 2013 (Jan.-Mar.)</td>
<td>1,124</td>
<td>Fewer boats left from Libya during this quarter, due in part to inclement weather</td>
<td>Somalis (271); Gambians (233); Egyptians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 2013 (Apr.-June)</td>
<td>5,311</td>
<td>Majority of migrants left from Libya</td>
<td>Eritreans (1,824); Somalis (1,141); West Africans (e.g., Malians and Gambians) (1,088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 2013 (July-Sept.)</td>
<td>More than 22,000</td>
<td>Over 90%</td>
<td>Eritreans (~6,000); Syrians (~6,000); Somalis (~2,700); Nigerians (1,800); Egyptians (1,000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4 2013 (Oct.-Dec.)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Eritreans; Syrians (3,432); Gambians (&lt;1300)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q1 2014 (Jan.-Mar.)</td>
<td>10,799</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>Malians; Eritreans (1,522); Syrians (1,268); Gambians (&lt;1,200)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2 2014 (Apr.-June)</td>
<td>Greater than 53,000</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>Eritreans; Syrians; Malians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3 2014 (July-Sept.)</td>
<td>75,267</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>Syrians; Egyptians; Palestinians</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Migration from Libya to Europe first surged during the second quarter of 2011 (April-June), when Sub-Saharan African migrant workers left Libya for Europe to escape the violence of the uprising. Qaddafi also subjected many Sub-Saharan migrants to repression and forcible deportation during this period, seeing the flow of migrants to Europe as his retaliation against NATO for intervening in his country.\(^\text{129}\) During this period, Libya was the single greatest source of irregular migration to the EU.\(^\text{130}\)

Immigration from Libya declined precipitously immediately after Qaddafi’s fall. The Libyan government’s limited border management capabilities, however, soon turned Libya into a hub for migration.

\(^{130}\) Ibid., p. 6.
for migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa looking to reach Europe. Without a competent border control force, Libya remained largely incapable of regulating the movements of migrant populations passing through it.

The first wave of migration from Libya to Europe in 2012 consisted primarily of East Africans. Growing numbers of Somalis, who largely left their homes for security reasons, began traveling through Libya to Europe in the first quarter of 2012 (January-March). Eritrean migrants first emerged in large numbers in the third quarter of 2012 (July to September), and by the second quarter of 2013, Eritreans would comprise the largest group of migrants using the Central Mediterranean route to enter Europe. One factor behind the sudden influx in Eritrean migration to Libya and Europe was the Israeli government’s renewed efforts in 2012 and 2013 to prevent East Africans from obtaining asylum in Israel, which forced Eritreans and other East African migrants to seek refuge elsewhere. The majority of East African refugees had no plans to remain in Libya, and instead merely used the country as a departure point from which to reach Europe: A May 2013 report produced for the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) found that 93% of Somalis and 71% of Eritreans living in Libya said the country was not their final destination.

Irregular migration from Libya to Europe remained largely consistent throughout 2012 before increasing again in the second quarter of 2013. This uptick was attributable to an increase in West African migrants, in addition to steady growth in migration from East Africa. But migration from Libya surged to unprecedented levels in the third quarter of 2013. Frontex recorded more than 22,000 detections of irregular migration via the Central Mediterranean route during the third quarter of 2013, a fourfold increase over the previous quarter. Frontex concluded that the majority of migrants traveling to Europe via the Central Mediterranean route during this period had departed from Libya. The surge in migration was primarily attributable to a massive increase in Eritrean migration and to a record influx of Syrian migrants: About 6,000 Syrians traveled via the Central Mediterranean route during Q3 2013.

The abundance of migrant smuggling networks in Libya, coupled with Libya’s lax border policing and limited naval capabilities, made Libya an increasingly popular departure point for Syrian refugees. Most Syrian refugees crossing the Mediterranean in early and mid-2013 traveled from Egypt, but by September 2013 growing numbers of Syrian refugees in Egypt travelled first to Libya before departing for Europe. In addition to migration through Libya becoming easier, the Egyptian government’s crackdown on Syrian refugees after Morsi’s fall may also have prompted Syrians to leave for Libya.

The eruption of armed conflict in Libya in May 2014 and subsequent deterioration in security conditions fueled another wave of migration to Europe. Frontex recorded over 53,000 detections of irregular migration via the Central Mediterranean route in Q2 2014, the highest level recorded since Frontex began gathering data in 2007. Of the 53,000 instances,

---

135 Ibid., p. 5.
136 Ibid., p. 19.
88% originated in Libya, underscoring the central role Libya had come to play for refugees and economic migrants from across sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East seeking to reach Europe. A surge in migration of sub-Saharan Africans, especially Malians and Eritreans, was responsible for the unparalleled upswing in migration from Libya in Q2 2014. Essentially, the Dawn-Dignity conflict had produced economic and political instability, and triggered attacks against the Sub-Saharan migrant population residing in Libya's coastal cities, thus prompting migrants to flee to Europe. The upswing in migration from Libya that began in the spring of 2014 intensified in the summer as the ongoing civil conflict constrained the capabilities of Libyan border authorities.

In Q3 2014, Frontex recorded 75,267 detections of irregular migration via the Central Mediterranean route, with 79 percent of migrants departing from Libyan ports. Detections of irregular migration in each month of Q3 broke all previous records for the Central Mediterranean route. Syrian war refugees comprised the largest single national group traveling via the Central Mediterranean route, and many Syrians traveling to Europe in this quarter had fled from Egypt to avoid an intensifying crackdown by the Egyptian government. Growing numbers of Syrian migrants flew from elsewhere in the Middle East to Algiers, from where they then traveled by land to Libyan ports before departing for Europe by boat.

The scope of the Central Mediterranean migration crisis presents a significant challenge to European border officials. The UNHCR estimated in October 2014 that 130,000 migrants had arrived in Italy from Libya since January of that year. Deaths of migrants attempting to traverse the Mediterranean rose in tandem with the surge in migration, with the UNHCR estimating that 3,400 migrants had died or gone missing while attempting to cross the Mediterranean in 2014, the largest number of migrant fatalities in the Mediterranean in a single year in recent history.

The continuation of civil conflict in Libya will likely produce sustained outflows of migration to Europe. The remaining migrant workers in Libya are highly vulnerable, and many may choose to leave for Europe if they are forced to flee from their homes. Similarly, there is no sign that the human smuggling routes through Libya are likely to abate.

The possibility of widespread migration of Libyan nationals to Europe poses another worrying scenario for the EU. According to the UNHCR, there are about 400,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Libya. There are few signs that displaced Libyans have elected to flee to Europe en masse. Instead, Libyan refugees generally have sought shelter in other parts of Libya or crossed into Tunisia. The possibility remains that Libyan IDPs will begin to migrate to Europe in greater numbers, posing an additional challenge for European countries.

*Tunisia.* Irregular migration from Tunisia is of lesser concern to Europe than irregular migration from Libya. Tunisia’s security apparatus and border management capabilities, while far from perfect, are superior to Libya’s. Indeed, Tunisian migrants often have traveled

---

139 Ibid., p. 16.
to Libya in order to reach Europe. Tunisia’s lack of geographic borders with Sub-Saharan countries also makes it more difficult for West and East African migrants to enter the country.

Tunisia witnessed a massive outflow of migration to Europe during the height of the revolution against Ben Ali in early 2011. In the first quarter of 2011, over 20,000 Tunisians fled to Europe via the Central Mediterranean route. The deterioration of Tunisia’s security forces during the uprising against Ben Ali and the reallocation of the remaining security resources away from border management had created opportunities for human smugglers. Observers on the ground in Tunisia in early 2011 reported that smugglers began operating in broad daylight on Tunisia’s coast.

This sudden influx of Tunisian migrants prompted Italy to declare a humanitarian crisis in Lampedusa, and led the EU to increase pressure on the nascent Tunisian government to crack down on irregular migration. In April 2011, Italy and Tunisia signed a repatriation agreement stipulating that Tunisian migrants who arrived in Italy between January and April 2011 would be offered temporary protection status, but those who arrived after April 2011 would be returned to Tunisia. This resulted in a noticeable decline in irregular migration from Tunisia in the latter half of 2011. Since the Italy-Tunisia repatriation agreement was signed, the EU has looked to strengthen Tunisia’s border management capacity. In March 2014, Tunisia established a mobility partnership with the EU aimed at improving coordination on migration flows and expediting the visa-granting process for Tunisian nationals. Efforts to strengthen Tunisia’s border control have caused irregular migration via the Central Mediterranean route to shift to Libya.

Though irregular migration from Tunisia remains low, ongoing civil conflict in Libya could cause a renewed migration crisis in Tunisia. Libyan nationals and other residents of Libya continue to flow across Tunisia’s borders, raising the possibility that refugees from Libya will begin seeking methods of traveling from Tunisia to Europe. Also, if instability rises in Tunisia—for example, due to escalation of Tunisia’s already existing problems with jihadists—that could also trigger a larger outflow from Tunisia to Europe. And economic stagnation coupled with high levels of unemployment serve as another “push” factor driving irregular migration from Tunisia.

Egypt. Egypt is both a destination and transit country for refugees and economic migrants from the Middle East and East Africa. The Egyptian government claims that 350,000 refugees reside in Egypt, along with one million economic migrants. The number of refugees in Egypt increased significantly in late 2012 and 2013, when Egypt became a hub for Syrians fleeing the country’s civil war. Israel’s war in Gaza in the summer of 2014 also caused an inflow of

---

143 Rana Jawad, ““Easier from Libya”—Migrants Return to Tripoli,” BBC, October 15, 2013.
144 Frontex, FRAN Quarterly: Quarter 1, 2011, July 2011, p. 5.
146 See “Tunisian Migrants Land in Italy,” Al Jazeera, March 2, 2011 (describing Italy’s declaration of a humanitarian emergency); “EU Demands Tunisia Do More to Stop Illegal Migration,” BBC, April 12, 2011 (reporting EU pressure on the new Tunisian government).
refugees from Gaza to Egypt. The vast majority of migrants and refugees in Egypt do not attempt to make the trip to Europe, either because they cannot afford to do so or because they are concerned about the risks of travel via the Mediterranean, and instead remain in Egypt indefinitely.

Despite this, irregular migration from Egypt to Europe surged in early 2013, largely due to the growth in Syrian refugees in the country. Five to seven boats per week began leaving from Alexandria, Egypt’s primary departure point for migrants trying to reach Europe. Irregular migration grew further after the Morsi regime’s fall in July 2013. The UNHCR estimated that 3,000 migrants made their way from Egypt to Europe from January to August 2013. From August to October, another 3,400 migrants made the trip. The increase in irregular migration after the fall of Morsi’s regime was due in large part to the new government’s attitude toward the population of Syrian war refugees. Under Morsi, Egypt maintained an open-door policy toward Syrian refugees as part of its broader strategy for supporting anti-Assad rebels. But after Morsi’s overthrow, conditions for Syrian refugees in Egypt deteriorated, as they stood accused of supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and participating in pro-Morsi protests. The new government arbitrarily arrested Syrians, and there were hundreds of cases of forced return to Syria. This worsening situation prompted many Syrian refugees living to flee Egypt for Europe.

Irregular migration from Egypt to Europe continued to increase throughout 2014. By October 2014, five to seven boats were leaving Egypt’s western coast for Europe each day, a sevenfold increase over departures in the previous year.

Regular and irregular migration patterns for Egyptian nationals traveling to Europe are distinct from the patterns for non-Egyptian migrants traveling from Egypt. The majority of Egyptian nationals traveling to Europe are unemployed males, many of whom are recent university graduates. These migrants generally retain close ties with family members in Egypt and intend to remain in Europe temporarily, sending home remittances and saving money with the intent of returning to Egypt. A smaller contingent of Egyptian Coptic Christian has fled to Europe to escape attacks on their community, and they are more likely to settle permanently in Europe. Egyptian economic migrants who do not plan to establish permanent residency in Europe will likely place less strain on social welfare systems than economic migrants and asylum-seekers who intend to stay permanently.

---

151 Norman, “Migrants in Post-Revolution Egypt.”
152 Yardley, “Shipwreck Was Simple Murder.”
157 Yardley, “Shipwreck Was Simple Murder.”
Egyptian security forces have attempted to crack down on irregular migration, with mixed results. Starting in August 2013, Egyptian navy vessels began seizing ships carrying migrants to Europe and placing the migrants in makeshift detention centers. These interdiction efforts intensified as irregular migration increased in 2014: The Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights estimated that the Egyptian navy detained over 6,800 migrants from January to September 2014. The Egyptian government has vowed to continue these efforts: interior ministry deputy spokesman Ayman Helmy said, “Those who attempt to illegally immigrate to Europe through the north coast are all criminals threatening the national security.” However, some analysts question whether Egyptian security forces are capable of bringing smuggling operations under control. Muhammad Kashef, a researcher at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, said, “The Egyptian government can’t handle this. They use old technology to track boats, they don’t have the manpower to stop smuggling, and they don’t have room to process the large number of migrants they arrest.”

Egypt’s border policing efforts, coupled with repatriation agreements it has with Europe, make Egypt less favorable as a point of departure for migrants than Libya. The lengthy distance from Alexandria to Italy also makes Egypt less appealing to migrants than Tunisia or Libya. Nonetheless, there has been a recent surge in irregular migration from Egypt that could portend a broader shift in irregular migration patterns in the coming years. For example, persistent conflict in Libya could limit migrants’ ability to travel to Libyan ports due to safety concerns, forcing migrants to seek alternative departure points such as Egypt. Growing instability in Egypt could also result in increased irregular migration.

**Morocco.** Morocco is the primary departure point for migrants traveling via the Western Mediterranean route to Spain. Sub-Saharan Africans comprise a growing number of irregular migrants departing from Morocco to Europe, in addition to steady flows of Moroccan and Algerian economic migrants looking for work. The Moroccan government estimates that, as of September 2014, between 25,000 and 40,000 undocumented migrants, the vast majority from Sub-Saharan Africa, reside in Morocco. Though some migrants settle and work in Morocco, others intend to live only temporarily in Morocco as they plan a move to Europe.

Migrants departing from Morocco either travel by sea across the Strait of Gibraltar, departing from ports between Ceuta and Tangiers, or attempt to traverse the three fences that separate Morocco from Ceuta and Melilla, Spain’s North Africa enclaves. In recent years, migrants have begun coordinating their efforts to cross into Ceuta and Melilla, studying border security measures for months and then crossing together in waves, sometimes amounting to over a thousand migrants at a time, in an effort to overwhelm border guards.

---

159 “‘We Cannot Live Here Anymore,’” Amnesty International.
162 Ibid.
Migrants have also attempted to swim around border fences to reach Melilla and Ceuta. In one February 2014 incident, Spanish guards fired rubber bullets at hundreds of migrants attempting to swim to Ceuta, and some observers believe that the guards’ conduct was partially responsible for the drowning deaths of 15 migrants.167

Irregular migration via Morocco surged in 2011, due in part to an influx of migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries, including Guinea, the Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Nigeria.168 Algerians comprised the single largest group of irregular migrants utilizing the Western Mediterranean route in 2011. The increase in irregular migration in 2011 was marked by a massive uptick in migration across the land borders in Ceuta and Melilla: Detections of irregular migration via land routes increased 113 percent from 2010 to 2011.169 The surge in irregular crossings into Ceuta and Melilla prompted the Spanish and Moroccan governments to intensify border security measures in and around the two enclaves.170

In 2012, migration via the Western Mediterranean route decreased. Frontex recorded 6,397 detections of irregular migration in 2012, a 24 percent decline from 2011.171 Algerians again comprised the largest group of irregular migrants.172

The rate of irregular migration from Morocco remained largely constant into 2013, though migration patterns shifted. Intensified policing of sea routes by Moroccan and European border agencies resulted in a decline in sea-based irregular migration to Europe.173 But irregular migration to Melilla and Ceuta increased by 49 percent over the previous year, indicating that irregular migration had shifted towards land-based routes in response to the crackdown on sea routes.

