Alerts
9 July 2026

The Idaksahak in the Malian Peace Process

With Whom to Make Peace?

Menaka - Mali, October 2007
In short
  • JNIM–FLA offensives since April 2026 expose the fragility of peacebuilding in Mali
  • Mali's Tuareg revolt, Islamist insurgency, and intercommunal conflicts are inextricably linked and must be addressed together
  • The Idaksahak, dominant in the Menaka region, illustrate this interrelatedness
  • Bamako's peace process offers some pathways to reconciliation but is undermined by the exclusion of armed opposition and civil society

On 25 April 2026, the separatist Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and militant Islamist Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) unleashed a wave of attacks across Malian territory. They killed key government figures, captured strategic towns, and plunged the country into turmoil. On 4 July 2026, the two groups struck again, hitting Aguelhok, Anefis, Gao, Sevaré and a prison near Bamako. Mali’s fragile order stands once again on the brink, with peace a distant prospect. This commentary analyses the peace process spearheaded by Bamako since the international community’s withdrawal in 2023. It does so by focusing on one northern Malian community and its place within local politics and peacebuilding: the Idaksahak.

A historically nomadic and pastoralist people, the Idaksahak are part of Tuareg society despite speaking a distinct language. They constitute the dominant group in Menaka and Ansongo and likely number 100,000 to 150,000 people. Originally a vassal tribe of the Iwellemmedan Tuareg, they rose in prominence in the 1990s through involvement in militia networks.1 Today Idaksahak society sits at a crossroads between several competing political trends: independentism, loyalism to Bamako, and militant Islamism. Together, these three forces define the local political climate and make this community a useful proxy for northern Mali writ large.

This article therefore looks at the main actors behind these tendencies and their place within current peacebuilding efforts, from the Idaksahak perspective. Through this lens, it becomes clearer how Mali’s ‘Peace and Reconciliation’ process risks being undermined by its selective engagement with armed groups.

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Authors

External authors

Camille Schenkenberg - Research Assistant at the Clingendael Institute