The trend of increased irregular migration via land routes continued in the early months of 2014, as migrants began coordinating efforts to cross the Ceuta and Melilla borders en masse.174 Sub-Saharan Africans comprised the overwhelming majority of migrants attempting to cross into Ceuta and Melilla during this period.175

Another shift in migration patterns along the Western Mediterranean route occurred in the latter half of 2014. Irregular migration in the third quarter via the Western Mediterranean route reached levels that had not been seen since 2011; in total, there were almost 3,000 detections of irregular migration during this period. Irregular migration via land routes declined even as total migration increased. Spanish officials took measures to fortify the land borders in Ceuta and Melilla, including adding mesh to the fences that separate Melilla and Ceuta from Moroccan territory.176 Such measures resulted in a significant decline in land-based migration in the third quarter of 2014.177 Instead, most migrants traveled via

167 “Spain Admits Use of Rubber Bullets on Migrants was Wrong,” BBC, March 10, 2014.
169 Ibid., p. 46.
171 Ibid., p. 20.
172 Ibid., p. 46.
sea routes during this period, with large groups congregating on the Moroccan side of the Strait of Gibraltar to attempt a nine-mile sea journey to Spain. The uptick in sea travel in Q3 2014 can be attributed largely to a massive influx in migration over a two-day period in August, which some Spanish analysts claim was the result of a deliberate lapse in Moroccan border security. One theory analysts advanced was that Morocco had relaxed security to demonstrate its continued importance to Spain in preventing irregular migration. Another theory was that the security lapse came as retaliation after a Spanish judge announced that he would investigate civil rights abuses perpetrated against migrants by Moroccan security forces.

This surge in migration in August 2014, during which more than 1,200 migrants arrived in Spain, demonstrates the extent to which Spanish border security officials depend on Morocco to contain irregular migration. Thus, political instability or a prolonged lapse in border security in Morocco could create a serious migration crisis for Spain. Even the two-day lapse in August 2014 strained the Spanish government’s resources.

Since 1992, Morocco has signed a number of readmission agreements with European countries, as well as a 2013 mobility partnership with the EU, that improve European-Moroccan coordination on repatriation of Moroccan citizens and third-party nationals who depart from Morocco to reach Europe. The EU has also provided funding to Morocco to strengthen its border security capabilities. In addition, Morocco and Spain have coordinated border security at both the land borders with Melilla and Ceuta and in shared sea areas.

Algeria. Irregular migration from Algeria to Europe is relatively infrequent, as both Libya and Morocco are more common points of departure for migrants. Migrants who do leave from Algeria typically depart on boats from coastal ports between Ghazaouet and Orán, arriving on the coast of Almeria in southeastern Spain. Mostaganem, on the northwestern coast of Algeria, serves as a primary departure point for migrants seeking to reach Murcia, which is also located on Spain’s southeastern Mediterranean coast.

**Challenge: Transnational Crime**

An array of criminal networks have established operations in North Africa, capitalizing on weak state governments, endemic corruption, and poor security conditions. Drug trafficking cartels have set up shop, sometimes cooperating with jihadist groups and other violent non-state actors (VNSAs) to ensure safe shipment of their products. Morocco has long been the predominant global supplier of cannabis to European markets, although the country’s cannabis production has dipped in recent years. Cocaine and heroin trafficking

---

181 Minder, “Spain Suspects Morocco Allowed a Brief Flood of Migrants.”
183 Ibid., p. 58.
has grown considerably in Libya in recent years, with smugglers exploiting the weak rule of law to expand their operations. Libya’s emergence as a potential transit hub offers cocaine traffickers an alternative to sea-based and air-based smuggling routes. There has also been a growing nexus between drug trafficking and migrant smuggling in Libya, with traffickers sometimes utilizing migrants to ship product into Europe. Egypt has also become a hub for cocaine and heroin trafficking.

Other criminal enterprises, including oil smuggling and illicit pharmaceutical trafficking, have also emerged in North Africa, with players capitalizing on Libya’s deteriorating security conditions to establish operations in the country. The pillaging of Qaddafi weapons stockpiles during the 2011 uprising also has fueled a booming black market weapons trade. The illicit antiquities trade in Egypt has surged since Mubarak’s fall, with smugglers fencing Egyptian antiques in European markets.

_libya_. The collapse of Libya’s security sector and its porous borders have created fertile conditions for transnational criminal networks. Libya’s location at the crossroads between Europe, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa makes it a desirable locale for traffickers looking to reach European markets. A 2014 United States Institute of Peace report by Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, titled _Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses_, provides an exhaustive view of criminal activity in post-Qaddafi Libya. Much of the information in the following section is derived from that valuable report.

Smuggling routes first established under the Qaddafi regime, which took a lenient view of illicit trade and often regulated smuggling as an alternative form of patronage, have grown in size due to the absence of a central government. Southern Libya in particular has emerged as a safe haven for a variety of smugglers and traffickers transporting weapons, drugs and migrants.

Though the Sahel and West Africa remain the primary hubs for the trafficking of drugs originating from South America, drug smugglers appear to be trying to diversify routes and avoid interdiction. The relative weakness of Libya’s security forces suggests that, as smuggling routes gradually move further into the Maghreb, Libya has the potential to become a central trafficking hub. Indeed, cocaine and heroin smuggling through Libya is increasing, with heavily armed trafficking groups dominating the trade. An incipient domestic market for cocaine and heroin has also emerged in Tripoli.

Much of the heroin, cocaine and hashish that enters Libya is then moved into Egypt. Traffickers in Libya also are involved in moving narcotics directly from Libya’s western ports to Europe. The western port of Zuwarah, located near the Tunisian border, and the surrounding towns of Sebratah and Zawiya, are believed to be hubs of migrant smuggling and drug trafficking to Europe.

186 Ibid., p. 11.
187 Ibid., p. 23.
188 Ibid., p. 15.
189 Ibid., p. 25.
The proliferation of weapons in Libya following the fall of Qaddafi’s regime has benefited existing criminal networks and helped new illicit economies to emerge. Weapons smuggling has become an increasingly lucrative business: the price of an AK-47 in local markets has surged from 3,000 dinars in 2012 to 12,000 dinars (about €8,176 in current exchange rates).\textsuperscript{190} Arms trafficking routes originating in Libya extend to the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, the Gaza Strip, Syria and other conflict zones.\textsuperscript{191}

Italian mafia groups and other criminal networks in Europe also reportedly have received arms shipments through Libyan ports.\textsuperscript{192} However, there is little data as to the extent of the illicit arms flows from Libya to Europe. The possibility exists, though, that Libya will emerge as an important source of weapons for European criminal networks, given the abundance of high-caliber weaponry available in Libya. After all, the dispersion of weapons originated in Libya has helped drug traffickers in West Africa and the Sahel become heavily armed.\textsuperscript{193}

There are also other criminal enterprises in Libya. The government’s subsidization of oil for domestic consumers has contributed to the emergence of illicit oil smuggling networks built around an arbitrage scheme. The oil is bought cheaply in Libya, then sent to Malta, Italy, or Tunisia, where it can be sold for a higher price. Zuwarah in particular has become a hub for oil smuggling networks, as numerous businessmen in Zuwarah reportedly have become rich through involvement in oil smuggling.\textsuperscript{194} In April 2014, the Libyan government proposed a system of ration cards that would limit the quantity of subsidized oil that each Libyan citizen could purchase, with the intent of constricting oil smuggling operations.\textsuperscript{195} However, implementation of such a program is quite difficult while the country is embroiled in conflict.

Libya has also become a destination for contraband goods smuggled from Europe. Since Qaddafi’s fall, unprecedented quantities of prescription drugs have flooded into Libya. Both armed factions and pharmacists are believed to be involved in this trade.\textsuperscript{196} There is also a thriving, and almost entirely unregulated, trade in used (and sometimes stolen) cars shipped from Europe. Some of the cars sent to Libya as part of this trade might be used to store weapons and drugs.\textsuperscript{197}

\textit{Tunisia}. Tunisia has witnessed a surge in smuggling since Ben Ali’s fall. This uptick is due in large part to a reduction in the number of Tunisian security forces along key smuggling routes near the border with Algeria, “especially in the regions of Kasserine and Tala.”\textsuperscript{198} This has created new opportunities for smuggling networks. Illicit trading has taken a serious toll on Tunisia’s economic growth, with the World Bank estimating that smuggling costs Tunisia around $1 billion per year.\textsuperscript{199}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{190} Ibid., p. 17
\item \textsuperscript{191} Ibid., p.19.
\item \textsuperscript{192} Ibid., p.25.
\item \textsuperscript{194} Shaw and Mangan, \textit{Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition}, p. 27.
\item \textsuperscript{195} Julia Payne, “Libya Plans ‘Smart Cards’ to Cut Fuel Subsidies that Boost Smuggling,” Reuters, April 17, 2014.
\item \textsuperscript{196} Shaw and Mangan, \textit{Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition}, p. 12.
\item \textsuperscript{197} Ibid., p.24.
\end{itemize}
Foodstuffs, oil and clothing comprise the majority of goods smuggled into and out of Tunisia. However, drug trafficking of cannabis has also increased. Tunisia primarily serves as a transit point for traffickers delivering cannabis to markets in Libya, Egypt, and Europe, though Tunisia’s domestic cannabis market has also grown in recent years.\textsuperscript{200} A domestic market for pharmaceutical drugs has also emerged in Tunisia, mirroring similar developments in Libya.\textsuperscript{201} Drug smuggling outflows from Tunisia to Europe are believed to be minimal, though in January 2015 Tunisian officials claimed to have disrupted an international trafficking ring, with authorities arresting three European traffickers and seizing five tons of cannabis, the largest drug seizure in Tunisia’s history.\textsuperscript{202}

The illicit weapons trade has also grown in Tunisia in recent years, though analysts note that Tunisian politicians often exaggerate the extent of arms smuggling.\textsuperscript{203} The majority of arms smuggled into Tunisia come from Algeria and Libya, but hunting guns and other weapons have also been smuggled in from Italy and other countries in Europe.\textsuperscript{204}

There has been a growing nexus between jihadist groups and criminal networks in Tunisia in the past few years. Jihadist groups based in Tunisia’s western mountains reportedly control key informal border routes with Algeria that are critical to smugglers. Smugglers pay jihadists, some of whom are members of the same tribe as the smugglers, to allow them access to smuggling routes and to provide protection as they cross the border. Local residents even report that jihadists based in the western mountains sometimes launch attacks to distract security forces from smuggling operations.\textsuperscript{205}

Drug trafficking and smuggling outflows from Tunisia to Europe are limited at this time. Though Tunisian security officials lament that they lack the capabilities and resources to control Tunisia’s smuggling networks, Tunisia has not yet become a central trafficking hub for criminal networks operating between North Africa and Europe.

\textit{Egypt.} Egypt plays a central role as a transit point for drugs heading to Europe. Egypt’s location at the intersection between the Middle East and North Africa makes it a prominent hub for drugs coming from North Africa and Southwest and Southeast Asia. Cannabis is smuggled from Morocco across Libya’s porous borders into Egypt, while heroin traffickers from Afghanistan and the Golden Triangle in Southeast Asia smuggle their goods into Egypt via the Suez Canal before the drugs are shipped onto Europe.\textsuperscript{206} Cocaine is also trafficked from West Africa to Egypt via southern Libya,\textsuperscript{207} and recent reports indicate that Egypt has become a new market for hashish produced in Pakistan and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{208}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{200} International Crisis Group, \textit{Tunisia’s Borders}, p. 15.
\bibitem{201} Ibid., p. 12.
\bibitem{202} “Tunisia Arrests 3 Europeans in Record Drugs Haul on Yacht,” Agence France Presse, January 14, 2015.
\bibitem{203} International Crisis Group, \textit{Tunisia’s Borders}, p. 15.
\bibitem{204} Ibid., p. 18.
\bibitem{205} Ibid., p. 10
\bibitem{207} Shaw and Mangan, \textit{Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition}, p. 15.
\end{thebibliography}
Overall, narcotics trafficking from Egypt to Europe is relatively robust, and Egyptian efforts to combat drug trafficking have been inconsistent and highly vulnerable to political volatility. The Council of the European Union expressed concern in May 2014 that combating trafficking was not a priority for the Egyptian government due to the tenuous political situation in the country.  

Egypt also possesses a small illicit drug production industry. Opium and cannabis are both grown in the Sinai Peninsula, with opium production increasing as Sinai residents turn to drug cultivation to compensate for shortfalls in tourism revenue. The opium grown in the Sinai is rarely processed into heroin—precursor materials necessary to produce heroin are strictly controlled in Egypt—and Egyptian opium is consumed locally, rather than being transported to European markets.

Egypt’s domestic illicit drug market has grown in recent years, and analysts have warned of rising levels of drug addiction, especially among young Egyptians. As in Tunisia and Libya, addiction to prescription drugs, such as the opioid painkiller Tramadol, has also increased in Egypt. In 2013, Egyptian counternarcotics agents conducted numerous seizures of large amounts of prescription drugs, including seizing 27 million tablets of Tramadol at the Port of Alexandria in March 2013.

Since Mubarak’s fall, Egypt has witnessed considerable growth in its illicit antiquities trade, with analysts estimating that the total value of antiquities stolen since 2011 ranges from $3 billion to $6 billion. Israel and Switzerland are primary destination points for antiquities smuggled from Egypt. In early 2015 Spanish police, in collaboration with Interpol, disrupted a major antiquities ring that had smuggled hundreds of thousands of dollars’ worth of ancient Egyptian artifacts from Alexandria to Europe to sell on the black market. Security authorities expressed concern that the revenue from these antiquity sales may have gone to jihadists.

Algeria and Morocco. Algeria has expressed growing concerns about the nexus between drug traffickers and jihadists operating in southern Algeria. In a telling sign of Algeria’s trepidations about drug trafficking, an Algerian security official noted in 2013 that drug smuggling was a higher security priority than terrorism for Algerian security forces. Meanwhile, Morocco has long been the largest producer of cannabis resin in the world, and is the primary provider of cannabis to European markets. However, production of cannabis has declined in Morocco in recent years, due in part to intensified eradication efforts and declining European demand for Morocco-produced cannabis. While cannabis production and trafficking has become an integral, and often tolerated, part of Morocco’s informal

References:
209 Ibid.
214 Ibid.
Moroccan security officials have voiced concerns about increased trafficking of cocaine from West Africa through Morocco to European markets.218

Both Algeria and Morocco serve as key transit points in the European cannabis trade. Cannabis produced in Morocco and destined for European markets is generally trafficked through the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla or other Spanish ports before being transported to the Netherlands and Belgium, where the domestic market for cannabis is robust.219 Algeria also serves as a departure point for traffickers bringing cannabis to Europe, with Algerian smugglers shipping cannabis across the Mediterranean via speed boats to French and Spanish shores.220 Algeria is also a transit country for cannabis resin shipped from Morocco to other countries in North Africa, including Tunisia, Libya and Egypt.

Cannabis production and smuggling in Morocco remains a persistent challenge for European counternarcotics officials. Although Morocco has responded positively to pressure by international actors to curb domestic cannabis production, the government has been reluctant to implement a comprehensive eradication program, in large part due to the potential for unrest. Thousands of Moroccan farmers depend on the cannabis crop for their livelihood, and recent efforts aimed at eradicating cannabis crops in the Rif region, Morocco’s heartland of cannabis production, triggered a local backlash.221 Because cannabis eradication is unlikely, some Moroccan politicians have broached the idea of cannabis legalization as a means of increasing state revenue and alleviating tensions with farmers.

Challenge: Economic Exposure to Instability in North Africa

Instability in North Africa could threaten European investment and operations in the region. A major reason that North Africa is economically important to Europe is its role in supplying energy resources. Three major European oil and gas companies currently operate in Libya. Total is a gas company headquartered in France that is involved in oil and gas exploration and production in Libya, specifically in the Mabruk field, the Al Jurf field (northwest of Tripoli on the border with Tunisia), the onshore El Sharaa field, and in the Muzruq Basin.222 Not all of these fields have French personnel on site; some are just sites in which the French company has a stake.223 The Italian company Eni S.p.A also has invested in Libya’s energy sector, and is the largest international oil company currently operating in the country.224 However, Eni’s expatriate personnel has been evacuated due to security concerns.225 Wintershall, a German company, has been active in oil exploration in Libya for over fifty years. While it has temporarily suspended its onshore production operations, it still has investments and shares in offshore platforms in conjunction with Total and the Libyan National Oil Company.226

219 Frontex, Annual Risk Analysis, May 2014, p. 42.
221 Roslington and Pack, “Morocco’s Growing Cannabis Debate.”
Six European oil and gas companies are operating in Algeria. Statoil, from Norway, works with the British oil company BP in two places: In Amenas and In Salah Gas. Royal Dutch Shell, Repsol from Spain, and Enel from Italy also have operations in Algeria. Petroceltic, based out of Ireland, has also recently started operations in Algeria, including the drilling of 24 wells and the construction of gas processing plants and related infrastructure.

While Egypt is not an OPEC member, it still provides significant energy resources to the European Union. Four European oil and gas companies operate and invest in Egypt: Eni, BP, Shell, and Total have recently made exploration deals for Egypt, and are working toward expanding their operations. Egypt is currently negotiating other exploration deals with other companies.

Overall, North Africa’s role in providing oil and gas to EU countries is significant. Libya and Algeria are both members of OPEC, and provide oil and gas to certain members of the European Union. For example, Algeria exports 62% of its natural gas to Italy, 27% to Spain, 6% to Portugal, and 1% to Slovenia. EU countries as a whole import 13% of their natural gas from Algeria, but just 2% from Libya and 1% percent from Egypt. Libya exports about 70-80% of its crude oil to European countries, with Italy being the main importer. About 56% of Egypt’s exports of crude oil go to European countries.

There are also other significant aspects to the EU’s trade with North Africa beyond energy resources. Overall, the EU has a unique Euro-Mediterranean partnership (including with Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey), accounting for 8.6% of its external trade. Two of the top three African states from which the EU imports goods are in the north, as are half of the top eight, including Algeria (17%), Libya (14%), Morocco (6%), and Tunisia (6%). As for EU exports, five of the eight largest African trading partners are in the north: Algeria (15%), Morocco (11%), Egypt (10%), Tunisia (7%), and Libya (5%).

Further, cross-referencing specific export and import goods with their market share for EU states provides a more comprehensive understanding of the EU’s vulnerabilities should trade be disrupted. For example, while legumes are only 5.7% of what the U.K. exports to Egypt, they account for 58.54% of all U.K. legume exports. Conversely, crude petroleum accounts


229 “Five Oil Companies Selected for New Blocks,” Ennahar.


for 94.05% of the U.K.’s imports from Algeria, but it only makes up 7.63% of U.K.’s total crude petroleum imports. Other than energy, if trade with North Africa is disrupted, the biggest impact on EU imports could be mineral tars, nitrogenous fertilizer, natural gums, uranium and thorium, acyclic alcohols, electric wire, and agricultural products (fish, legumes, tomatoes). In particular, the natural calcium phosphates market in the EU is almost entirely reliant on Morocco, Algeria, and Egypt. The effect on export revenues likely would be greatest in iron products (bars, rods, wire), cement, wheat, copper, and liquefied petroleum gasses.

France relies on North Africa for select imports, such as tomatoes from Morocco (51.42% of France’s imports come from that country) and nitrogenous fertilizer from Egypt (21.76%). Spain also relies on Egypt for nitrogenous fertilizer (30.78%). A few EU states import electric wire from Morocco, but most significantly Spain (44.07%), and both Spain and Greece rely on Algeria for mineral tar imports (42.22% and 71.04%). Several EU states rely on Egypt for their supply of petroleum jelly (Germany 18.67%, Italy 17.09%) and acyclic alcohols (Greece 26.79%, France 9.95%).

Further, several EU members rely on Algeria, Morocco, and Egypt as export markets for wheat, iron, liquefied petroleum gases, and some agriculture products. The wheat export industry “skyrocketed in 2013,” with Morocco taking 8.52% of France’s miscellaneous wheat while Algeria took 20% of all EU exports. Algeria imports 32.80% of Spain’s iron bars and rods, 20.80% of Italy’s, and 48.29% of Greece’s, in addition to 31.17% of Greece’s iron wire and 26.18% of its cement. Egypt takes 19.11% of France’s liquefied petroleum gases and 21.47% of Greece’s, as well as 58.15% of Greece’s apples and 94.44% of its tobacco substitutes.

Now that this section has examined the major challenges emanating from North Africa, it turns to contingencies that EU lawmakers may have to confront.

**Contingency: The Death or Exit of Key Leaders**

The politics of Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, and to a lesser degree Tunisia are closely entwined with the health and wellbeing of certain prominent figures. The death or exit of these individuals could have a significant impact.

**Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.** The Egyptian president is a likely assassination target. Sisi’s death or a sudden transition in power might precipitate a realignment of Egypt’s counterterrorism and domestic security strategy. Pressure on VNSAs in the Sinai and Nile River Valley may weaken, and Sisi’s death or exit could precipitate communal violence in Cairo, Alexandria, or other large cities. Conversely, Sisi’s departure from the Egyptian political scene may open up space for European policymakers to push for a less confrontational regime approach to the Brotherhood.

---


237 Ibid.


239 Simoes, “Products Exported.”
Abdelaziz Bouteflika. The long-time Algerian president is in bad health. Bouteflika has battled stomach cancer since the mid-2000s, and suffered what has been dubbed a “mini-stroke” in 2013, spending 80 days in a Paris hospital. He seems unlikely to serve his full term, which is scheduled to end in 2019.

The Algerian political system is somewhat inscrutable to outsiders, and there is much uncertainty surrounding a potential succession. Most political power is centralized in a shadowy group of party leaders, military chiefs, and the heads of the police and intelligence services—known collectively as “le Pouvoir.” A leadership transition might provoke factional competition, as each element of the ruling clique scrambles for greater power. Factional violence—including purges, street battles, assassinations, or coups d’état—is within the range of possibilities.

Even a smooth, constitutional transition might prove destabilizing: student, liberal, leftist, and Islamist activists might use this transition as a catalyst for protests. Similar protests were, of course, the spark for both the Arab Spring uprisings and also the Algerian Civil War (1992-2002), so it’s unclear how the security services would respond.

King Mohammed VI of Morocco. King Mohammed VI has governed the only kingdom in North Africa since 1999. He is generally seen as a modernizer and reformer, and is a key western ally. However, his unexpected exit or incapacitation would be one of the least destabilizing leadership transitions in North Africa because he has a clear and widely-accepted heir apparent, Crown Prince Moulay Hassan.

Rachid al-Ghannouchi. A longtime Islamist dissident, Ghannouchi returned to Tunisia from decades of exile after Ben Ali was toppled in 2011. Ghannouchi is the founder and current chairman of Ennahda, Tunisia’s Brotherhood-affiliated political party. He is widely recognized as an exceptionally gifted politician. Though he has attracted his share of controversy, Ghannouchi has helped steer the Tunisian political transition along its path of conciliation and compromise. The controversies surrounding Ghannouchi relate to his perceived alliance—or at least flirtation—with hardline Salafists following the Jasmine Revolution.

Ghannouchi’s prominence makes him a possible target for assassination, and his age raises the possibility that he could experience incapacity or otherwise exit the political scene. Ghannouchi’s death, particularly if he meets a violent end, could convulse Tunisia.

Contingency: Mass Atrocities Carried out by VNSAs

North Africa is home to sizeable ethnic and religious minorities who have suffered considerable violence since the onset of the Arab Spring, including Berbers, black Africans, Bedouins, Tuaregs, Sufis, Shias, Christians, and Jews, to name a few. These groups and others have been targeted in communal violence, rioting, terrorism, insurgency, and retributive attacks. Under certain circumstances, these marginalized groups could be vulnerable to mass killings. If government authority faltered in Egypt or Tunisia, or extremists gained even greater foothold in Libya, minority communities might come under sustained attack.

The emergence of Islamic State affiliates in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Algeria adds new weight to concerns about the killing of religious minorities in North Africa. In Iraq and Syria, IS has, on numerous occasions, conducted “cleansing” operations against religious minorities. IS’s genocidal violence against Iraq’s Yazidis and its attacks on Christians in both Iraq and Syria illustrate this concern. Indeed, a number of atrocities have already been inflicted upon religious minorities in North Africa. The most prominent incident occurred recently, when on February 15 a Libyan IS affiliate released a new video showing IS militants grotesquely beheading 21 Coptic Christians on a Mediterranean beach. Though the most dramatic incident, this beheading was the culmination of a broader pattern in which religious minorities have been systematically targeted in both Libya and Egypt. Fourteen Egyptian Copts were reportedly killed in Libya in 2014 alone.241 Jihadists have also targeted and killed Coptic Christians in Egypt’s Sinai.

Mass violence, “cleansing” campaigns, or even genocide might force Europe to consider whether it should intervene in North Africa under a Responsibility-to-Protect (R2P) mandate—the same rationale that justified NATO’s intervention in Libya.

Contingency: Tiananmen-Style State Violence

Chinese security forces massacred hundreds of protesters around Beijing (and perhaps far more than that) after large protests erupted in Tiananmen Square in 1989. The massacre significantly disrupted political, military, and economic cooperation between China and the West, despite the reluctance of Western powers near the end of the Cold War to let internal political developments upset key strategic relationships. In today’s context, where international actors are more sensitive to human rights concerns and access to information is more difficult for governments to control, a massacre on such a scale in Cairo or Algiers could threaten to rupture relations with Europe (though the August 2013 slaughter of protesters in Egypt, discussed subsequently, did not have this effect).

After such a massacre, European governments might be forced to scale back bilateral support for the responsible governments. EU and NATO collaboration with these governments might be interrupted. There could be a debate about suspending military aid, arms sales, intelligence sharing, and other security assistance, at least in the short term, though pragmatic considerations might override these concerns.

The Egyptian military’s violent crackdown on political Islamists in August 2013 underscores the willingness of some North African regimes to resort to massive force to quell internal dissent, though it also suggests that Western countries may have a high threshold for suspending cooperation with these regimes. On August 14, 2013, at the height of the military crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters, soldiers killed over a thousand protesters who had congregated in Cairo’s Rabaa al-Adawiya Square.242 Both the EU and the U.S. were reluctant to meaningfully sanction Egypt in the wake of that massacre, concerned that punishing the Egyptian military would weaken a key counterterrorism partner in an environment already rife with weak and failing states.

But future incidents similar to the one in Rabaa, wherever they might occur, may force Western actors to take a more aggressive approach in responding to state-perpetrated atrocities.
3. Policy Options

Instability in North Africa poses a cognizable threat to Europe's political and economic security. The European Union and EU member countries have a number of policy options available to address the myriad challenges emanating from the region. This section thus provides a menu of options that policymakers can consider.

The purpose of this policy menu is to better inform European practitioners about the various options available to them, not to advocate for a specific solution. This policy menu outlines the approaches that European policymakers can take to address strategic challenges in North Africa, and then objectively analyzes these approaches, assessing benefits and risks. Because the policies discussed in this section are only options rather than prescriptions, some of the potential policies that are discussed conflict with one another.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country-Specific Policy Options</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Libya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanctioning factions that obstruct negotiations, and incentivizing political factions to engage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalizing or removing Khalifa Hifter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incentivizing Dawn and/or Dignity factions to target IS and other jihadist groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting HoR and Operation Dignity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launching direct counterterrorism operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pressuring states to end support for Libyan proxies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launching a peacekeeping mission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implementing a guest worker program for Copts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Facilitating greater political engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Re-engaging with tribes in the Sinai</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The spectrum of policy options discussed in this section ranges from resource-intensive hard power strategies to soft-power approaches addressing economic and political issues that may contribute to instability. The potential effectiveness of these policies depends on a variety of factors, including the willingness and ability of the EU and member countries to invest resources in them, the extent of cooperation between North African countries and the EU, and evolving political and security conditions in North Africa.

This section begins by exploring policy options specific to various countries in the region, then turns to more general paradigmatic options toward the region as a whole.

Libya Policy Options

Of all the countries in North Africa, Libya's political environment poses the greatest threat to European interests and internal security. The civil conflict has deeply fractured the country, and created vast amounts of ungoverned space that have been exploited by various VNSAs, including drug traffickers and jihadist groups aligned with the Islamic State and al-Qaeda. Indeed, jihadist groups now operate virtually unchecked in many parts of the country, running
training camps, recruiting fighters, and coordinating with other militant organizations. Degradation of security in Libya has had a number of other destabilizing effects, including making Libya one of the primary departure points for irregular migrants seeking to reach Europe.

Analysts correctly view facilitating political negotiations between Dignity and Dawn as the first step toward resolving the civil conflict. Though the two sides won’t reach a complete resolution, making the conflict in Libya narrower would have clear benefits—one of which may be separating “reconcilables” from extremists through the negotiation process. EU policymakers have rightfully prioritized political negotiations as their preferred policy option, but they should be prepared for the possibility that negotiations may fail.

For now, EU policy should focus on achieving two objectives: 1) encouraging Dawn and Dignity officials and militias to come to the negotiating table, and 2) containing the violence in Libya. While the former objective focuses on strengthening the political process, the latter can attain its objectives even if political reconciliation is unlikely. This section now turns to specific policy options that can advance these objectives, and also those that may be considered if the current policy posture fails.

Policy #1: Sanctioning factions that obstruct negotiations, and incentivizing political factions to engage. EU policymakers could implement a policy of rewards and punishment aimed at coercing rival factions to engage in negotiations. One component of this approach would be targeted economic sanctions against Dawn and Dignity officials who impede reconciliation efforts. Disincentives such as financial sanctions would go hand-in-hand with rewards, which could include political recognition and financial assistance, for factions that demonstrate a willingness to engage politically and renounce “armed politics.” The EU and member countries could also provide rewards to factions that enact internal reforms that ameliorate the concerns of their adversaries, including increasing civilian oversight over armed groups and sidelining polarizing players.

Implementation of targeted economic sanctions against individuals and groups in Libya could allow EU policymakers to increase the costs of non-engagement, and coerce intransigent factions to come to the negotiating table. The framework for such a sanctions regime already exists. In August 2014, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 2174, which emphasized the UNSC’s “determination to use targeted sanctions in pursuit of stability in Libya, and against those individuals and entities who threaten its stability and obstruct or undermine its successful completion of the political transition.” But disagreement among UNSC members concerning the potential targets of sanctions has impeded action. Specifically, France and Russia have refused to include Operation Dignity forces (Hifter in particular) on the sanctions list. France has argued that sanctions should exclusively target members of the GNC and the Dawn coalition. In contrast, the U.K. reportedly proposed including Khalifa Hifter on the sanctions list before France rejected this approach.

---

244 Ibid., p. 20.
Under this policy option, EU practitioners would push for the ability to impose sanctions against both Dawn and Dignity factions. The logic behind this move is that restricting sanctions to Dawn leaders and members of the GNC fails to encourage negotiations, instead creating the perception of bias and discrediting the EU as a neutral arbiter. Another rationale for this policy option is that sanctioning only Dawn leaders ignores the fact that Dignity forces have also obstructed negotiations.246 Indeed, imposing sanctions only on Dawn could not only alienate Dawn but also embolden Dignity forces to press for more concessions and seek additional battlefield gains at the same time, further undermining negotiations.

There is reason to believe that sanctions, if applied evenhandedly, would be effective in bringing certain political factions to the table. Political forces and armed groups from the Dawn-allied city of Misrata may be particularly receptive to sanctions: The city is one of Libya’s economic hubs, and Misratan businessmen may not be willing to prolong the war if they risk losing access to foreign markets. Indeed, reports indicate that the threat of sanctions against a Misratan businessman played a role in encouraging the Misratan municipal council to join political talks,247 and there are signs that economic players in Misrata may be willing to come to the negotiating table.248 The threat of targeted sanctions could be the final push needed to bring some Misratan factions to the table.

Creating a deal acceptable for Misratan factions could potentially open the door to future arrangements that are acceptable to other moderates within the Dawn coalition. Some Misratan factions are, of course, likely to be “irreconcilables,” as some are closely associated with Dawn’s hardline Islamist groups.249 Thus, sanctions would not be a silver bullet even in bringing Misratan factions to the table. But sanctions might also help persuade the HoR to come to the negotiating table, and adopt internal reforms that would improve the chances of a comprehensive settlement. The HoR derives a considerable amount of legitimacy and advantage from Western actors who regard it as Libya’s only legitimate national governing body. Threatening to sanction the HoR and Dignity officials if they obstruct negotiations thus would send a strong message. Thus, including Hifter on the sanctions list could prompt HoR to minimize his role within Dignity; the benefits and costs of marginalizing Hifter will be discussed further in the next Libya policy option.

Sanctions can also be employed if negotiations collapse. In that case, the purpose of sanctions—which would be less controversial than sanctions designed to coerce parties to come to the negotiating table—would be to punish jihadists and actors who support jihadists. The sanctions would specifically target Libya Dawn actors who provide support, political or material, to jihadists in Benghazi and other parts of the country.

Though sanctions might be effective in persuading Dawn and Dignity factions to come to the negotiating table, there are several obstacles to an efficient sanctions regime, and it would have its disadvantages. A foremost question is whether it is appropriate for outside actors to use sanctions to force the country’s recognized government to negotiate with a set of actors, including religious militants, who are challenging its legitimacy. Pursuing this course of action

247 Ibid., p. 19.
248 When Frederic Wehrey toured the al-Naseem dairy plant in Misrata, the owner told him that “he had suffered a 40 percent revenue loss since the start of the conflict,” and was now “tired of fighting and ready for dialogue.” Frederic Wehrey, “Libya’s War-Weary Make Peace?” Foreign Affairs, February 2, 2015.
would generate some legitimate resentment. There would also be practical obstacles. For example, sanctions would only be effective against those actors with sufficient assets outside Libya. Further, if the sanctions regime were unilateral EU sanctions, it may be insufficient to change the behavior of the HoR and Operation Dignity. Egypt and the UAE provide military and economic support to this side of the conflict, and unless the EU can persuade these outside players to end their support, EU sanctions are likely to have little impact on Dignity.

**Policy #2: Marginalizing Khalifa Hifter or removing him from power.** Khalifa Hifter has long played a polarizing role in the Dawn-Dignity conflict. Throughout the Dignity offensive, he has targeted political Islamists along with jihadists, labeling all Islamist factions his enemies. This strategy has driven moderate Islamists and their more radical counterparts together, thus strengthening the hand of jihadists. Similarly, concerns about Hifter’s ambitions has hardened opposition to his side among Dawn forces. As one Dawn-aligned politician said, Hifter “just wants to be on top of the throne. If any unity government appoints Hifter, he will eat the unity government.”

The fact that Hifter defines his set of enemies as broadly as he does has made Libya’s conflict worse. In light of the problems with Hifter, European policymakers may consider pressuring the HoR to marginalize him. Ideally, European policymakers should apply this pressure quietly and behind the scenes, ensuring that Hifter is given a symbolic title that sounds prestigious—such as national security advisor—while removing him from a position in which he can determine who his coalition will number among its enemies.

Sidelining Hifter would be a powerful gesture on the part of the HoR, indicating that the government takes the negotiations seriously, and is willing to remove a key roadblock. Such a move might also have an impact on the internal dynamics of the Dawn coalition by alleviating the fears of moderate Islamists, and encouraging some Dawn factions to sever their alliance of convenience with Ansar al-Sharia.

Of course, given Hifter’s influence within the HoR/Dignity, marginalizing him may be an extraordinarily difficult task. But there are indications of discontent in the HoR camp about Hifter’s role. For example, such tensions came to the fore recently when Omar al-Zanki, the HoR’s interior minister, criticized Hifter for preventing HoR prime minister Abdullah al-Thinni from visiting Benghazi. Thinni then announced that Zanki had been suspended, sparking a row that underscored the degree of discord surrounding Hifter.

Few outside the HoR can anticipate how the Tobruk government would respond to European efforts to sideline Hifter. However, Western states should avoid throwing their full weight behind HoR/Dignity so long as Hifter plays such a central role. Defining his enemies so broadly risks making the conflict worse—or, at the very least, suggests that Western states

---

252 See Claudia Gazzini, “More Weapons are Not the Answer to Libya’s Jihadi Upsurge,” *In Pursuit of Peace* blog (International Crisis Group), February 25, 2015 (noting that some Dawn members’ alliance with Ansar al-Sharia “is an alliance of convenience, and members of ‘Libya Dawn’ admit that it is an uncomfortable alliance, but they feel it is a necessity because they fight a common enemy”).
could throw a considerable amount of support behind Hifter without making the situation on the ground appreciably better. Over the past decade and a half, Western states have too often compromised their values by throwing their weight behind questionable allies with no security gains to show for it. They should not repeat that mistake in Libya.

**Policy #3: Incentivizing Dignity and/or Dawn factions to target IS and other jihadist groups in Libya.** One option is to incentivize Dawn and Dignity factions to go after these groups militarily. This would entail offering support—whether monetary, military, or otherwise—to Dawn and Dignity factions in exchange for military action against specific jihadist groups. This policy would allow EU practitioners to weaken jihadist groups and prevent them from striking Europe while keeping European troops out of Libya. In order to successfully implement this policy, EU practitioners may have to persuade the UNSC to lift its arms embargo on Libya.

Thus far, Dignity and Dawn have largely focused their attacks on one another, though that has been changing with IS’s push into Sirte, which placed it in direct confrontation with Dawn forces. Hifter’s Operation Dignity, however, has a clear incentive to bring the fight to IS last, after it has eroded the other Dawn factions. Among the factions Dignity has been combating are al-Qaeda–linked jihadists, and that never captured outside states’ interest or earned their support. In contrast, IS’s over-the-top villainy serves as the perfect foil for Operation Dignity. As IS grabs headlines in Libya, that gives Operation Dignity a more persuasive case for outside assistance, presenting itself as a bulwark against IS’s expansionism. Dawn forces also largely refrained from targeting IS until the Islamic State’s Libyan affiliate basically forced its hand, and there are questions about its willingness to engage in a sustained anti-IS campaign.

Though there are clear benefits for the EU in working with and through local partners to target jihadist groups, supporting proxy forces also involves risks. For one, practitioners cannot be assured that Dignity or Dawn will follow through on their promise to target jihadist groups. The Dawn coalition sees Dignity as its greatest threat, and vice versa. Until that calculus changes, the possibility exists that both factions will use European aid to fight one another, even as they pay lip service to targeting jihadist groups. A related concern is that aiding Dawn forces actually could benefit jihadists aligned with the Dawn coalition: Dawn hardliners could seize any EU assistance for their own purposes.

Finally, it is not clear that Dawn or Dignity possess the necessary desire and capabilities to degrade jihadist groups, especially those in southern Libya. Both forces may be ill-equipped to conduct counterterrorism operations against clandestine actors. Neither Dawn nor Dignity possesses intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, which would likely be necessary to target militant groups in southern Libya. Thus, an aid package sufficient to persuade either coalition to mount a sustained and comprehensive campaign may be larger than EU countries are willing to provide.

**Policy option #4: Supporting HoR and Operation Dignity.** If negotiations appear unlikely to attain their objectives, European policymakers may consider providing security assistance to Operation Dignity forces, in the hope of shifting the conflict decisively in favor of the HoR. Sanctions against Dawn might complement this policy. This policy will not—and should not—be implemented now because it would undermine or scuttle negotiations. But concerns about the proliferation of VNSAs in Libya has already caused some EU policymakers to conclude that supporting Dignity is the “least bad option,” one that would best mitigate terrorist and other risks emanating from Libya.
The rationale behind this policy is that the Dignity coalition is the most promising partner for the West, as it has been “attacking groups that, frankly, are on our list of terrorists,” as U.S. ambassador to Libya Deborah Jones noted. Support for Dignity would look even more attractive if Hifter can be sidelined in favor of leadership that is more inclined to distinguish between moderate Islamists and hardliners.

But there are risks associated with this policy. If EU countries support Dignity/HoR while Hifter still plays a critical role in that coalition, they would be supporting one of Libya’s most divisive players, whose strategy has had a destabilizing effect. Hifter’s indiscriminate targeting of all Islamists in Benghazi helped unite disparate militias into a single coalition. Even in Benghazi, the militia landscape had been ideologically diverse, and included moderate Islamist contingents who had been willing to align with the state. Hifter’s approach, rather than accentuating the divisions among his foes, provided them with a common cause. This ended up strengthening the most problematic groups in Benghazi, notably Ansar al-Sharia, as the differences between the various Islamist militias melted away in the face of Hifter’s offensive. As one Islamist politician explained, “When you are fighting against an intruder, sometimes you have hard choices. You are brothers in arms now and work out your differences later.” In addition, concerns remain about Hifter’s personal ambitions and authoritarian tendencies.

Thus, Western support for Dignity if Hifter remains vital to that coalition may further polarize the country, and make it even more difficult to achieve a political settlement. Perhaps the greatest risk associated with aiding Dignity forces without sidelining Hifter is that—similar to the result of his offensive in Benghazi—doing so could push moderate Islamist elements in Dawn into a closer alliance with jihadists to counterbalance Western support for Dignity.

Policy option #5: Direct counterterrorism (CT) operations in Libya. EU policymakers may elect to conduct direct CT operations against jihadist groups in Libya. This is essentially a policy of last resort. European powers are already militarily engaged against Islamic State fighters in Iraq and Syria, and it is possible that this campaign could be extended to North Africa eventually. European airpower could strike a variety of jihadist targets, alone or in conjunction with either allied local fighters or European special operations forces. Europe could also use special forces to kill or capture key jihadist leaders in North Africa, as the United States did in June 2014 when U.S. forces captured Ahmed Abu Khattala, a suspect in the 2012 killing of U.S. ambassador Christopher Stephens in Benghazi.

There are logistical, legal, and strategic risks associated with European direct military action in Libya. First, most European militaries have a dearth of armed UAVs, a critical component of U.S. “light footprint” counterterrorism operations in Yemen and Pakistan. Without armed drones, there is a greater risk to European military personnel. Second, European military intervention in Libya, even if relatively limited, could spark retaliation by jihadist groups and their sympathizers. Still, if the situation seems to demand action—especially if there is a terrorist attack against Europe or planning for one with the locus in North Africa—one or several EU states could decide that such CT operations are worth the risks.

---

Policy option #6: Pressuring regional actors to stop interfering in Libya. Libya has been subject to an arms embargo since February 2011, when the UN Security Council unanimously approved an embargo in response to Qaddafi’s repression of protesters. Though the UNSC relaxed the parameters of the embargo following Qaddafi’s fall, the escalating civil conflict in the country prompted the UNSC to pass a resolution in August 2014—Security Council Resolution 2174—mandating that the Sanctions Committee must approve, in advance, all arms shipments to the Libyan government. Regional actors have circumvented the arms embargo on numerous occasions to provide support for their preferred proxies in Libya, effectively denuding the embargo of its effectiveness. A February 2015 UN report noted that “implementation [of the embargo] is weak,” and warned that future arms trafficking into Libya is “inevitable” absent better enforcement.

One policy the EU can pursue to deescalate the conflict in Libya is to pressure outside states to end their financial, political, and military support for warring Libyan factions. Various Middle Eastern and African states have lined up behind proxy forces in Libya. Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and to a lesser extent Saudi Arabia have all sided with the HoR and Operation Dignity, viewing Hifter’s campaign as a bulwark against Libyan jihadists and Islamists. Egypt in particular has taken a leading role in providing military support to Operation Dignity, while conducting direct military operations on several occasions. Conversely, Turkey, Qatar, and Sudan have demonstrated varying levels of support for the GNC.

One option for EU policymakers is to strongly discourage outside intervention in the Libya conflict, and pressure key powerbrokers to push their proxies to engage in political talks. The EU can attempt to change their behavior through a strategy of persuasion and coercion. In terms of persuasion, the EU can emphasize to regional actors that neither Dawn nor Dignity possesses the capabilities to overwhelm the opposing force, and that outside interference, short of a massive military intervention, will only intensify the conflict. The EU can also stress that Libya’s further deterioration would be detrimental to all regional actors. In terms of coercion, EU countries can push for stronger enforcement of the arms embargo, and threaten to enact sanctions against states that continue to provide military support to the warring Libyan factions.

However, there are limits to how far EU countries might be willing to go in deterring outside states from interfering in the Libya conflict. Imposing sanctions on Qatar or Egypt may be a non-starter, given these countries’ strategic importance.

Because of the possible political infeasibility of heavily pressuring outside states to end their interference, some observers have argued for the imposition of a naval blockade in the Mediterranean Sea to prevent illicit weapons shipments. An EU blockade, which would likely come only after a UNSC resolution, could also reduce illegal oil smuggling and irregular migration from Libya, two other major concerns for European countries. In March 2015, Bernardino Leon, the UN’s envoy to Libya, called on the EU to establish a naval blockade, suggesting that it was “a measure that the European Union can take right away” to address

Libya's deteriorating security situation. Russia has also publicly flirted with the idea of participating in a blockade.

A naval blockade is unlikely to be a foolproof solution, though. Dawn factions are likely to perceive the EU's imposition of a naval blockade as yet another instance of Western meddling in favor of the HoR. The Egyptian government's endorsement of the blockade, which it framed as an effort to limit weapons transfers to all but the "legitimate Libyan government," has stamped the blockade as a partisan move. Further, the impact of a blockade on arms flows to both Dawn and Dignity is disputable, considering that both coalitions retain possession of airports that regional actors have used to send weapons into the country.

Given the association of the blockade with the Egyptian government's partisanship, a blockade would be best utilized if EU states want a tool to weaken the Dawn coalition, rather than conceiving of it as a neutral policy instrument. If the EU chooses to implement a blockade, it should do so only if political negotiations have collapsed and the chances of reconciliation appear limited. The blockade could then be employed to punish the Dawn coalition, and limit its access to weaponry and supplies.

There is, however, another alternative use for a naval blockade that would not appear partisan. The EU could deploy a blockade after the establishment of a national unity government that reconciles members of the warring factions. In this scenario, the blockade would be designed to strengthen the unity government by allowing arms transfers only to Libya's recognized, legitimate government. However, VNSAs operating in Libya could still receive weapons through land shipments across Libya's porous borders.

Policy option #7: Peacekeeping. Europe may be called on to secure a post-war Libya. Italy is among the European countries most vulnerable to spillover from Libya, and its prime minister said in January 2015 that it would consider participating in a UN-led peacekeeping mission after a political settlement has been reached between Dawn and Dignity factions.

Peacekeeping in Libya would consist of complex, resource-intensive tasks requiring mission profiles similar to post-war operations in Bosnia, East Timor, and Kosovo. Those missions involved "complex peacebuilding" operations that attempted, "after a peace has been negotiated or imposed, to address the sources of current hostility and build local capacities for conflict resolution." During the peacebuilding missions of the 1990s, the emphasis was on speed: "shock therapy" or "revolutionary transformations" for post-war societies. Post-war Kosovo and East Timor are the clearest examples of this "international peacebuilding consensus." In both cases, the UN directly governed the territories as protectorates: With international troops and police enforcing their writ, the UN deployed agents to administer or supervise the administration of hospitals and schools, courts and prisons, and police, fire, and rescue services. Over several years, the UN established multi-party parliaments, closely supervised the local media for incitement, and auctioned off state-owned enterprises. As

local authorities reached certain benchmarks for capacity and behavior, the UN transferred responsibility to them.

Even with its expertise in peacekeeping and peacebuilding, a European mission in Libya would be exceptionally difficult. A successful peacekeeping mission would require tackling several challenges. First, the main political coalitions and their affiliated militias would need to negotiate a detailed ceasefire. This agreement would likely incorporate political actors from the HoR and GNC parliaments into a single unity government, and would establish procedures for the demobilization of various armed groups. In the interim, these armed groups would agree to respect each other’s territory on the condition that each organization roots out violent extremist groups such as Ansar al-Sharia and IS affiliates. The parties would need to negotiate a timeline for the withdrawal of Dawn forces from Tripoli, and the transfer of security control to a neutral municipal administration. In exchange, Dawn may demand that Dignity withdraw from cities under its control, including Benghazi.

After a ceasefire agreement is reached, more concrete planning for a peacekeeping operation could begin. In UN peacekeeping missions, a technical assistance mission will be sent ahead to the area of operation to determine the "overall security, political, humanitarian, human rights, and military situation on the ground and the implications for a UN operation.”

The ratio of 10 to 20 troops to 1,000 civilians has been deemed an appropriate ballpark figure for peacekeeping operations. This model would suggest a high-end peacekeeping force of 120,000 troops (20:1,000), estimating Libya’s population at around 6 million. This is a high estimate, and the true number of troops would be considerably less for several reasons. First, the ratio can be recalculated to only reflect the population centers where the conflict is most intense. Second, troop-contributing countries’ anticipated reticence toward getting involved in Libya is certain to limit troop levels. Third, no peacekeeping operation in Africa since 2000 has mobilized over 21,000 troops. A 10:1,000 ratio would require around 18,000 troops, a more feasible number for troop-contributing countries, and more in line with what has been attempted in Africa previously.

Europe could narrow the profile of a peacekeeping mission to Libya to protect its forces. There are precedents for short-duration, narrowly-tailored peacekeeping deployments focused on monitoring the withdrawal of forces and facilitating the transfer of territory among factions that have signed a ceasefire agreement. In post-war Guatemala (1997), peacekeeping troops successfully disengaged combatants, monitored compliance with the ceasefire agreement, collected weapons, and demobilized rebel fighters—all within three months. United Nations forces successfully verified compliance with agreements at the end of the Iran–Iraq War (30 months), at the end of the Aouzou strip conflict (2 months), during the transfer of West New Guinea from the Netherlands to Indonesia (7 months), and after the India–Pakistan War of 1965 (7 months), to name a few examples.

Monitoring the withdrawal of outside forces from Tripoli, reconstituting and redeploying the city’s police, and organizing a local gendarme could take a matter of months. Even less

---

intrusively, Europe could offer to secure, repair, and administer Tripoli’s international airport, or perhaps establish a security guarantee over a military zone in Tripoli.

European countries involved in a peacekeeping mission in Libya could also consider disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) as an option to address the proliferation of armed groups in the country. The purpose of DDR programs is to dissolve non-state groups and reintegrate their members into society. DDR programs are three-pronged: first, weapons and war materiel are secured and stored; second, military units and command-and-control of armed groups are broken up; and third, soldiers are reintroduced to civilian life. Since 1970, international and local peacebuilders have implemented some type of DDR in 42% of post-war episodes, in such places as El Salvador, Ethiopia, Kosovo, Liberia, and Nepal. Europe has much experience conducting DDR programs in post-war settings, essentially inventing them in Southeastern Europe during the 1990s.

Military power-sharing could serve as an alternative to a policy of DDR. While DDR would require the dissolution of armed groups, military power-sharing would instead seek to integrate former combatants into a single command structure under the aegis of a nationally-recognized unity government. A policy of military integration implies that significant numbers of fighters from all sides of the conflict remain under arms, and factions retain some ability to defect from the post-war armed services and return to combat, even though they are formally subordinate to the unified command structure. By remaining at least partially mobilized, factions maintain a residual capacity to punish the post-war government should it renge on the terms of the peace. This residual capacity protects factions, and thus they should feel less vulnerable in post-war settings characterized by military power-sharing. Military power-sharing may thus be appropriate in Libya, considering that significant distrust exists between rival armed groups, and these factions may only agree to disband if they retain military capabilities in a reconstituted military structure.

Various challenges are associated with undertaking a peacekeeping operation in Libya. A peacekeeping mission would impose significant financial and human costs on contributing countries. Peacekeeping troops would likely be targeted by jihadist groups who reject foreign intervention, and armed factions who find themselves left out of a unity government may also target peacekeepers. Violent extremist groups also could target participating nations on their own soil in retaliation for their involvement. Implementing DDR or military power-sharing programs could also be problematic, as previous attempts to incorporate revolutionary militias into structures like the Libyan Shield Forces and the Supreme Security Committee proved ineffective.265

**Policy Options for Egypt**

**Policy option #1: Facilitating greater political engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood.**

Following the 2013 ousting of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s military-led government launched a massive crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, including designating the group a terrorist organization on December 25, 2013. That campaign has effectively resulted in the Brotherhood’s complete political marginalization.
Most Western observers view Sisi’s approach to the Brotherhood as problematic for several reasons. Analysts argue that marginalization from the political process could drive Brotherhood supporters to join hardline groups that engage in terrorism and political violence. As political engagement becomes less feasible for the Brotherhood, the group’s supporters may see a more militant approach as attractive.

An escalation in violence by Brotherhood supporters would be destabilizing for Egypt, and would sap its security resources. In order to avoid this scenario, Europe may consider facilitating political dialogue between the Sisi government and the Brotherhood. As part of this approach, European officials could host political forums and conferences that include regime officials and Brotherhood members as a means of fostering a culture of engagement, and opening the door to political reconciliation. It is not clear, however, that government representatives would be interested in participating in such forums. European officials could also maintain a bilateral dialogue with Egyptian Brotherhood members, which would demonstrate to the Sisi regime that Europe sees the Brotherhood as a political player that won’t simply disappear, and that Europe has an interest in Egypt becoming more inclusive toward this actor.

The shortcomings of this policy approach are obvious, as European leverage over domestic affairs in Egypt is inherently limited. While European practitioners can help facilitate track two diplomacy in the hope of increasing Egypt’s engagement with the Brotherhood, the government’s willingness to reconcile with the Brotherhood will largely depend on internal political dynamics. Moreover, by engaging with the Brotherhood on a bilateral basis, the EU may open itself up to accusations that it is interfering in Egypt’s internal politics.

Policy option #2: Reconciliation efforts with the Sinai tribes. The jihadist threat Egypt confronts in the Sinai Peninsula is closely interlinked with tribal dynamics, and deeply rooted historical tensions between Sinai tribes and Egypt’s government. Bedouin tribes of the Sinai have long suffered from marginalization and disenfranchisement. In the 1990s, Hosni Mubarak, acknowledging the extent of Bedouin hostility, attempted to appeal to the Sinai tribes by promising to lift a ban that prohibited Bedouins from owning land, and by investing in tourism in the Sinai. However, only southern Sinai residents benefited from the growing tourism market, while foreigners and Egyptians from outside the Sinai received the majority of tourism-related jobs. Excluded from opportunities in the formal economy, many Bedouins came to rely on smuggling for income. Some disaffected Sinai residents turned to salafi jihadism.

Recent Egyptian military operations have fueled Bedouin resentment, and furthered a convergence of interests between jihadist groups and some Bedouins. The EU could play a role in fostering political reconciliation between the Egyptian government and the Sinai population by, among other things, helping to address the socioeconomic grievances driving Bedouin discontent. The instruments available to EU policymakers include orchestrating formal political dialogue between Bedouin tribes and the government, providing targeted

---

266 See, e.g., Dan Byman and Tamara Cofman Wittes, “Now That the Muslim Brotherhood is Declared a Terrorist Group, It Just Might Become One,” Washington Post, January 10, 2014.
269 Ibid.
econmic assistance to Bedouin communities, focusing development efforts in the Sinai Peninsula, and encouraging the Egyptian government to exercise more discretion when conducting counterterrorism operations in the Sinai.

**Policy option #3: Guest worker program targeted at Egyptian Copts.** As Egypt’s economy has faltered, it became increasingly reliant on other countries, including Libya, to provide jobs for its underemployed population. Prior to the outbreak of the current conflict in Libya, an estimated 300,000 to 1.5 million Egyptian workers had gone to Libya. But as violence in Libya has grown, Egyptian workers were increasingly targeted: Coptic Christians were victimized in particular even before IS's recent cold-blooded execution video. Thus thousands of Egyptian workers have fled since that grisly video’s release, with over 45,000 Egyptians fleeing from Libya since then. This sudden influx of newly unemployed Egyptians will likely place further strain on Egypt’s economy. Unfortunately, the Copts also face serious discrimination back home in Egypt, and have also been targeted by armed groups, including jihadist groups with anti-Christian animus and Brotherhood-affiliated groups who blame the Copts for siding with Sisi’s regime.

One option that EU policymakers may consider is a guest worker program specifically targeting Coptic Christians. Currently the EU’s immigration policy prioritizes the admission of skilled workers from non-EU states, but it also allows for temporary immigration of unskilled workers. Under this policy option, the EU’s immigration policy would give priority to Coptic Christians. This policy would have the double benefit of allowing Coptic Christians to escape persecution in Egypt while alleviating Egypt’s unemployment crisis. European states generally are permitted to target certain nationalities for immigration privileges. Doing so seems particularly justified when, as here, the group being granted privileges is experiencing discrimination and targeted violence.

However, EU member states may encounter legal and strategic risks if they attempt to implement a policy that specifically benefits a certain ethnic, national, or religious group. A temporary worker program aimed at Coptic Christians may exacerbate sectarian tensions in Egypt, as some Egyptian Muslims may resent Europe’s preferential treatment of the Copts.

Now that this report has explored specific policy options for Libya and Egypt, it turns to options that could be implemented on a regional basis.

---

272 “Over 45,000 Egyptians Flee Libya after Daesh Beheading,” AFP, March 21, 2015.
Regional Policy Options

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Improving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) technology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prioritizing security sector reform (SSR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Providing counter-IED capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Establishing a regional Center of Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting migration and border security initiatives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political</td>
<td>Launching anti-corruption reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Developing a counter-IS messaging campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>Structural economic reforms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Implementing unemployment policies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Increasing investment in North African countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migration</td>
<td>Implement new policies to safeguard borders</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regional Security Option #1: ISR Support

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) is a “critical enabler in understanding, tracking and targeting terrorist networks,” and should thus be a critical component of North African countries’ counterterrorism strategy. Algeria, Egypt, and Tunisia all need to modernize their ISR equipment and expand their ISR capabilities in order to effectively monitor VNSAs operating within their borders. Generally speaking, EU states can bolster North African countries’ ISR capabilities through one of two approaches: 1) conducting direct ISR operations (i.e., drone overflights) in North Africa and sharing intelligence with local states, and 2) conducting capacity-building initiatives and training aimed at strengthening North African states’ indigenous ISR capabilities.

Algeria has taken a number of steps toward addressing its ISR capabilities gap in recent years. Much of its focus of late has been on upgrading the country’s arsenal of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Though the Algerian air force currently operates a fleet of Denel Dynamics Seeker UAVs, Algeria has been in the market in the past two years to purchase new UAV models that will fulfill Medium-Altitude Long-Endurance (MALE) and High Altitude Long Endurance (HALE) ISR requirements. Algeria has been involved in talks with Russia and China to purchase UAVs, including attack drones, though little information exists as to the status of current negotiations. Algeria also operates six Beechcraft King Air 350ER manned surveillance planes, which are equipped with radars and infrared cameras. While Algeria’s UAV procurement program will strengthen its ISR capabilities, Algeria will need additional assistance and assets to monitor VNSA activity in weakly-governed areas along the country’s southern and eastern borders with Mali, Niger, Libya, and Tunisia.

278 Ibid.
Information on Tunisia's ISR capacity is scarce, but it is likely that Tunisia's ISR capabilities are limited. Though Tunisia was one of the early manufacturers of UAVs in the Middle East, launching production of the Nasnas UAV in the mid-1990s, the capabilities of the Nasnas are limited. Tunisia also received a small number of ScanEagle UAVs from the United States, which were paid for in Peacekeeping Operations funds in 2008.279 Of all the countries in North Africa, Tunisia would derive some of the biggest benefit from European ISR support and capacity building: ISR support would allow Tunisian security forces to track jihadist activities in closed military zones in the western mountains, and to concentrate resources in hotspots within those zones. Thus, improved ISR could increase the efficiency of Tunisian counterterrorism operations, and reduce risks to Tunisian military personnel.

Egypt is well equipped to conduct ISR operations, and its ISR needs differ considerably from Tunisia's. Egypt has an extensive arsenal of fixed-wing, rotary-wing, and UAV aircraft suitable for ISR purposes. Indeed, Egypt was one of the first countries to field UAVs, first deploying these systems in the early 1980s.280 Egypt has begun producing UAVs domestically in collaboration with a Chinese company, which will reduce Egyptian dependence on foreign producers and strengthen Egypt's indigenous ISR capacity.281

European countries can best support Egypt’s ISR operations by upgrading existing technology and helping to refine its intelligence collection capabilities. European countries can also provide technical expertise to Egypt on ISR mission planning and oversight. Improving Egypt’s ISR capabilities would allow Egypt to sharpen its counterterrorism operations in the Sinai, and enable Egypt to reduce civilian casualties and collateral damage by conducting more targeted operations. Developing Egyptian ISR capabilities would also empower Egypt to take the lead on future ISR operations in North Africa, thus reducing demands on the EU and other Western states to provide intelligence support.

The United Kingdom would likely be the best positioned European state to provide direct ISR support to North African states. The U.K.’s Royal Air Force possesses over 500 UAVs, including ten armed Reaper drones and over 50 Watchkeeper surveillance drones, along with other UAV systems.282 The U.K. also has had extensive experience in deploying UAVs to combat zones in Afghanistan. France may also be able to provide ISR support to North African states in the near future. Though France has long lagged behind other developed militaries with regard to its ISR capabilities—during Operation Serval in Mali, France had only two surveillance drones in theater and had to rely on the U.S. for intelligence support283—France placed a request with the United States in 2013 for the sale of 16 MQ-9 Reaper Remotely Piloted aircraft, as well as associated equipment, parts, and training related to ISR support.284 France and the U.K. also agreed in January 2014 to jointly develop armed drones, though the first armed drone to be created by this agreement is not expected to be

ready for deployment until 2030. Acquisition of the Reapers from the U.S. and indigenous development of armed UAVs could enhance France’s ISR capabilities.

However, outside of the U.K. and France, European ISR capabilities are limited: NATO major general Marcel Druart noted in 2012 that NATO had relied on the U.S. for ISR support during the intervention in Libya, and that European countries faced serious ISR shortcomings. Since then, EU countries have sought to improve their ISR capacity by purchasing additional UAVs from U.S. companies and developing indigenous UAV production capabilities, though this process has been slow to get off the ground. European countries’ limited ISR capacity may inhibit the EU from providing robust ISR support to North African states, especially given the expense involved in sustaining an ISR program. European proposals to conduct ISR missions in North Africa are also likely to encounter opposition from some governments wary of allowing other countries to operate within their borders. Algeria in particular has been reluctant to cooperate with Western intelligence agencies: Though Algeria allowed the U.S. to operate a Predator drone over the In Amenas oil facility during the January 2013 siege of the site by militants, it demanded that the U.S. withdraw the UAV immediately after military operations at the facility concluded.

**Regional Security Option #2: Prioritizing Security Sector Reform**

Even before the Arab Spring placed extreme stress on these sectors, North African armed forces, intelligence agencies, and police organizations were regarded as too large, under-trained, riven with politicization, top-heavy with personnel, equipped with obsolete weapons systems, incapable of providing adequate levels of security, incapable of providing human-rights centered security, suffering from poor morale, unresponsive to civilian authorities, and unable to engage in long-term planning, produce transparent and accountable budgets, and submit to legislative oversight. Across North Africa, the security sectors’ primary function was not to provide external and internal security to the state and its people, but to protect the regime from domestic and international political opposition—while, if possible, enriching its membership with patronage opportunities.

Whether North Africa becomes more or less violent over the next few years, a security sector reform (SSR) agenda is appropriate: SSR will help counterterrorism efforts while addressing continuing organizational and accountability deficits. Security sector reform is a catchall term for a number of policies thought to improve security practices and outcomes in developing and democratizing states. The United Nations describes security sector reform as “a process of assessment, review and implementation as well as monitoring and evaluation led by national authorities that has as its goal the enhancement of effective and accountable...
security for the State and its people without discrimination and with full respect for human
rights and the rule of law."290 Sean McFate similarly defines SSR as the transformation of
“components of the security sector ... into professional, effective, legitimate, apolitical, and
accountable actors [through] the creation of institutions, force structure decisions, the
formulation of national security strategy and doctrine, the recruiting and vetting of individuals,
the selection of leadership, and a myriad of other considerations.”291

Thus, SSR entails an impetus toward organizational reform, improved civilian oversight, the
modernization of doctrine or equipment, transparency in budgeting and acquisitions, and
accountability to civilian authorities. SSR therefore differs from DDR in both the identity of
the target (state vs. non-state actors) and the level at which the policy operates (institutional/
organizational vs. individual former fighters). From the perspective of Western countries,
the textbook examples of SSR occurred in post-authoritarian regimes in Central and South
America and post-communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, the latter group
undertaking reforms as part of their accession to NATO in the 1990s.

Recently there has been a push for SSR in North Africa, though not without challenges.
The European Union is already involved in a number of initiatives promoting SSR across the
region—directly or indirectly—in Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt.

In Morocco, the EU has provided funding through its European Neighborhood and
Partnership Instrument: €580.5 million between 2011 and 2013.292 This program supports
policy reform, security cooperation, institutional support, and assistance with human rights
efforts.293 While no funding is currently devoted specifically to SSR, the aforementioned issues
support SSR efforts. One issue in Morocco is that, while progress has been made in terms
of civilian oversight of the military, there are no measures yet specifically designed to guard
against abuse or corruption among military personnel.294 However, Morocco has made strides
under King Mohammed VI’s leadership toward political reform and civil society engagement,
which makes for an environment where SSR may be able to thrive.295

In Tunisia, a major push for SSR is underway. The Jasmine Revolution demonstrations put
a spotlight on security sector organizations such as the police and military, and public
grievances with them were on full display. The EU has yet to implement a security assistance
program for Tunisia, but individual countries such as France, Finland, and the United Kingdom
provide unilateral assistance. The focus has primarily been on reforming security forces
and antiterrorism units.296 While this support is beneficial, it fails to address issues such as
resource mismanagement and lack of budget transparency, and thus may be too narrow a
strategy.

291 Sean McFate, The Link Between DDR and SSR in Conflict-Affected Countries (Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace, 2010), p. 4.
292 ENPI Info Centre (European Union), “EU Supporting Morocco’s Reforms with €580.5 million in 2011-2013,”
http://www.ssrresourcecentre.org/countries/morocco/.
294 Ibid.
295 Ibid.
296 Bassem Bouguerra, Reforming Tunisia’s Troubled Security Sector, Issue Brief, Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle
Reforming_Tunisia’s_Troubled_Security_Sector.pdf.
Algeria has been experiencing some unrest over the effectiveness of its security sector, as some Algerians have demonstrated in favor of the removal of corrupt security officials.\(^{297}\) Algeria has seen a persistent divide between the presidency, the army, and the department of intelligence and security. The EU and Algeria formed the EU-Algeria Association Agreement in 2005, which provides Algeria with economic and trade support, financial support, and provisions for justice and home affairs, such as rule of law.\(^{298}\) The latter indirectly addresses SSR, but there has not been a comprehensive SSR program dedicated to supporting Algeria.

In Egypt, SSR has been given significant attention due to the country’s well-publicized Arab Spring transition. Experts have suggested disengaging military institutions from political and economic activities, and subjecting them to civilian oversight, while promoting accountability and neutrality in support of rule of law and human rights.\(^{299}\) Of course, this is easier said than done. Similar to Algeria, there has not yet been a comprehensive SSR program implemented in Egypt. However, Egypt is a major beneficiary of aid from the EU and is party to an EU-Egypt Association Agreement, as well as the European Neighbourhood Policy.\(^{300}\) These initiatives promote economic development and political stability, touching on tenets found in SSR without addressing SSR explicitly.

Throughout North Africa, complete security sector reforms will take patience and engineering. The main issue is that there is no broad push for reforms in the region despite pervasive issues in the states’ security sectors. Each country presents a different set of challenges, but generally speaking they share similar systems of government that can be resistant to change. Donors must prioritize the needs of the people, ideally ensuring “the immediate protection of civilians,” while in the longer term they can aim to “increase the strength of the relationship between the state and the society.”\(^{301}\)

Special attention must be paid to ensuring the SSR approach is viable in the intended environment. Going forward, perhaps the most important concept for developing SSR in North Africa is understanding how each country’s distinct culture will impact SSR. Donors should carefully collaborate with partners from the security sector and civil society to ensure their strategy will be the most effective. Next, donors should reach out to the highest levels of the security sector or government (in some cases, one and the same) to gauge receptiveness to SSR. Doing so will help identify problem areas where leaders or elites are reticent or obstinate toward reform. There may be a need to introduce incentives, such as training for the military, upgraded equipment, and economic or financial support, to bring the necessary leaders on board. In addition, donors should focus on robust training programs, both for security sector personnel and civil society. Security sector personnel should be able to understand their role in society according to SSR ideals, and civil society should be able

to trust the security sector and reinforce SSR ideals. It is unlikely recipient countries in North Africa would be able to implement SSR on their own.

**Regional Security Option #3: Strengthening Counter-IED Capabilities**

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) have become an increasingly popular weapon for jihadist groups operating in North Africa. Jihadist groups operating in the northwestern mountains of Tunisia have relied heavily on IEDs as a means of disrupting Tunisian military operations in the region. Militant groups in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula have also employed IEDs to target Egyptian military personnel, and an increasing number of IED attacks by militants are also occurring outside the Sinai region. The proliferation of IEDs in heavily populated areas, including Cairo and Alexandria, presents a particular challenge, as IED detection in urban areas is generally more difficult.

North African states have struggled to neutralize the IED threat. Tunisia’s counter-IED capabilities are limited. Though Tunisia has a limited number of armored personnel carriers (APCs), Tunisian APCs are vulnerable to IEDs. The M60 tank, the only Tunisian military vehicle that provides protection against IEDs, is not equipped to operate in mountainous terrain, where the majority of Tunisian sweeping operations are currently occurring.

Egypt’s counter-IED capabilities are more robust than Tunisia’s, though Egypt remains ill-equipped to confront current threats. Though Egypt has developed extensive mine detection and demining technology, traditional de-mining technology may not be transferrable to counter-IED operations. Many non-conventional IEDs are constructed of non-metallic materials and may therefore be difficult to detect using conventional mine detection equipment, such as metal detectors. In response to the surge in IED attacks, Egypt has sought to increase the number of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.

A variety of policy instruments are available to EU states to bolster North African counter-IED capabilities. First, EU states may provide these countries’ militaries with Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles. Created specifically to protect troops against from IEDs, MRAPs typically are designed with a V-shaped hull that allows the vehicle to better withstand an IED strike. These vehicles thus reduce the risks to personnel operating in volatile areas where IEDs are present.

Second, EU states can provide North African countries with counter-IED equipment, including systems that will allow security forces to detect and neutralize IEDs. The equipment that the EU may provide to North African forces includes ground-penetrating radar systems

---


(to detect buried IEDs) and mine rollers (to clear fields and detonate IEDs prior to conducting dismounted clearing operations). Similar initiatives are already being implemented: The U.S. announced plans in August 2014 to provide Tunisia with counter-IED equipment as part of a $60 million military aid package.\textsuperscript{308}

Third, the EU can help build intelligence-gathering capabilities related to the IED threat. Building counter-IED intelligence capabilities would help North African security forces to identify and interdict IED networks, including procurement and bomb-making cells. The U.S. defense department’s Joint Improvised Explosives Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) may serve a model for an IED-centric intelligence center in North African countries. JIEDDO, which was stood up by the U.S.’s defense department in 2006, functions as a fusion center focusing on counter-IED intelligence collection and analysis. JIEDDO also leads counter-IED training for deployed units, and helps to develop new counter-IED technologies.

Should the EU pursue this policy approach, it will likely confront obstacles. One obstacle concerns the availability of MRAPs that could be provided to North African forces. A number of European countries, including the U.K. and the Netherlands, purchased MRAPs or other mine-protected vehicles in the past decade in response to the use of IEDs by insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the number of MRAPs purchased by European countries pales in comparison to the nearly 28,000 MRAPs that the U.S. has procured since 2007.\textsuperscript{309} European countries may lack surplus MRAPs to provide to North African countries.

Establishing a counter-IED intelligence center could also be challenging, given North African intelligence agencies’ limited resources. Successful counter-IED network operations require robust ISR that enables analysts to identify cells and effectively disseminate intelligence packages to operators. Tunisia’s weak ISR system would be a clear limiting factor in this intelligence process. Consequently, North African ISR capabilities would likely have to be strengthened in conjunction with the establishment of a JIEDDO-like counter-IED center.

**Regional Security Option #4: A North African Center of Excellence**

A Center of Excellence (CoE) is an intelligence center that operates in a manner similar to a think tank, but is usually set up within a nation’s government—thus making its role less academic, and instead making it a focal point of strategic analyses. The CoE is action-oriented, but its function is less tactical than other divisions of the government’s defense sector. In this way, the CoE is intended to shape and guide policy at the doctrinal and strategic levels while also developing expertise and building capacity in key areas.

A Center of Excellence operating in and focused on North Africa could prove valuable for the region. The EU could help facilitate the establishment of a CoE. Since a North African CoE would require the cooperation of several states in the region, it would not only be an inter-agency institution, but also an inter-country one. The U.S.’s Afghanistan-Pakistan Center of Excellence, established under the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Central Command in 2009, provides a possible blueprint for a CoE in North Africa. The purpose of DoD’s AfPak CoE is to garner independent primary research and generate independent policy analyses to inform

\textsuperscript{308} “U.S. to Give Tunisia $60m in Military Aid,” Al Jazeera, August 26, 2014.

DoD’s initiatives and actions in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. A CoE established in North Africa could serve a similar function.

If EU states work to establish a CoE in North Africa, one critical question is the overarching purpose of the CoE. On the low end of things, it may simply be a place for discussion about best practices and doctrinal issues, rather than a forum for intelligence-sharing and policy decision-making. A more robust CoE would do more to integrate operations. However, while a North African CoE designed to facilitate intelligence-sharing would have significant utility, there would be obstacles to its establishment. First, the EU has not previously played such a role in establishing a CoE in regions beset by crisis. As such, it would be instructive for the EU to turn to some of the U.S.’s CoEs as models—though this must be done cautiously, as the United States has been most successful at running its CoEs under a single defense department to focus on problem areas, rather than at creating a viable CoE in conjunction with the governments of an external region.

Second, there has been regional resistance to intelligence-sharing in the past. In 2003, the Bamako Conference convened intelligence officers from several North African states. Urged by U.S. agencies, the intent was to systematize intelligence-sharing and create a counterterrorism task force. However, the African states were not ready to cooperate, as they still viewed their terrorism problems as separate and distinct. Further, lack of trust between the various intelligence serves may preclude the sharing of information. However, one recent signal that some North African countries may be ready for greater counterterrorism cooperation can be seen in Morocco’s agreement to increase its intelligence-sharing with Saudi Arabia.310

Regional Security Option #5: Supporting Migration and Border Security Initiatives

Porous North African borders. Porous borders in North Africa provide VNSAs with significant freedom of movement. VNSAs have exploited weak border security to expand their networks into, and develop safe havens in, weakly governed territory. Porous borders thus have hampered counterterrorism and counter-network operations in North Africa.

The deterioration of security in Libya in particular presents new security challenges for North African countries. VNSAs have exploited the absence of border controls in Libya to transit arms, contraband goods, and fighters across the region. Consequently, securing their borders with Libya has become a focal point for other North African states, which have deployed contingents of troops and intelligence assets to their borders with Libya to limit spillover and border infiltrations.311

Though Algeria’s security forces are better equipped than many other regional militaries, it would have trouble securing its vast borders without other regional partners playing a role. Consequently, Algeria has worked to strengthen Tunisia’s border control capacity, providing Tunisia with intelligence derived from thermal camera technology that Algeria has

311 “Tunisia and Algeria Send Military Reinforcements to Borders with Libya,” Libya Herald, February 18, 2015.
deployed to the Tunisian border.\textsuperscript{312} Algerian security officials are also considering building a 120-kilometer long electric fence on the Libyan border, and surging troops to the border region.\textsuperscript{313} Algerian also faces a growing from its border with Niger, where jihadist activity and drug smuggling has intensified recently.\textsuperscript{314}

Tunisia faces a number of challenges in securing its borders. Pervasive smuggling of contraband and weapons from Libya has presented a particularly daunting problem. Regional security analyst Imad Mesdoua recently noted that Tunisia lacks the border control capacity to address the growing threat from Libya, and asserted that Tunisian security forces are “playing a game of catch-up now in terms of experience and learning” with regard to preventing infiltration from Libya.\textsuperscript{315} Tunisia’s struggles to secure its borders are due in part to structural in Tunisia’s security sector. Tunisia lacks effective interagency coordination of border security responsibilities, as the military, national guard, and customs all claim jurisdiction over border security.\textsuperscript{316} Corruption also undercuts Tunisia’s border security efforts, as many border officials benefit financially from the smuggling of contraband across Tunisia’s borders.\textsuperscript{317}

Despite these obstacles, Tunisia has made some strides in strengthening its border security. In an effort to address cross-border smuggling, the Tunisian government has established a buffer zone along the country’s border with Libya and Algeria.\textsuperscript{318} Tunisia is also considering creating a border protection command to improve interagency coordination.\textsuperscript{319}

Egypt also faces border security challenges. The country’s thousand-kilometer border with Libya is a particular problem, given the flow of arms and militants across the Libyan border into Egypt.\textsuperscript{320} With Libya’s HoR government in Tobruk largely incapable of securing its side of the border, Egypt has taken a number of unilateral steps to shore up its border with Libya. In May 2014, Egypt temporarily sealed the border with Libya, and in December of the same year, it closed the Salloum border crossing.\textsuperscript{321} Egypt has also taken steps to secure its border with the Gaza Strip, which has become a growing point of concern as jihadist activity has intensified in the northern Sinai. The Egyptian military recently expanded its buffer zone on the border with Gaza to prevent militants from building tunnels to smuggle weapons and fighters in and out of Gaza.\textsuperscript{322}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{313} Mary Atkinson, “A New Walled Border for Algeria and Libya?”, \textit{Middle East Eye}, October 4, 2014.
\bibitem{317} Ibid.
\bibitem{318} Ibid.
\bibitem{319} Ibid.
\bibitem{320} Mustafa Bassiouni, “Will Egypt’s Military Intervene to Secure Libyan Border?”, \textit{Al-Safr} (republished in \textit{Al-Monitor}), August 8, 2014.
\bibitem{322} Adnan Abu Amer, “Egypt’s Buffer Zone Expansion Hurts Hamas’ Arms Supplies,” \textit{Al-Monitor}, January 9, 2015.
\end{thebibliography}
Past European initiatives. Thus far, European initiatives to strengthen North African states’ border capabilities have yielded mixed results. Civil conflict between warring factions in Libya has undermined the European Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya), a program intended to strengthen Libya’s border management capabilities. The Council of the European Union announced the launch of EUBAM in May 2013, with the EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Catherine Ashton, noting that the establishment of EUBAM came out of a “direct request” from the Libyan government for border management assistance. EUBAM was tasked with providing support, mentoring and training to Libyan border authorities on best practices for border control and regulation. In its early months, EUBAM conducted frequent trainings with Libyan border management officials at checkpoints throughout the country. But pervasive civil conflict has severely restricted EUBAM’s activities in Libya, and raised questions about the mission’s feasibility. In July 2014, EUBAM evacuated all remaining personnel operating in Tripoli to neighboring Tunisia, where EUBAM now is based. Although EUBAM continues to organize foreign study trips for Libyan border officials, its operations have been seriously curtailed. An EU options paper released in January 2015 suggested that suspending the EUBAM mission temporarily may be the best short-term option, and recommended shutting down the mission entirely if Libya’s security conditions continue to worsen.

Meanwhile, European migration programs relating to irregular migration from North Africa to Europe have done little to staunch the flow. The Italian government announced the launch of the Mare Nostrum operation in October 2013, after two shipwrecks off the coast of the Italian island of Lampedusa killed close to 400 migrants. Mare Nostrum allowed Italian navy ships and helicopters to drastically expand their search and rescue missions. However, the economic sustainability of the Mare Nostrum operation was soon called into question: Monthly operating costs reached €9 million, straining Italy’s limited financial resources. Immigration officials and NGOs also debated Mare Nostrum’s impact on migrant flows. Some European officials asserted that Mare Nostrum provided an incentive for migrants to take the perilous trip across the Mediterranean to Europe. The U.K. Foreign Office stated in October 2014 that it no longer supported search and rescue missions, noting that Mare Nostrum created “an unintended ‘pull factor’, encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and thereby leading to more tragic and unnecessary deaths.” Some reports indicated that smugglers in Libya and Egypt gave migrants satellite phones, and instructed them to inform the Italian coastguard of their impending arrival once they were an hour from the North African shore. An Italian navy official cynically called Mare Nostrum a “taxi service” to Europe.

324 Ibid.
329 Nick Miller, “The Refugee Crisis in the Mediterranean is a Story of Death and Desperation.” Sydney Morning Herald, October 31, 2014.
The combination of economic strain and concerns among officials ultimately prompted Italy to shut down Mare Nostrum. In October 2014, Italy formally ended the operation, although the Italian government promised that it would maintain a reduced presence in the Mediterranean. In its place, Frontex announced the launch of Operation Triton, whose mandate—which focuses primarily on border control, and limits navy patrols to within 30 miles of the Italian coastline—is more restricted than Mare Nostrum’s had been. Operation Triton comes at a lower cost than Mare Nostrum, and also reduces the incentives to migrate that Mare Nostrum had created. However, humanitarian officials and organizations have expressed concerns that Operation Triton’s reduced area of operations places migrants at greater risk.

_Policy options for EU states._ The EU can play a role in strengthening North African border security, building indigenous capacity and enhancing technical expertise on border management issues. There are two primary ways in which the EU can achieve these objectives. First, the EU can help establish a pan-North African border agency that will coordinate regional border control policies, identify best practices, and lead trainings for North African countries’ border agencies. Second, the EU can develop bilateral border control assistance programs, similar to the EUBAM mission in Libya, to build North African countries’ border control capacity through trainings and provision of technical expertise.

A pan-North African border organization would likely be modeled after Frontex, the EU’s border agency that “helps border authorities from different EU countries work together” and promotes, coordinates, and develops European border management. Frontex’s tasks include joint operations, training, risk analysis, research, providing rapid response capabilities, assisting member states in joint return operations, information systems, and information sharing environments. Frontex also conducts intelligence analysis on border security issues, and consults with individual states on operational planning, policy implementation, and program evaluation. Because Frontex does not replace member states’ border control authorities, but rather helps to coordinate among them and build capacity, North African countries wary of ceding control of security to a supranational entity may be amenable to the establishment of a Frontex-like agency.

Bilateral border programs between the EU and North African countries may be modeled after the European Union Border Assistance Mission in Libya. Though EUBAM’s work has been suspended because of Libya’s civil conflict, the EUBAM model nonetheless could serve as a blueprint for future bilateral initiatives.

There are obstacles to successful implementation of both EUBAM and Frontex-type programs. For one, North African security institutions may be hesitant to collaborate with one another on border policy, whereas the Frontex program’s success owes a great deal to EU member states’ willingness to collaborate with one another. Further, helping to stand up and coordinate a massive initiative like Frontex in North Africa could impose massive economic costs on EU states. The logistical challenges to creating such a program for North

---

331 Ibid.
333 Ibid.
Africa could also be significant, as regional integration in Europe is much greater than it is in North Africa.

Regional Political Option #1: Launching Anti-Corruption Reforms

Addressing corruption in North Africa is one of the biggest challenges for EU practitioners, in large part because corruption is so deeply embedded in the region’s political culture. Several factors contribute to high levels of corruption in North Africa, such as chronic insecurity, lack of access to information, weak legal frameworks, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, and nepotism. It is unlikely that any EU policy will address all of these issues simultaneously.

Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt all experience significant levels of corruption. According to Transparency International’s rankings of the perception of corruption in 175 countries (the country ranked first being seen as the least corrupt), Tunisia ranks 79th, Egypt ranks 94th, and Algeria ranks 100th. Algeria has, however, made recent strides to address corruption, launching a number of high-level prosecutions, including one targeting a former energy minister. Tunisia has made some progress in addressing corruption after the fall of Ben Ali’s regime, but structural political issues, including a weak judiciary, have limited the effectiveness of anti-corruption initiatives. Conversely, Egypt has made little progress in reducing corruption.

Though changing North African political culture will be challenging, EU practitioners have a number of tools that can spur corruption reform. Anti-corruption initiatives such as Transparency International’s National Integrity System in European Neighborhood South countries, are already underway in North Africa. The National Integrity System program, which is funded by the European Commission, assesses key areas of a country’s governance system related to corruption, and provides final evaluations and recommendations to civil society and government leaders. The EU can build on this initiative by providing and funding training programs, and by pressuring North African countries to become more transparent.

Regional Political Option #2: Counter-Islamic State Messaging Campaign

By declaring that it had re-established the caliphate, the Islamic State largely staked its legitimacy to the caliphate’s continuing viability. The group’s well-known slogan \textit{baqiyah wa tatamaddad} (staying and expanding) is indicative of the importance of territoriality to IS. As IS experiences military losses in Iraq and Syria, it has to find new opportunities for growth.

---


338 Ibid., p. 6.


340 Ibid.

Africa has become a critical theater for IS’s growth, such that Africa was the central theme of the eighth issue of its English-language magazine *Dabiq*, released on March 30, 2015—and, even more significant to North Africa, the image on the cover was Uqba ibn Nafi’s mosque in Kairouan, Tunisia.

Indeed, North Africa boasts an array of jihadist groups. Some of them have a large number of foot soldiers who fought alongside IS in the Syria theater, and thus may be susceptible to IS recruitment appeals. In addition, by providing a jihadist entity that can compete with al-Qaeda, IS provides an alternative for disgruntled or alienated al-Qaeda members. The pledge of *bayat* that IS secured from AQIM’s Central Zone is an example of this phenomenon. Moreover, some regional governments struggle to project power internally, a fact that IS can exploit to carve out areas of influence.

An effective counter-messaging campaign is one important part of limiting IS’s influence in North Africa. After all, much of the reason IS has been able to spread so rapidly relates to its ability to communicate effectively, particularly over social media, and fashion a brand that is attractive to other jihadists and the movement’s sympathizers. Much of IS’s expansion, particularly in Africa, has been based on exaggerations of its own capabilities. For example, in Libya, where social media penetration is minimal and granular information regarding local dynamics is often lacking, a local IS affiliate was able to persuade major news outlets to report that IS had come to control the entire city of Derna. In reality, Derna is divided between various jihadist groups, some of whom are directly at odds with IS. Because exaggerations, and even outright fabrications, have been an essential part of IS’s communications strategy, their messaging is vulnerable to refutation and disruption—yet thus far Western states have been ineffective at countering IS’s messaging.

An EU counter-IS messaging campaign would entail providing information to civil society actors, primarily journalists and other members of the media, that can disrupt IS’s messaging. The information that European policymakers would provide to the media would fall into the following categories that could disrupt the Islamic State’s communications strategies:

- Exposing IS’s fabrications and exaggerations, demonstrating that the group does not have the kind of momentum that it claims. EU policymakers can provide information to civil society actors about concrete losses and other setbacks that IS has experienced.
- Demonstrating that the caliphate’s governance is poor, and that life under its rule is full of hardships.
- Revealing IS atrocities that the group would prefer to keep hidden. While IS has proudly displayed certain atrocities, such as the beheading of its victims, the group seems to prefer keeping other acts it has committed—such as mass killings—out of sight.

---

344 See, e.g., Benoît Faucon and Matt Bradley, “Islamic State Gained Strength in Libya by Co-Opting Local Jihadists,” *Wall Street Journal*, February 17, 2015 (claiming that IS “controls Derna, along with pockets of the Sirte region”).
345 A granular analysis of how a counter-IS messaging campaign would be conducted is beyond the scope of this study. However, two of the study’s authors, Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, are currently working on a study for the consulting firm Wikistrat that examines this question in detail.
• Reporting instances where poor character is demonstrated by IS’s leadership or foot soldiers, thus undermining the narrative of IS’s virtuosity.

• Highlighting the reports of defectors and others with knowledge of the battlefield showing that life in IS’s army is not the glamorous adventure that it is made out to be, but rather is frequently tedious and menial.

Sometimes EU member states can be the voice pushing this message forward, while other times civil society voices can do so after they consider the information the EU provides, and make their own decisions about its veracity. The primary goal of a counter-narrative campaign would be to mitigate the Islamic State’s communications advantage. A coordinated European counter-IS messaging campaign focusing on North Africa could counteract IS’s claims of its centrality and growth by depicting areas where the group is only a marginal player, and showing where IS’s portrayal of itself is contradicted by facts on the ground.

This messaging campaign would have two major target audiences: other jihadist groups in North Africa and European radicals who could potentially join the Islamic State. The first cohort, non-IS jihadist groups in North Africa, may be the most critical audience. IS is likely to thrive in North Africa only if it can attract other jihadists in the region, either by peeling away disgruntled members or by prompting entire groups to join (as it did in the case of Sinai-based militant organization Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis). Demonstrations of IS’s weakness and exaggerations would be designed to cut off its growth before it hits a critical mass. For the second target audience, European residents susceptible to IS’s appeal, the EU’s messaging goal would be to discourage Europeans from traveling to the region to join IS affiliated groups.

One obstacle to this approach is the question of whether European governments are seen as credible voices by the target audience. Nicholas Rasmussen, director of the U.S.’s National Counterterrorism Center, has noted that “the government is probably not the best platform to try to communicate with the set of actors who are potentially vulnerable to this kind of propaganda and this kind of recruitment.” This is why part of the proposed campaign would be conducted by pushing relevant information to civil-society actors. Another problem with this approach is that by highlighting the Islamic State’s limitations in North Africa, participating states would risk inadvertently strengthening other jihadist groups in the region, including those aligned with al-Qaeda (by reducing the risk that these groups would defect from their previous networks). Thus, embarking on this messaging campaign would entail the determination that the problems posed by IS’s brutal methods outweigh the benefits of the discord sown in the jihadist movement by competition within the ranks.

**Regional Economic Option #1: Structural Economic Reforms**

North Africa faces a series of structural economic issues that require new policies. As a recent World Bank report has shown, these problems consist of a lack of competition in the economy, biased access to the economy, excessive government subsidies, and the inhibition of trade liberalization. This has resulted in a plethora of societal problems, including high youth unemployment. While some attempts have been made to address these issues, more action is needed.

---

The EU may have leverage via trade agreements and aid packages to encourage North African countries to adopt policies that would boost their economies. The major kind of trade agreement that could give the EU leverage in encouraging North African structural reforms is a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement (DCFTA). The EU has negotiated and implemented a DCFTA with Morocco, and has begun to discuss possible DCFTAs with Tunisia and Egypt.

EU states can encourage North African countries to remove the barriers that exist to market entry, in order to create a more competitive environment that can foster economic growth. If more firms are allowed to participate in the market, that would help boost job creation. EU states can also encourage development of the private sector, and the expansion of its role in the economy. Increased economic competition is only possible if governments take a step back from too much direct intervention into their economies. The establishment of an independent competitive authority may be an option, with the purpose of ensuring that no company secures too much preferential treatment from the government.

Another economic policy that EU states can encourage is for North African governments to lower their spending on energy subsidies. Most countries in the region spend a significant amount of their budget on these subsidies. For example, Egypt was spending almost 30% of its total budget on energy subsidies as of April 2014, which put an undue strain on the government’s spending. While one might assume that these subsidies are helping the entire population of the countries that have implemented them, the reality is that it disproportionately benefits a few large firms that can afford to make large investments in energy-intensive industries. While higher energy prices will have an impact on the public, overall a reduction in spending on subsidies will give governments more spending power to strengthen other programs that can boost economic growth.

Finally, a policy needs to be implemented to make the financial sector of these countries more efficient. This can be done through restructuring state-owned banks and their role in the economy. Two foremost policy options are privatization of the state-owned banks and consolidation of multiple state-owned banks into a single, larger bank. Now that this section has outlined general issues related to structural economic reform in the region, it turns to specific policy options for both Tunisia and Egypt.

Structural economic reforms in Tunisia. Structural reform of the Tunisian economy is an ongoing process. Recent reforms indicate some progress, but the country is still in dire need of further reform. Though many observers championed Tunisia’s apparent economic success under Ben Ali’s regime as an “economic miracle,” in fact this miracle was a mirage masking deep-seated corruption and cronyism with which the country continues to grapple.

Tunisia has had long-standing trade relations with the EU. In 2011, discussions began about the possible passage of a DCFTA between the EU and Tunisia, and this process is ongoing. A DCFTA would give Tunisia preferential access to the EU market, and vice versa. The agreement would provide Tunisia with trade advantages with the EU that are not available to

countries that have not signed DCFTAs, and would facilitate greater integration between the Tunisian economy and the EU economy.

The European Commission commissioned a trade sustainability assessment for Tunisia in 2013, outlining the potential impacts of a DCFTA. The assessment concluded that a DCFTA would result in a higher national income for both Tunisia and the EU, resulting in GDP growth of about 7% in the long run for Tunisia. Additionally, a DCFTA would result in increased trade between the two economies by about 25% in the long run.\textsuperscript{351}

Despite the advantages of a DCFTA, many aspects of the Tunisian economy require adjustment. The first area that requires adjustment is the removal of barriers to competition. According to the World Bank, “the leading thread of the new government’s action should be to move from a rent- to a competition-driven economy to the benefit of the Tunisian population at large.”\textsuperscript{352} Tunisia has a Competition Authority, but its effectiveness is limited due to the institution’s legal framework, which allows it to grant monopoly exemptions without careful research and analysis.\textsuperscript{353} One change that can bolster the Competition Authority is including it in the constitution as an independent administrative authority, while adding clauses to both decrease its minister’s authority to grant exemptions and to increase the transparency of its decisions. Currently the institution can grant exemptions to allow certain monopolies without publishing a report rationalizing the decision. Such changes could make the Competition Authority’s decisions less arbitrary, thus facilitating competition in the economy.\textsuperscript{354} The EU has leverage to encourage this modification because the absence of a competitive economic environment is a major roadblock to establishing a DCFTA with Tunisia.

\textit{Structural reforms in Egypt.} Egypt faces a number of economic problems, including high energy and food subsidies, weak public finance management, and inefficient tax laws.\textsuperscript{355} The IMF carried out a consultation in November 2014 on Egypt’s economic status of Egypt, the first assessment of Egypt conducted by the fund since the 2011 uprising. The consultation concluded that the economic reforms Egypt had undertaken put the country on the right track. These reforms included a cut in energy subsidies, and a decline in its current account deficit as a result of aid Egypt received from the Gulf states.\textsuperscript{356} Both of these changes have helped Egypt grow its budget and save money. However, the recent drop in oil prices has raised questions about how much more funding Gulf states will provide Egypt in the near future.

A DCFTA between the EU and Egypt is being negotiated. The agreement would benefit Egypt’s economy, though its impact on the EU would be less significant. An independent assessment concluded that implementation of the DCFTA would cause Egypt’s national income to increase by €2,300 million in the short run and €3,400 million in the long run.\textsuperscript{357}

\textsuperscript{352} World Bank, \textit{Advancing Tunisia’s Global Integration}, June 25, 2014, p. 15.
\textsuperscript{353} Ibid., p. 33.
\textsuperscript{354} Ibid., p. 59.
Regional Economic Option #2: Address Unemployment

One of the major economic issues in North Africa is unemployment, particularly youth unemployment. These high unemployment rates stem from a variety of causes, including the diminishing availability of public sector jobs, a small private sector, a large informal economy, and a lack of appropriate education for existing job markets. This section now turns to the specific unemployment problems faced in Tunisia and Egypt.

Unemployment in Tunisia. The World Bank has reported that Tunisia faced an unemployment rate of 15.3% at the end of 2013. Tunisian youth (ages 15-24) account for 40% of the unemployed population. This issue is a result of the poor business climate in Tunisia, which discourages investment by private firms. There is also a skills mismatch in the labor market: There is “a surplus of skilled labor that is not rightly adapted to the needs of the labor market and a shortage of unskilled and semiskilled labor.” Tunisians also generally prefer employment in the public sector because it offers job stability, as well as better pay and benefits than Tunisia’s limited private sector.

Tunisia currently has a few labor market programs managed by its National Employment Agency, which is designed to provide counseling and training programs. The EU could work with this institution to craft policies that would better align the training Tunisian youths with the labor market’s needs. For example, a significant portion of Tunisia’s unemployed youth are educated, but many of them studied the humanities, health, and social sciences. In contrast, Tunisia’s economy needs more members of the labor force who have prepared to work in telecommunications and financial services, but the universities generally do not produce graduates to work in them. Vocational education and training programs could also help to solve the skills mismatch in the labor market.

Unemployment in Egypt. At the end of 2014, the unemployment rate in Egypt was 12.9%, and 63% of the unemployed population were young people between the ages of 12 and 29. Like Tunisia, Egypt has a skills mismatch in the labor market. The EU can provide vocational education and training for youth. Egypt and the EU have explored the idea of creating a technical and vocational education and training program with the objective of providing the necessary skills for the labor market.

Overall, much of the youth unemployment in North Africa stems from a paralyzed private sector, a disconnect between the education system and labor market, and a public sector that plays an outsized role. The EU can help to address these imbalances.

362 Ibid.
363 Ibid.
364 Ibid.
Regional Economic Option #3: Improving EU Investment in North Africa

To bolster North African economies, the EU can encourage direct investment by European companies. The EU can offer investment incentives to EU companies to establish operations in North Africa, including tax exemptions, preferential tariffs, exemption from regulations, and property subsidies. European businesses may also be enticed to invest in North Africa because labor costs in the region are lower than in Europe. To further encourage investment in North Africa, the EU could partner with regional governments in producing public messaging campaigns outlining the benefits of investment in the region.

European investment in North Africa has drawbacks, though. Europeans may react unfavorably to policies that promote outsourcing rather than creation of jobs in Europe. Additionally, despite the lower costs associated with outsourcing, North African workers may lack the technical skills and education necessary to perform the responsibilities expected of them in certain European industries.

Another potential problem is the security situation in North Africa, a factor that may deter companies from setting up operations in the region. Areas of North Africa remain potentially dangerous to personnel due to the possibility of attacks on company facilities. As the recent attack on the Bardo museum in Tunis shows, even relatively stable countries are not completely safe—and Westerners will be a foremost target.

Migration and Border Security Policy Options

The EU can choose from a range of options aimed at addressing the flow of irregular migrants into Europe from North Africa. The policies the EU can implement include tightening asylum policies and accelerating repatriation of irregular migrants to home countries or third countries, enhancing land border security measures within the Schengen Area by modifying the Schengen agreement, and establishing a naval blockade in the Mediterranean that would return migrants to their point of departure.

EU member states’ irregular migration policies. Though the EU sets most immigration and border control policies for its member states, member countries looking to deter irregular migration may reduce refugee benefits, toughen asylum policies, and impose barriers for refugees and migrants seeking permanent residency. Some member states have even appealed to the European Parliament to allow them to modify the freedom-of-movement policies that make up the bedrock of the Schengen system. These proposals rest partly on the theory that irregular migrants, including those departing from North Africa, abuse the freedom-of-movement principle by entering into southern Europe and then settling in northern European countries that offer robust welfare systems and social services.

Though the Dublin Regulation states that asylum seekers must remain in the first European country they enter throughout the asylum process, many migrants leave detention centers in Italy and Greece without being documented, and make their way to wealthier countries, where they then apply for asylum.366 In 2012, northern European countries reported that they

had registered 70% of all asylum seekers in the EU. Consequently, such states as France and Germany are among the strongest advocates for reforming Schengen Area immigration policies. Some European politicians have also couched recent calls for modifications to the Schengen Area rules in counterterrorism and counter-trafficking terms. Since the notorious January 2015 attack on the French publication Charlie Hebdo, both France and Spain have called for the reestablishment of national border controls in response to the terrorist threat. They argue that free-movement policies allow terrorists and criminals to move unfettered through the EU. These assertions have been challenged, however, by some European analysts who claim there is little evidence that jihadists have exploited freedom of movement within the Schengen Area to conduct attacks or evade surveillance, and instead point to poor intelligence-sharing between EU countries.

EU member states have also adopted some unilateral border control measures in response to irregular migration. In 2011, the French government placed guards on the Italian border to deter Tunisian migrants, many of whom were economic migrants who had taken advantage of political turmoil in Tunisia and relaxation of border controls to flee to Italy. This move was deemed legal by the European Commission, though Italy condemned it as a breach of the Schengen Agreement. Similarly, in June 2011, Denmark reestablished customs controls on its borders with Sweden and Germany—a move intended to mollify the Danish People’s Party, a right-wing political party that campaigned to tighten immigration policies in Denmark.

However, absent comprehensive EU-wide migration reform, efforts by member countries to tighten border controls or reduce social welfare benefits to migrants will instead shift irregular migration flows, and the attendant economic and social burdens that accompany migration, to other countries within the Schengen Area that have more lenient migration policies. Individual states may still determine that tighter border controls are in their own interest, but implementing such policies may not reduce irregular migration to the EU as a whole.

EU bloc irregular migration policies. The EU’s existing external border policies have been largely ineffective at reducing irregular migration from North Africa. Italy’s Mare Nostrum naval operation, which was previously described, reduced migrant deaths and was celebrated as a humanitarian initiative, but if anything it caused migration inflows to increase. Operation Triton, the EU-led program that replaced Mare Nostrum in October 2014, focused resources on border security and reduced the scope of search and rescue operations to within a

---

371 Ibid.
30-mile radius off the Italian Coast, while decreasing the amount of naval assets involved in the mission.\textsuperscript{374}

This downsized border security initiative does not appear to have had a deterrent effect on irregular migration from North Africa: Frontex’s executive director noted in February 2015 that irregular crossings into Europe at all border points since January 1, 2015 were the highest ever recorded, and voiced concerns that this could be a record year for irregular migration.\textsuperscript{375}

The most heavy-handed option for EU policymakers would entail the establishment of a naval blockade in the Mediterranean Sea. Under this policy, EU member states would deploy naval assets to the “high seas” (non-territorial waters), where they would intercept migrant boats and escort them back to North African shores. The imposition of such a blockade would be legally controversial under the EU’s non-refoulement principle, which prevents EU states from repatriating asylum-seekers to a country where a migrant could be exposed to torture, persecution or degrading treatment. Further, the imposition of a naval blockade would be resource-intensive, as it would require the deployment of significant naval assets, as well as surveillance and intelligence components. Even the Mare Nostrum operation, which was not as robust as a naval blockade, was prohibitively expensive, costing Italy €9 million per month.\textsuperscript{376} A naval blockade may also have the unintended consequence of encouraging migrants to resort to increasingly dangerous smuggling methods to avoid detection. This could then result in higher numbers of migrant deaths.

An alternative option would be to allow migrants to apply for asylum while living abroad. This policy, which the European Commission briefly proposed in December 2013 amid a surge in irregular migration from North Africa, could reduce irregular migration and human smuggling by ensuring that those offered asylum would travel to Europe by legal channels.\textsuperscript{377} However, migrants living under particularly dire conditions—whether political or economic—may still choose to take the treacherous trip to Europe.

Another option would be to tighten EU-wide restrictions for asylum seekers, thus deterring migrants from making the trip to Europe. Currently, EU member states have considerable autonomy in setting asylum regulations, resulting in variations in asylum policy. But if a pan-EU asylum system is developed, policymakers could implement strict restrictions that could impose barriers to some migrants filing for asylum in Europe. Doing so would resolve the current discrepancies in asylum policy between EU member states—which has resulted in an influx of asylum-seekers to countries with lenient policies—and could discourage irregular migration to Europe.

There are limitations to this approach. For one, EU member states may be unwilling to cede total control of asylum policy to the EU. Second, toughening asylum policy for economic...
migrants will do little to address the influx of refugees from war-torn countries like Syria and Somalia. And tightening asylum policies could also have the second-order effect of driving economic migrants into hiding, thus fostering the growth of undocumented migrants.
Conclusion

Since the Arab Spring protests of 2011, the political environment in North Africa has been characterized by insecurity and volatility. While the regimes in Morocco and Algeria managed to endure the region’s political turmoil, the revolutions in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt have had vastly different outcomes. Tunisia has long been considered the lone success story of the Arab Spring, with a relatively stable transition to democracy—albeit one that is increasingly threatened by regional instability, as can be seen in the recent attack on the Bardo museum. Conversely, Egypt's counter-revolution has essentially restored the political order that existed during the Mubarak regime, even while challenges from jihadist groups in the Sinai pose a growing threat to security. Meanwhile, Libya's post-revolution implosion has served as a cautionary tale. The civil conflict now ravaging Libya has left the country deeply fragmented and insecure.

Instability in “Europe's Southern Neighborhood” poses an array of threats to Europe’s physical and economic security. The transnational terrorist threat emanating from North Africa has increased dramatically, due in large part to the deterioration of security in Libya. State weakness in Libya has also created a fertile environment for drug traffickers and human smugglers, who are now sending unprecedented numbers of irregular migrants on dangerous journeys across the Mediterranean Sea to Europe.

While Libya’s security situation makes it of chief concern to European practitioners, political and economic volatility in the rest of the region also threatens Europe’s strategic interests. Thus, this study has provided a menu of policy options—including security, political reform, economic reform, and border options—for European decision-makers to consider when seeking to address North Africa’s myriad threats.

It is increasingly apparent that instability in North Africa will pose long-term challenges. Addressing these challenges will require a multifaceted approach that includes economic, political, and security engagement with North African state and non-state partners. This approach must be both preventive (i.e., strengthening North African state institutions and helping states to rectify local grievances in order to preempt domestic instability) and also reactive (i.e., mitigating existing threats and reducing European vulnerability). We hope that this report succeeds in providing practitioners with a starting point for the implementation of a comprehensive, multidimensional strategy.